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ARGUMENT AND THE RECOGNITION OF ŚIVA: THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF UTPALADEVA AND ABHINAVAGUPTA

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Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya,* and the Buddhist-Naiyāyika debates. He became a member of my committee in 1986.

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ABBREVIATIONS

APS	*Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* by Utpaladeva
BIPV	*Bhāskarī*, by Bhāskara, commentary on IPV
DMS	*Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra*, falsely attributed to Śaṅkara
DMSM	*Mānasollāsa*, commentary on DMS, falsely attributed to Sureśvara
IPK	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* by Utpaladeva
IPKV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* by Utpaladeva, commentary on IPK
IS	*Īśvarasiddhi* by Utpaladeva
IPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on IPK
IPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*
SN	*Spandanirṇaya* by Ksemarāja, commentary on *Spanda Kārikās*
SS	*Sambandhasiddhi* by Utpaladeva
TA	*Tantrāloka* by Abhinavagupta
TAV	*Tantrālokaviveka* by Jayaratha, commentary on TA
TS	*Tantrasāra* by Abhinavagupta
VPP	*Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* by Virūpākṣanātha
VPPV	*Virūpākṣapañcāśikāvṛtti* by Vidyācakravartin, commentary on VPP

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> In fact, one may—this simple proposition, which is often forgotten, should be placed at the beginning of every study which essays to deal with rationalism—rationalize life from fundamentally different basic points of view and in very different directions. Rationalism is an historical concept which covers a whole world of different things.
>
> Max Weber
> *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

The problems of interpretation, relativism and rationality, major Western dilemmas at least since the Enlightenment, are especially critical to the discipline of the history of religions or comparative religion. This is brought out through considering the two main roots of the discipline. The first is the interpretive posture of largely Christian natural theology regarding other "religions" of the world. Among the classic early reflections on this posture is Paul's acknowledgement of some, albeit misguided, approach towards God by the gentiles.[1] Also of basic importance are the myths of the *logos spermatikos* and the *prisci theologi,* by which the Church Fathers justified the incorporation of ideas from pagan philosophy and literature into Christian theology. We may further include in the natural-theological roots of the history of religions the

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[1]E.g., Romans 1:18-2:11, Acts 17.16-31. Some of the early Christian attitudes towards the Gentile religions are briefly summarized in Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History,* (New York: Scribner, 1975), 8-13. See the studies and expository articles on early Jewish and Christian attitudes in *Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology* 40 (October 1986).

transformations of these myths since the Renaissance, in which a primordial revelation has often been conceived as more independent of, or even at odds with, the Christian revelation/grace. In various ways such conceptions of religious truth developed in later romanticism, "occultism" and "perennialism."

The other major root of the history of religions may be described as a range of "modern" conceptions of scientific and historical rationality. Since the Renaissance, the realm of truth generally acknowledged to be preserved by religious tradition has increasingly been challenged and eroded by empirical science and humanistic scholarship. It is obvious that the criticism and marginalization of tradition was advanced not only by the forerunners of the hermeneutics of suspicion, but also by a number of secular theories of human life and culture which developed into the mainstreams of history, sociology, anthropology and psychology. In response, such diverse earlier thinkers as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, etc., were preoccupied with ways of reconciling the epistemological resources of tradition and the emerging modernity. Philosophy and theology attempted to recover the truth of religion by placing it and the ostensibly objective methods of science in their proper perspectives.

The varieties of formative *Religionswissenschaft* stand in continuity with the larger pattern of efforts of "retrieval." *Religionswissenschaft* attempted to authenticate much of the presumptiveness of the natural-theological understanding of religion *through the empirical method of science or history itself.* This is clearly evident in the effort to establish a sort of romantic theology through history and philology by the scholar often cited as the father of the discipline, Friedrich Max Muller.[2] The discipline,

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[2]Max Muller extended his agenda so far as attempting to account for the origin of religious understandings of the infinite in direct perception itself (rather than faith or any other special religious faculty). See "The Perception of the Infinite," in Friedrich

later often formulated in terms of the ostensibly nonnormative, descriptive ("empirical") methods of phenomenology, continued to pursue this synthetic agenda through the first three quarters of the twentieth century. It is central to all of the classic systematic-historical theories—of Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, etc. Although there are many differences in the details of formulations, the terms of inquiry have largely been those characterized by van der Leeuw—essence and manifestation. The scholar identifies some essential features of religion, from Christianity per se or his own personal synthesis (e.g., Eliade), and interprets all religious phenomena as manifesting its structures to different degrees.[3]

Though there are still natural-theological themes in the history of religions, e.g., in the writings of Eliadeans such as Charles Long and Lawrence Sullivan, by and large the grand synthetic agenda of the classic thinkers has been abjured. This has happened on the bases of the criticisms inherent in the "modern" search for empirical knowledge of culture analogous to that achieved in the physical sciences, as well as the "post-

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Max Muller, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (London: Longman's, Green & Co, 1880), 1-51. The following statement is typical: "... I maintain that religion, so far from being impossible, is inevitable, if only we are left in possession of our senses, such as we really find them, not such as they have been defined for us. Thus the issue is plain. We claim no special faculty, no special revelation. The only faculty we claim is perception, the only revelation we claim is history, or, as it is now called, historical evolution." Ibid., 32. Max Muller is mentioned here only as a widely cited foundational figure. Early forms of the program I am characterizing may be found in a great historical range of scholars, from Marsilio Ficino to Cornelius Petrus Tiele.

[3]This pattern also underlies scholarship in the area of "mysticism," inside and outside of the history of religions proper. It is of course found clearly in the perennialists, or those arguing for a common core of mystical experience, of such diverse sorts as Aldous Huxley, Frithjof Schuon, Huston Smith, Frits Staal, W.T. Stace, etc. It is notable that the best-known refutations of perennialism by Rudolf Otto and R.C. Zaehner equally rest upon a universalist model for natural theology. They simply increase the number of universal types. The more relativist interpretations of Stephen Katz and others forfeit the theological agenda.

modern" concern with problems of arbitration and interpretation between theoretical and ethical frameworks. In the shift of interpretive assumptions along with the mainstreams of contemporary Western academia, culture and religion have come to be viewed in terms of various forms of "projection" rather than manifestation.

It is easy to comprehend that universal phenomenological categories are not established on the basis of purely historical or philological judgements. The "evidence" of the statements and documents of people around the world can only reveal that they understand themselves in their own terms, and not as examples of foreign theological speculation. A succinct characterization of the down-to-earth, empirical agenda common in the history of religions today may be taken from the article by Frank Reynolds, "Maps, Models and Boundaries."[4] Reynolds delineates this agenda on the basis of three fundamental choices. He explains that the history of religions differs from theology, philosophy and ethics in that it is historical in method rather than normative.[5] It differs from focused historical (i.e., area) studies in that its reflections are universal and systematic rather than "parochial." It differs from the social sciences in that it is concerned with religion qua religion rather than the reduction of it to one or the other set of factors such as economics, social system, etc.[6] It was the effort of the discipline to

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[4]Frank E. Reynolds, "Maps, Models and Boundaries: Some Reflections on the Historical and Normative Elements in Religious Studies," *Criterion* (Winter 1981): 26-31.

[5]Reynolds explains that there are two valid perspectives on the relationship of the historical and the normative. The first generally emphasizes the presence of both historical and normative aspects throughout religious studies. That is, with respect to the case at hand, it observes the normative implications of all methods. The second emphasizes the distinction of the two approaches. Ibid., 26-27. We are considering the implications of the first perspective.

[6]Other notable examples of more historically oriented programs for the history of religions are those of Ugo Bianchi and Kurt Rudolf. Scholars have frequently used concepts such as "family resemblances" to refer to the empirically achieved, and

ground itself in more authentically historical knowledge which encouraged the addition of the plural s to the word religion in the title of the discipline.

The basic agenda accepted in the mainstream of current history of religions scholarship still runs into difficulties. What is it which is understood by a study of a number of patterns of which all ontological status ("essence") and normative implications are intended to be bracketed out? How can this be said to be a study of religion qua religion? In my opinion, even minimalist conceptions of "religions," "myths," "rituals," etc., actually do depend upon some ontological understanding of their referents. To the extent that the ahistorical is equated with the nonexistent,[7] such categories reflect a contemporary ontology of disenchantment or nihilism; the world is viewed as essentially without essence.[8]

In actual practice there has been a change of the interpretive direction of most history of religions scholarship from that of one to that of the other set of comparative-systematic alternatives. Most scholars have implicitly or explicitly allied themselves with one or more of the reductive approaches of the humanities or social sciences—literary criticism, structuralism, functionalism, Marxism, psychology, etc.[9] In many

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ostensibly nonontological generalizations of religious structures arrived at through such studies.

[7]As Ben-Ami Sharfstein has pointed out, the recourse to context to supply all the meanings of cultural phenomena may be a method of distanciation. "The Contextual Fallacy," in *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, ed. Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94.

[8]There may still be a motivating jouissance in a study articulating such a conception. In this respect an affinity may observed with the varieties of popular, aesthetic and noncommittal multi-culturalism.

[9]To an extent from recognition of the sorts of problems which I am endeavoring to characterize here, there have in recent years been moves back to cooperative efforts with the explicitly normative disciplines. Thus we have the inquiries into the relation of

ways these approaches are imitative of the ostensibly neutral physical science conception of truth in terms of verification. "Metaphysics," values, etc., tend to be viewed as epiphenomena, *projections,* of the scholars' favorite objective causal variables.[10] All these theories are as much an imposition of extrinsic categories to the worlds' cultures as any natural theology.

The quest in the history of religions for historical knowledge of religious phenomena, as unhindered as possible by scholars' preconceptions, stands in continuity with critical reflexivity about the role of interpretation in human experience throughout philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences. It may further be challenged by considering the radical nature of this problematic. The role of interpretation in the construction of human experience has been an increasing preoccupation of Western thought during the last few centuries, and took on a rigorous epistemological form especially through the philosophies of Hume and Kant. Different theories have drawn

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historical and ethical approaches in Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, eds., *Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Likewise there have been the discussions about the interface with comparative philosophy; this dissertation obviously is examining the requirements for this association.

[10]It is not even possible to separate causality from the issues of whether beliefs are true or false, for certainly truth itself would be an important cause of beliefs. See the discussion in Steven Lukes, "Relativism in its Place," in *Rationality and Relativism,* ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 292-298. As Charles Taylor has observed, in attempting to explain foreign beliefs, we would not accept that actual giants created the universe or that dances could really cause rain. Charles Taylor, "Comparison, History, Truth," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 44-46. I believe that a theory such as that of Pierre Bourdieu which claims to avoid objectivism falls squarely within it, by emphasizing the material conditions of behavior. See *Outline of a Theory of Practice,* trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

attention to its aspects as language, conceptualization, symbolism, etc.; a comprehensive term widely used in the humanities is *imagination.*[11]

To simplify, imagination/interpretation may be understood as the means by which humans construct a world of enduring entities, processes and values. This extends through the most elementary perceptions of objects and types of object, symbolic/mythic and scientific realities, and principles of action. With the acknowledgement of the role of interpretation in experience has come the realization of its historical and linguistic contingency. It may be shown that any discourse or action is based upon certain assumptions, paradigms or metaphors about truth and falsity, real and unreal, ethical and unethical. "Rationality," the founding in reason(s) for ideas and actions, is parasitic upon such assumptions; this is the case with widespread conceptual principles such as noncontradiction, along with specialized styles of inference and

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[11]For an attempt to summarize common insights about the imagination as developed through Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Wittgenstein, Sartre and others, see Mary Warnock, *Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). For a careful argument on how Kant's undertandings of the imagination were critically developed by Heidegger (who will be brought up shortly), see Eric H. Crump, "Imagination, Representation and Faith: Foundations for a Revised Representational Christology" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989). There has been much discussion about the relation of imagination to actual mental images or pictures. Gilbert Ryle made one of the most influential attacks on the notion of mental images. See chapter 8 in Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). David Tracy explains the production of the sense and referent of cultural classics through the imagination. In putting forth his position, he argues for the connection of imagination with language, in contradistinction to images derived from perception. See David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1975), 123, 149 n. 96. Cf. Mary Warnock's discussion in "The Nature of the Mental Image," chap. in *Imagination,* 131-195. She attempts to demonstrate the positive connections between the imagination and either mental images or at least the potential for the creation of mental images. For our concerns imagination and interpretation should be taken heuristically as representing the largest range of the human construction of meaning in experience. This will include language, symbols/metaphors, theory and proto-theory and, sometimes, images.

justifications of action. It is particularly the confrontation with "others" having different sets of assumptions which reveals one's own. One is faced with the problem of the arbitration of one set of beliefs and values with another.

Usually included in scholars' explanations of "contexts"—ultimately in contradiction to the acknowledgement of the plurality of assumptions—has been the identification of various nonepistemic factors in the generation of beliefs and values. These factors are any of the biological, psychological, linguistic, economic, political or other such factors known in the human sciences. Especially important in formulations of the problem of interpretation are the pathological or unattractive factors identified by the various "hermeneutics of suspicion" initiated by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Observations inspired by Marx and Durkheim of the function of discourse in legitimating relationships of power are by far the most frequent.

David Tracy has pithily summarized the two basic considerations in the dilemma about interpretation with the terms *plurality* and *ambiguity.*[12] In the case of cross-cultural studies such as the history of religions, the problem is how to arbitrate between what are usually a Western discourse and a non-Western one in accounting for what the latter is doing. Each discourse starts from different assumptions, and our act of interpretation is often seen to perpetuate an imperialist intent.

Relativism is the position that there is no way of critically arbitrating between ideas and behaviors. In its strongest form, this means that no view of reality or norm of behavior is more correct than any other. Universally applicable rational justification of one or the other is not possible.

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[12]See David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).

> Reason ... is always relative to some myth, that is, to some set of assumptions and to certain discursive practices that have been given by God, the ancestors, or other powers that be.[13]

For most relativists the causes understood as integral to the contextuality of beliefs and values by the various human sciences or theories of suspicion, are given extra stress, and entirely displace the issues of truth/rightness. Barry Barnes and David Bloor thus repudiate Antony Flew's rationalist conception of "evidencing reasons" for a belief:

> 'Evidencing reasons,' then, are a prime target for sociological enquiry and explanation. There is no question of the sociology of knowledge being confined to causes *rather than* 'evidencing reasons'. Its concern is precisely with causes *as* 'evidencing reasons.'[14]

There are as few self-avowed relativists in the history of religions as in other disciplines. Two of the more relativistic of the well known scholars may be Jacob Neusner and Jonathan Z. Smith. It should in any event be understood that even the most unpolemical historicist approaches are almost invariably associated with a causal-projectivism, and thus a degree of relativism, regarding one or the other feature of human experience—metaphysics, values, etc. We will consider some of the main problems with a full-blown relativism of the conceptual variety in order to clarify that there is absolutely no way out of the problem of interpretations—even by making the interpretation which claims that there is no interpretation.[15]

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[13]Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, "Myth, Inference, and the Relativism of Reason: An Argument from the History of Judaism," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 275. Cf. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 29.

[14]Ibid., 29.

[15]I am focusing the discussion here on conceptual relativism since our main concern is the academic understanding of religion. I do believe that the problem of groundedness for matters of fact/concept and value is ultimately factual/conceptual in nature. I see myth, world view, etc., as justifying praxis in a way such as has been described by Mircea Eliade, Peter Berger and Clifford Geertz. This relationship holds even though requirements for action are found in the course of action (and some ideas may be its epiphenomena—though which sorts cannot be decided in advance). On the

In my opinion, the most obvious and frequent criticism of conceptual relativism is the most important, and is the clue to understanding the others. This is that relativism is self-vitiating, because it gives an "absolute" account of everything as relative. As Martin Hollis explains regarding what he calls the "strong program" of relativism:

> There is an old paradox about a strong programme. If there is to be the same impartial and symmetrical style of explanation for all beliefs, it should, presumably, apply to the beliefs of those who advocate a strong programme. Yet these beliefs lay claim to a scientific status, which the programme dare not forfeit and dare not assert, since both would subvert the programme.[16]

Other important criticisms of relativism focus on the coherence and practical academic implications of the notion that different views are incommensurable. Among the deepest and most widely discussed of the assessments of coherence is that put forth by the philosopher of language Donald Davidson, particularly in his classic article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme."[17] Davidson sets up his argument by

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other hand, all beliefs have practical implications—if only in the bare sense that they identify matters to be reckoned with, intellectually or more concretely.

[16]Martin Hollis, "The Social Destruction of Reality," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 80-81. Cf. the similar arguments of Dan Sperber, "Apparently Irrational Beliefs," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 153; and Scharfstein, "The Contextual Fallacy," 94. I do not agree with Ernest Gellner (himself a rationalist) that this argument is "facile and superficial" because we are able to visualize a relativist world. "Relativism and Universals," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 183. The problem here is analogous to that with other attempts to defend the coherence of a total conceptual skepticism. I do not find acceptable Bimal Krishna Matilal's effort to make defensible Mādhyamika skepticism through J.R. Searle's concept of illocutionary negation. He does this in various places; for an example, see *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 66-67. All levels of an account must be taken together in assessments of consistency. Cf. the debates about the coherence of moral relativism in Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz, eds., *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); and Michael Krausz, ed. with introduction, *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).

[17]Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 (November 1974): 5-20.

identifying ostensible conceptual schemes with languages.[18] He interprets the alleged incommensurability of such schemes as untranslatability.[19] Another of Davidson's basic premises is that the meanings in linguistic expression are themselves constituted by or dependent upon beliefs about what is true. "Meaning, as we might loosely use the word, is contaminated by theory, by what is held to be true."[20]

On the subject of the nature of truth, Davidson attacks the common attempt to explain a correspondence between language/scheme and some uninterpreted reality. For him invocations of notions such as organizing or fitting the facts, evidence or

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Davidson endeavors to refute the very idea of a conceptual scheme as an interpretation of a separate realm of objects or experience. Davidson understands this dualism of scheme and content as of a piece with that between subjective and objective. "The Myth of the Subjective," in *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation,* ed. Michael Krausz, 163, 166. For him the very idea of a separate scheme includes the possibility of alternatives, and thereby opens the way for relativism. See Michael Krausz, "Introduction," in *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation,* 5; and Gordon C.F. Bearn, "The Horizon of Reason," in *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation,* 210. Davidson's attempt to get beyond these problems which have occupied Western thought for hundreds of years, through the demonstration of a sort of "unmediated touch" with objects (Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 20) has some affinity with the wider epistemological theory of transcendental recognition discussed below.

[18]He grants that more than one (natural) language could express a conceptual scheme. Thus he more exactly identifies the alleged conceptual schemes with "sets of intertranslatable languages." Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 7. The idea of a language has shifted, but I believe that the semantic issues he brings up remain the same.

[19]Ibid., 12.

[20]Ibid., 9. The following passage states the idea more explicitly: "... A belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject-matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject-matter." Idem, "Thought and Talk," in *Mind and Language,* ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 20. Davidson explains this position more technically in terms of the abandonment of the philosophical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 9.

sensory experience, do not in any way further our understanding of truth.[21] To provide an alternative to such endeavors, Davidson further develops the semantic theory of truth of Alfred Tarski.[22] Tarski argues that truth for a language will comprise all what he describes as equivalences of the form T. This may be explained as follows: A sentence p is given the name or description X. The form T is written: X is true if, and only if, p.[23] To quote an example and explanation from Davidson: "The sentence 'My skin is warm' is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of evidence."[24] For Tarski this equivalence is stated in what constitutes a metalanguage in relation to the language in which p has been made.[25] Davidson explains that if the original statement is not in English, the second expression (here p) will be its translation into English.[26]

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[21]Ibid., 14-16.

[22]Tarski gives a simplified explanation of his theory in "The Semantic Conception of Truth, and the Foundations of Semantics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1944): 341-375. Tarski's theory is intended to apply specifically to languages with an exactly specified (likely formalized) structure. Ibid., 347. Davidson attempts to generalize his theory to cover natural languages. See the discussion of what is involved in this strategy in Bjorn T. Ramberg, "Convention T," chap. in *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 49-63.

[23]See Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," 344. Tarski gives an actual definition of truth intended to materially to cover all T equivalences in terms of *satisfaction,* ibid., 353.

[24]Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 16.

[25]Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," 351. This condition is central to what has to be dealt with by Davidson in generalizing the theory to explain natural languages. In the case of a single language formulations in terms of convention T are made through a "conceptual or ideological expansion of the object language." Ramberg, *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language,* 51.

[26]Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 17.

The incorporation of Tarski's theory of truth means that the battle is over for a coherent idea of an alternative conceptual scheme:

> ... Convention T suggests, though it cannot state, an important feature common to all the specialized concepts of truth. It succeeds in doing this by making essential use of the notion of translation into a language we know. Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if that test depends upon the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation.[27]

In this way Davidson is able to justify the strong contention: "... Nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behavior."[28]

Davidson's reductio may be understood as supplementing the more general one offered above. Without quibbling over terminology, it is obvious that there are a variety of divergent conceptual frameworks, religious, scientific, etc., explaining fact and value. Davidson has shown that some agreement is necessary even to make sense of their differences.[29] In a non-Davidsonian language we may say that he shows that the

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[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., 7.

[29]Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 19-20. Some scholars have have argued that Davidson has not completely eliminated the possibility of relativism. Thus both Ian Hacking and Gordon C.F. Bearn have accepted Davidson's argument that there is some basic level of common beliefs (or truths) which makes all languages at least partially translatable. However, beyond this level they advocate relativisms of styles of reasoning or understandings of what constitutes a good reason. See Ian Hacking, "Language, Truth and Reason," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 61-62; and Bearn, "The Horizon of Reason," 205-209, 214. Though it is not possible to go into details, I believe that the attempt to separate truth from reason is invalid. As explained above, reason is parasitic upon the truth of its assumptions. And truth cannot be relative. Cf. Terry Godlove, "In What Sense Are Religions Conceptual Frameworks?," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52 (1984), 289-304. Godlove's (non-relativist) argument for relegating differences between religions to the interpretations

very coherence of the idea of any system of meaning presupposes that it have some sort of universal groundedness.

Other arguments against relativism have been made on the basis of what must be assumed in order for translation to begin, or to account for the actual fact of successful translations. Martin Hollis has given the name "rational bridgehead" to a common core of experience and rationality which is necessary for understanding the beliefs and practices of others. Davidson's argument against incommensurable schemes gives such pragmatic considerations a transcendental nonoptionality.[30] Davidson has made his own procedural formulation of a "principle of charity" according to which we must assume a lot of common truth in order to translate. "We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement...."[31]

Now, it is important to realize that though Davidson has established that there must be a shared understanding of truth in anything we can understand as a language or conceptual system, he has not at all established what constitutes that shared

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of "an autonomous world of shared objects and subject-matters," ibid., 301, also does not do justice to the extent to which religious differences are differences over matters of fact. For a more sophisticated attempt to account for linguistic/conceptual differences in Davidsonian terms, see Ramberg, "What is Incommensurability?," chapter in *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language,* 114-137.

[30]Martin Hollis has argued that the rational bridgehead is an a priori presupposition. See Hollis, "The Social Destruction of Reality," 67-86. W. Newton-Smith on the other hand maintains that it can be an a posteriori conjecture confirmed by the fact of successful translations. W. Newton-Smith, "Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 114-115. Lukes suggests that some common core is an a priori necessity. However, exactly what may be assumed to be common as the basis for translation is an empirically testable hypothesis. Lukes, "Relativism in its Place," 272-273.

[31]Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 19.

understanding.[32] However, actual interpretation always depends upon a position, implicit or explicit, about the nature of this common core. Accordingly, those making arguments against relativism on the basis of the pragmatics of translation have attempted to specify its nature. Here it is notable that the bridgehead is often represented by the anti-relativists in the distinctively modern terms of empirical experience and scientific rationality. Thus they allege that people live in about the same physical world and with about the same physical endowment.[33] Contrary to the more skeptical approaches of Thomas Kuhn's *Structure,* Paul Feyerabend, etc., the progress of science and associated technological control are also held to be undeniable.[34] Robin Horton explains his own account of the common core in a typical fashion: "Central to this 'common core' of rationality is the use of theory in the explanation, prediction and control of events. Central too is the use of analogical, deductive and inductive inference in the development and application of theory."[35]

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[32]My treatment of this point may be compared with that of Lukes, "Relativism in its Place," 272f.

[33]Gellner, "Relativism and Universals," 193. Also see Lukes, "Relativism in its Place," 268, on studies refuting the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in the area of perception.

[34]See Charles Taylor, "Rationality," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 103; Gellner, "Relativism and Universals," 193. See Steven Lukes' more differentiated analysis of universal and contextual criteria of rationality, which he calls rational (1) criteria and rational (2) criteria, in "Some Problems about Rationality," in *Rationality,* ed. Bryan R. Wilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 194-213.

[35]Robin Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," in *Rationality and Relativism,* 256. Horton's whole scheme of primary and secondary theory may be understood as oriented around the development of scientific and technological rationality. Davidson reveals that he also has a modern sort of understanding of the bridgehead in the statement: "We get a first approximation to a finished theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds these sentences true. The guiding policy is to do this as far as possible, subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects

An additional point often made by the universalists is that relativists themselves engage in successful acts of translation or interpretation.[36] This is more than a matter of making simple glosses for the words and sentences of foreign languages. The causes which the relativists allege to displace judgement are an important part of what we may describe as their unacknowledged bridgehead. Edward Farley makes this point clearly:

> The anomaly of an absolute skepticism about truth, knowledge, or reality apprehension is that it must appropriate what it rejects to make its case—namely the sphere of the interhuman. There is a common element in various attempts to deny or eliminate truth as a feature of the human transaction with things. This is the initial restrictive placing of truth (and knowledge, reality) in a prereality individual whose capacities for truth must then be demonstrated. The enterprise then is to indicate a number of causalities (cultural relativities, brain physiology, genetic predispositions) whose interventions hold reality and truth in abeyance. It is obvious to the point of banality that reality-positing must occur to make the case for such interventions.[37]

It is notable that the implicit bridgehead of relativist interpretation depends upon many of the same conceptions of scientific or extended social-cultural empirical understandings of truth invoked by the anti-relativists.

There is actually a continuity between the destructive force of relativism and mainstream historical studies. Relativism only moves further into inconsistency by attempting to displace entirely cognitive and ethical claims with the favored features of the bridgehead. Since relativism is an absolutism with its own version of a common

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of social conditioning, and of course our common sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable error." Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 19.

[36]Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 6; Newton-Smith, "Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation," 114; Henry Rosemont, Jr., "Against Relativism," in *Interpreting Across Boundaries,* 49-50. It was observed in the Chicago conference on myth and philosophy that the relativist Howard Eilberg-Schwartz succeeded in making the allegedly incomprehensible Rabbinic inference, the *qal va homer*, more comprehensible to the audience.

[37]Edward Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," in *Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion,* ed. Daniel Guerriere (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65-66.

core of experience and rationality, *it does not at all escape from the problem of interpretation but succumbs to it in an insidious way.* It thus does severe violence to the views of the others whom it is supposed to defend. Most people in different times and cultures do not understand their views to be no more true than any others, nor to depend only upon a collection of scientific causes.[38]

The failure of relativism clarifies the truly radical nature of the problem of interpretation. Every interpretation is inseparable from claims of validity as well as practical application.[39] A nonnormative discipline is logically impossible even as an ideal.[40] The critical approach to religious phenomena requires more than a forum for the empirical approaches of the humanities and social sciences. Such approaches themselves require mediation with the religious views which they interpret.

The "ethics of inarticulacy" about the metaphysical and moral presuppositions of contemporary thought must be given up.[41] David Tracy makes the remark appropriate to the whole area of religious studies:

> If an interpreter believes that religious claims about Ultimate Reality are nonsense, or sick, or meaningless, or purely epiphenomenal, then she should say so—and argue why others should agree. If the interpreter believes that religious claims are meaningful and true, or possible, or even probable, again he should say

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[38]W. Newton-Smith mentions the distortion resulting from relativism in "Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation," 112.

[39]See Taylor, "Comparison, History, Truth," 43; Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity,* 101.

[40]Cf. the criticism of the notion of bracketing in Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity,* 140, n. 51.

[41]The expression quoted is from Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Taylor attempts to retrieve the positive (mainly ignoring assessments in suspicious/unattractive terms), ultimately religious, ethics underlying current theories which deny the groundedness of value judgements. The suggestion is that coherence is at least problematic if such orientations are not acknowledged.

> so—and argue why others should agree. To demand less is to refuse to interpret the religious classics as the kind of texts they are.[42]

We are forced to reconsider our premises when we confront the different ones of others. This problem becomes serious the moment we depart from the prima facie in explaining the significance of a concept or behavior. The problem of interpretation becomes one of *justification* of the various features of one's own or the others views about reality, and about what we or they are doing.

This is a process of dialogue or conversation. I believe that the discipline which is most rigorously dialogical and is best suited to the problems of arbitrating between views/values and interpretations is *philosophy.*[43] For philosophy, as I understand it, is the effort to say something *while justifying one's assumptions in terms of ostensibly universal criteria of experience and rationality.*[44] Every academic discipline and every fundamentally different theory within each discipline must be grounded and circumscribed in relation to others through philosophical reflection. The problem is merely more obvious in the case of the interpretation of the self-intepretations of people of very different cultures and historical periods. In my view, the interpretive

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[42]Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity,* 99.

[43]There are various understandings of the nature of conversation in cultural studies. There are the varieties of Gadamer-inspired hermeneutics. (See Ramberg, *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language,* 114-141, on the convergence between the views of Davidson and Gadamer.) The formulation of Wilfred Cantwell Smith has long presented one of the main options in the study of foreign religions. The acknowledgement of the inevitable and often positive role of prejudice, the emphases on the need for really learning from others, along with the need to avoid imperialist attitudes, are all important themes in formulations of the need for conversation. My position is that the interpretive problem can only be finally addressed by considering the rational justification of assumptions in relation to each other—philosophy.

[44]It might be described, in Steven Lukes terms, as the attempt to adduce rational (1) criteria for rational (2) criteria. Cf. Aristotle on wisdom as the science of first principles in *Metaphysics,* trans. W.D. Ross, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. with introduction, Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1.2, 691-693.

violence is most blatant in the case of reductive or deconstructive interpretations of others who have made their own efforts to make themselves intelligible through philosophical argument.[45]

There has been a development since the nineteenth century of increasingly sophisticated dialogue between Western philosophies and non-Western philosophies—e.g., of India, China, Islam, etc—an area sometimes called "comparative philosophy."[46] Unfortunately, disciplines such as the history of religions and anthropology have largely ignored issues of philosophical reflexivity as well as consideration of the real explanatory presumptions of exotic philosophies. Recently, however, there has been renewed interest in the importance of comparative philosophy as a "bridgehead" important to the general problems of cross-cultural interpretation which came to the fore in these fields.

The significance of comparative philosophy for these problems is addressed in two recent compendia. The articles in *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy,* edited by Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch, assess the general nature and prospects of intercultural philosophical discussion. Those in *Myth and Philosophy,* edited by Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, are oriented around

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[45]We are focusing in on philosophy as subject as well as method. What about the more frequent cases where the subject matter is non-philosophically-explicated religious expressions such as myth and ritual behavior? I believe that in such cases it is ultimately necessary for there to be developed and evaluated (by at least some scholars) a philosophical poetics, metaphysics, ethics, etc., which articulate the *religious subject's* assumptions. The procedure would seemingly be on more shaky grounds than approaches to philosophical expressions inasmuch as more of the rationalization would likely be produced by the scholar.

[46]Nevertheless it is still quite obvious that the mainstreams of Western philosophy completely ignore non-Western thought.

considering the historicist and universalist/rationalist interpretations of the categories in the title.[47]

The study in the latter book focusing most directly on the universal presumptiveness of philosophical rationality is that of Paul J. Griffiths. Griffiths describes philosophy in its character of transcending historical context as "denaturalized discourse"—a character which he states is ideal-typical. He explains the pursuit of this ideal on the basis of a conception of the nature of philosophy as presenting unambiguous and easily assessable propositions, as developed through Aristotle, Frege and contemporary Anglophone philosophy, which he calls the "propositional mythos." He explains: "The perfectly denaturalized language, towards which the Aristotelian propositional mythos propels us, is no language at all but rather a universe of disembodied *noemata*, changelessly reflecting reality."[48]

I believe that the effort for universal intelligibility of many of the religious philosophies of other cultures may be further illuminated by some of the reflections of contemporary Western theology.[49] David Tracy has distinguished philosophical theology, which he calls fundamental theology, from systematic theology and practical

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[47]I have already been citing articles from these compendia.

[48]Paul J. Griffiths, "Denaturalizing Discourse: Ābhidharmikas, Propositionalists, and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 66.

[49]Theology has seen its own debates parallel to and often associated with those between relativists and universalists/rationalists in the larger arena of cultural studies. On the one side have been the "anticorrelationists"—traditionalists and fundamentalists, e.g., Balthasar, Barth and Lindbeck. On the other have been the "correlationist" theologians such as Tillich, Rahner, Lonergan and Tracy. See David Tracy, "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Post-Modernity," *Theological Studies* 50 (1989): 555-559. Tracy argues that even the intratextual nature of the Christian (or Jewish or Muslim) understanding of God requires that theology be universal in its intent (page 559), and *Analogical Imagination,* 51-52.

theology in a manner addressing problems of interpretation and rationality. Further supporting the interpretation so far of philosophy as a rigorously explicit and assessable, dialogical justification of assumptions for particular views is his explanation that "fundamental theology is concerned with the *most abstract possibilities and necessities* that *are* fundamental for understanding some of the necessary presuppositions of systematic and practical theologies."[50]

Fundamental theology is primarily addressed to the academy, and is accordingly abstracted from the religious and ethical commitments, and presumptions regarding truth, of the other two types of theology.[51] Tracy explains that

> In terms of modes of argument, *fundamental* theologies will be concerned principally to provide arguments that all reasonable persons, whether "religiously involved" or not, can recognize as reasonable. It assumes, therefore, the most usual meaning of public discourse: that discourse available (*in principle*) to all persons and explicated by appeals to one's experience, intelligence, rationality and responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with appropriate warrants, backings and rebuttal procedures.[52]

At the same time he acknowledges that because of its historical and linguistic nature this effort is intrinsically problematic or uncertain.[53]

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[50]Tracy, *Analogical Imagination,* 89 n. 47. Cf. the analysis of how Kukai attempted in his Shingon theories to give an archaic (a term I do not like) world view a philosophical underpinning in Thomas P. Kasulis, "Kukai (774-835): Philosophizing in the Archaic," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 141.

[51]Tracy, *Analogical Imagination,* 57. See the analysis of the differences between the three types of theology in terms of five rubrics, ibid., 54-58.

[52]Ibid., 57. Another brief explanation of the submission only to public criteria of argument rather than personal faith, etc., in fundamental theology is given, ibid., 64.

[53]See David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology* (Minneapolis: Winston-Seabury Press, 1975) 64-87; and "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 557-559, 567-568. He talks of judgements of "relative adequacy," by which he means not relativism but the "partly history-transcending character of reason" (basing himself on Lonergan), ibid., 567.

Great emphasis should be given to the provisos that a fundamental or denaturalized discourse is only *ideal typical,* and *problematic.* Philosophy is only an effort to adduce universally applicable, undeniable considerations for particular views. It is a truism that consensus is never achieved about philosophical matters. This notion entails another: Although many common patterns are found, such as the adherence to the principle of noncontradiction, the particular details of philosophical method—criteria of experience and argument—are ultimately inseparable from the substantive positions advanced.[54] It is at this point that there should be developed in a non-relativist fashion the contributions of historical or cultural/linguistic contextualism. Nobody possesses the single discourse within which all issues will be decided. Discussion involves a continuous reevaluation of the arguments for particular views, i.e., the premises as well as the types of inferences for different conclusions. Since there is always the possibility of the articulation of "otherness" in the form of philosophical doubt, the process is intrinsically open-ended.

While they will always be subject to contention, the "relativization of relativism," as discussed above suggests that universally valid knowledge and values are approachable asymptotically. More particularly, I am not denying the validity of the predictive and manipulative successes of the physical sciences pointed out by the anti-relativists or the importance of contemporary ethical criteria such as democratic tolerance. Nor am I making the unhelpful claim that there is not much which is true in the various human disciplines; both the natural-theological and the reductive emphases in the history of religions have yielded great insights. The ramifications of the easily forgotten insight of Max Weber that there are a number of different points of view and

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[54]One may get an appreciation for the substantive orientations of different types of recent philosophy from Paul Ricoeur, *Main Trends in Philosophy,* Main Trends in the Social and Human Sciences (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978).

directions of rationality extend far beyond sociological analysis.[55] So also do those of his seminal insight—"his revelation that there are historically consequential affinities and conflicts among independently varying manifestations of rationalization."[56]

This all suggests the banal but usually ignored idea that complex views and behaviors are likely to be right and wrong, "absolutely" rational and irrational in a number of complex ways. There can be no "instant rationality"[57]—absolutist or relativist—which provides a neat account of everything. At the most general level in the study of other philosophies, we should be content with an ever more informed and differentiated consideration of the many ways in which various beliefs and behaviors are rational/correct and irrational/incorrect.

This dissertation is concerned with the Pratyabhijñā apologetics for monistic Śaivism of Utpaladeva (c. 900-950) and Abhinavagupta (c. 975-1025).[58] I will attempt to interpret the overall structure of the Pratyabhijñā argumentation from the point of view of the manner in which these thinkers understand it to speak universally. At one

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[55]For a valuable critical reconstruction of the many ways in which Weber differentiated rationality, see Donald N. Levine, "Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond," *Sociological Inquiry* 51(1981): 5-25. Levine charts the intersection of three typological rubrics—subjective and objective; conceptual, instrumental, substantive, and formal; and further analyzes according to spheres such as religion, economy and law. See the charts, on pages 13-14, and the summary on pages 23.

[56]Ibid., 14.

[57]The phrase is from Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, volume 4* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-195. The idea is applied to religious studies in Guilford Dudley, III, *Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977).

[58]See the final section of this chapter on the place of the Pratyabhijñā system in the general history of monistic Śaivism in Kashmir.

level, I will follow the descriptive and holistic trajectory special to the history of religions. This will elucidate the manner in which the Śaivas' philosophical program is pervasively informed by their spirituality. At the same time I will show that this philosophical rationalization addresses problems and offers solutions in important ways similar to approaches and families of approaches familiar in the West. Besides illuminating an intrinsically important system of thought, this work more generally confirms the requirement for comparative philosophy in pursuing a critical study of religion which addresses the problems of interpretation discussed above.

The Pratyabhijñā system was articulated in the context of the philosophical "academy" in India. Over many centuries, the diverse schools of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism created a sphere for themselves "dialogically" to argue their positions over a variety of problems.[59] Insofar as they pertained to soteriology, we may understand the theories developed in these debates as varieties of fundamental religious speculation.[60] The Śaivas can further be classified with a number of Hindu, Buddhist

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[59]"Intertheoretic competition," to use Horton's phrase, is an important condition of all sorts of conceptual rationality. See Jean-Pierre Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), on the social basis of the development of Greek philosophy in the rise of democratic political discussion. For a study showing how interreligious polemics furthered the development of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, see Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its Conflict With the Buddhist Dignāga School (Critique of Indian Realism),* with a foreword by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Agra: Agra University, 1964; repr., Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976). Likewise see David Tracy's study of the role of dialogue and comparative studies for the classic Western founders of the philosophy of religion—Hume, Kant and Hegel. David Tracy, "On the Origins of Philosophy of Religion: The Need for a New Narrative of its Founding," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 11-36. We will consider in the third chapter the way in which doubt is formulated as an essential component of Indian philosophical method.

[60]Various qualifications should be made with this classification. A term other than theology seems best to include the nontheistic systems. Francis X. Clooney explains how in most of the arguments of the Vedantin Śaṅkara reason is subordinated to the process of exegesis of scripture. See Francis X. Clooney, "Vedānta,

and Jaina thinkers Matilal has called the "*pramāṇa* theorists," whose discussions focused around the formulation of critical epistemology (which they took to be inseparable from developing a proper ontology).

Though differences always remained, there emerged a number of convergences about methods and experiential and rational criteria for philosophical justification spanning the various Indian schools. The Śaivas endeavor to adhere to the most widely accepted of argumentative standards in Hinduism. Gautama summarized these standards in the *Nyāya Sūtra* as sixteen categories pertaining to philosophical discussion, and the various commentators on this text further elaborated them.[61] Abhinavagupta explains that the Pratyabhijñā system derives its very power to convince others through following these categories. In adhering to the rules for discussion of the philosophical academy, the Śaivas abstracted their thought away from concerns with iconographic symbolism and social-ritual action which are predominant in their esoteric *tantric* tradition. Thus their fundamental theology is intended to be exoterically intelligible, in virtue of being denaturalized.

This intelligilibity of the system is fully compatible with its religious/cultural integrity. The Śaivas understand their apologetics as much more than a detached intellectual enterprise. The Pratyabhijñā, like many other philosophical and

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Commentary, and the Theological Component of Cross-Cultural Study," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 296. I suggest that it is precisely because of this that Śaṅkara is a philosopher only on exceptional occasions. He would better be described as a systematic and practical theologian, or "Brahmalogian." I note that even systems which wished to deny the validity of rational discourse itself were provided with an arena within philosophically rationalized discourse for attempting to repudiate the views of others. The most radical skepticisms were articulated by the Mādhyamikas and the Advaita Vedānta school of Śrīharṣa. In the case of the Mādhyamikas, the "fundamentals" of Buddhist soteriology justified would have to be understood in a paradoxical sense.

[61]More will be said about the Nyāya categories in the next chapter.

nonphilosophical theologies around the world, is given a place within the tradition's soteriology.[62] In this respect the Śaivas go especially far. For them the philosophical method, at the same time as it is an ostensibly universal argument, is a conceptually internalized form of *tantric* and yogic praxis—which fully elicits the individual's realization of his identity with Śiva. Further, philosophical speculation is ultimately framed by the Śaivas as an expression of the very myth of Śiva emanating and enjoying the universe as His consort Śakti.[63] In a characteristically *tantric* manner they thus "transfigure" the academic discussion between world views.

The extension of the full load of Śaiva symbolism and ritual depends on an ambitiously correlational philosophical agenda. I believe that the Śaiva theory may be characterized at the most basic level, along with some of the more ambitious forms of Western philosophical theology, as a transcendental or metaphysical inquiry. The Śaivas do not merely attempt to show that their soteriology is supported by means of knowledge in a manner parallel to other items of experience. They attempt to show that their God is *necessary* for the operation of all means of knowledge and the existence of all items of experience.[64] What is especially of interest is that their transcendental argument is formulated in the context of discussions about cognition, language and

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[62]For examples, see the studies in David B. Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974); and Hossein Ziai, "Beyond Philosophy: Suhrawardi's Illuminationist Path to Wisdom," in *Myth and Philosophy,* 215-243.

[63]The continuity between philosophy as myth and as ritual may be understood as illustrating a fundamental monistic *tantric* principle that the spiritual means (*upāya*) is identical with the goal (*upeya*). This will be discussed later.

[64]See David Tracy on the nature of fundamental theology as a transcendental/metaphysical inquiry in *Blessed Rage,* 55-56, 108; "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 559. Cf. the description of the difference between scientific and religious truth in Philip Clayton, "Religious Truth and Scientific Truth," in *Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion,* ed. Daniel Guerriere, 57-58.

universals which may be taken as directly bearing upon the contemporary discussions of interpretation, skepticism and relativism.

To explain the relevance of the Pratyabhijñā theory, I will suggest a particular viewpoint on the issue of the theoretical/linguistic construction of experience. The application of interpretation to reality, epitomized in the problem of linguistic reference, about which there has been so much discussion in so many areas—can be seen as having the nature of *recognition.*[65] Recognition is commonly understood as the knowledge that an object of a present experience is the same as the object of a past experience as retained in the memory. In our generalization, the memory may be construed as holding all of the raw material of interpretation.[66] This includes the most elementary syntheses and generalizations of empirical experience, the meanings of words, and deeper theoretical and symbolic orientations to reality.

The counter of memory may be further enlarged to comprise any sources for the interpretation of experience which are conceived to be innate or a priori; these may be Platonic forms, God, or other "mythic" realities.[67] Mary Warnock thus also includes

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[65]The phenomenon of recognition is considered in many accounts of the imagination without being thematized. The following passage of Warnock is typical: "So imagination is necessary, I have suggested, to enable us to recognize things in the world as familiar, to take for granted features of the world which we need to take for granted and rely on, if we are to go about our ordinary business; but it is also necessary if we are to see the world as significant of something unfamiliar, if we are ever to treat the objects of perception as symbolizing or suggesting things other than themselves." Warnock, *Imagination,* 10. See the study of the theories of imagination of Hume and Kant of P.F. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," in *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London: Metheun, 1974), 45-65. This concerns the recognition of various sorts of object and kind identities.

[66]On the role of memory in imagination, see Mary Warnock, *Memory* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987).

[67]The theme of the memory or recollection of higher, sacred realities is extremely widespread. For some useful sample studies, see Mircea Eliade, "Mythologies of Memory and Forgetting," *History of Religions* 2 (Winter 1963): 329-

instinct in the category of memory.[68] The recognition of the constructions of imagination in experience yields the universe of enduring states of affairs—objects, types of objects, persons and higher realities. All "seeing as" is recognition.[69]

We may construe various sorts of skepticism, from phenomenalism through relativism, as *denying the validity of recognition.* The repudiation of the groundedness of imaginative constructions, of a bridge between language and reality, may be understood as a repudiation of the connection between memory and present experience. There are for the skeptic no transtemporal or paradigmatic items in seeing, nonremembered data of experience, which validate a seeing as.

I recall the fundamental point of the relativist argument regarding the historical contingency of the root myths or paradigms of particular world views. Barnes and Bloor explain the meanings of words which cultures teach children as "possible judgements of

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344; Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Aspects mythiques de la memoire en Grece," *Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique* (1959): 1-29; Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, "Recollection, Indian and Platonic," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 64 (1944), Supplement 3, 1-29; Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1984); Lawrence A. Babb, *Redemptive Encounters: Three Modern Styles in the Hindu Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). For the northern Indian *tantrics,* memory is the heart of *mantra.*

[68]Warnock, *Memory,* 6. She sees memory per se as a continuum from the unconscious form in the simplest animals to the conscious. Ibid., 14. If we wish to continue to speculate in this vein, we could include here the deep structures of Noam Chomsky and others.

[69]On recognition in animal learning see Warnock, *Memory,* 6-7, 12-13. Cf. the discussion by Edward Farley of the need for all living beings to learn the enduring conditions which support their own enduring. Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," 64-65. On the relation of the learning of language to the ability to recognize things and types of things, see Warnock, *Memory,* 11. Marcel Proust's philosophical novel remains the classic contemporary reflection on the roles of memory and recognition in the construction of personal identity. See Roger Shattuck, *Proust's Binoculars: A Study of Memory, Time, and Recognition in A la recherche du temps perdu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). Likewise see Warnock, *Memory,* 56-57.

sameness."[70] Thus an anthropologist may discover that a culture such as the Karam of New Guinea do not have a word the semantic range of which is exactly the same as our word "bird."[71] They explain what they believe this entails:

> One clear implication arises from the character of concepts as arrays of judgements of sameness. Every such array, being the product of a unique sequence of judgements, is itself unique. No array in one culture can be unproblematically set into an identity with an array from another culture.[72]

To put this in our terms, for relativists there are no natural kinds in reality by which there can be established equivalences or overlaps in the linguistic memories of different cultures.[73]

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[70]Barnes and Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," 37.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid., 39.

[73]Barnes and Bloor contradict their strong relativist program by stating that successful translation is possible by practical, contingent, local standards. Ibid. Even this should not be possible according to their views. J.Z. Smith's program for the history of religions further illustrates the ironic game which the scholar must play when the groundedness of his (recognitive) application of imagination is denied: "If we have understood the archaeological and textual record correctly, man has had his entire history in which to imagine deities and modes of interaction with them. But man, more precisely western man, has had only the last few centuries in which to imagine religion. It is this act of second order, reflective imagination which must be the central preoccupation of any student of religion.... Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the scholar's analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the student of religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of study. For the self-conscious student of religion, no datum possesses intrinsic interest. It is of value only insofar as it can serve as exempli gratia of some fundamental issue in the imagination of religion." Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), xi. In its literal sense this view seems to preclude any real learning from other cultures. Again, like other conceptual skeptics, Smith quickly moves on to contradict himself by stating that there must be "some method for explicitly relating the exemplum to the theory, paradigm or question and some method for evaluating each in terms of the

The principal opponents of the Śaivas, as of the mainstream of Hindu orthodoxy, were the Buddhists. I do not wish to engage in debates about the appropriateness of calling Buddhists "skeptics." They certainly had a "positive attitude" with respect to their own soteriological and charitable agendas. However, on the basis of their doctrine of impermanence, they were very critical of a number of the metaphysical categories of the various Hindu schools. The Śaivas were particularly concerned with refuting the sophisticated epistemological and ontological theories of the school known as the Buddhist logicians. These thinkers elaborated a doctrine of the denial of the conceptual and linguistic synthesis of experience which is in some key ways akin to Humean phenomenalism.

In debates over hundreds of years the Buddhist logicians attacked a number of categories of the various Hindu schools—the permanent Self, God, ritual action, as well as the realists' understandings of permanent objects. Though their skepticism was less radical than those of the Mādhyamikas or some contemporary skeptics, their criticisms may again be understood as centered around the allegation of the contingency of the mnemonic resources of imagination with respect to any given datum. In many of the discussions, the issue of the validity of recognition was seen to be paradigmatic of the problem. In the Śaiva elaboration of the threat to their own views, the Buddhists deny the recognition in the flux of experience of the realia corresponding to the key Śaiva doctrines. They contend that there can be no enduring Self, no Lord with whom He is identical, no Powers/Consorts (Śaktis) belonging to Him, and no universe emanated through Them.

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other." Ibid., xi-xii. Smith's irony is evident in his use of earlier categories of the discipline, e.g., the Eliadean concept of sacred space—"Map is not territory" (a maxim from Alfred Korzybski) denies recognition.

The Śaivas' response is a brilliant synthesis of their traditional symbolic resources with ideas of the Buddhists, the Hindu realists and the linguistic idealism of Bhartṛhari. They argue that recognition is integral to all experienced states of affairs; that is, we may say that they claim it is *transcendental.* In this they have a substantial similarity with a large historical range of Western conceptions of truth, ranging through pre-Socratic *alethia,* Platonic and Neoplatonic/Christian *anamnesis* and contemporary hermeneutics. The basic intellectual strategy has been thematized in relation to our recent Western problems by Heidegger. Heidegger revived the early Greek term *alethia,* 'unveiling,' to describe the disclosure of Being or beings as the most basic cognitive, and behaviorally orientative, experience.[74] All seeing is seeing as.[75]

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[74]See Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,* ed. with an introduction by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1977), 113-141. I am not taking up here Heidegger's theories about the nature of philosophy and metaphysics. For a survey of some varieties of the basic intellectual approach being pointed out, see James J. DiCenso, *Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990). David Tracy uses the disclosure model, often formulated directly in terms of recognition, to explain the truth arrived at through the arguments of fundamental theology as well as the interpretation of religious classics in systematic theology. In his fundamental theology he refers to the disclosure model of Ian Ramsey, (*Blessed Rage,* 22, 150; *Analogical Imagination,* 63) as well as the stronger arguments of Heidegger (*Analogical Imagination,* 63). On his understanding of the recognition of truth through aesthetic and religious classics see *Analogical Imagination,* 108, 139 n. 35. In more explicated accounts Tracy correlates revelation with the manifestation/disclosure-concealment of the religious object and recognition with faith; and explains their interaction with the hermeneutic category of conversation. See "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 564; *Plurality and Ambiguity,* p. 28. Cf. the discussion of faith at Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," 72-74.

[75]See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 188-195. This section is discussed in Merold Westphal, "Phenomenologies and Religious Truth," in *Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion,* ed. Daniel Guerriere, 111-112. Farley further brings out the nature of disclosure as a surpassing of time: "... Human beings experience and know actual things always in acts that synthesize the discerned particular with transparticular meanings, contexts, significances, and so on. That which renders this unavoidable is not

This is the essential condition upon which depends understandings of the nature of truth (in distinction from falsity) as correspondence:

> All working and achieving, all action and calculation, keep within an open region within which beings, with regard to what they are and they are, can properly take their stand and become capable of being said. This can occur only if beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speaks of beings *such-as* they are....
>
> A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence.... But if the correctness (truth) of statements becomes possible only through this openness of comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must with more original right be taken as the essence of truth.[76]

Mathematical, scientific truth, etc., are all of orders of truth derivative of this primordial truth.[77]

I am in strong agreement with the point which the Śaivas will be understood to make along with their various Western analogues against contemporary forms of skepticism. The necessity of recognition puts in the most general epistemological terms the unavoidable role of normative assumptions in all cross-cultural study.[78] The

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something 'in' the ego or created by the subject, but the complexity and enduringness of whatever is. The human world transaction is a surpassing of particularity toward enduring meanings, features of situations, and ways-of-being. Hence, *that which is manifest, the truth of things, is the enduringness of being.*" Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," 71.

[76]Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 124-125. Also see page 129

[77]The expression "orders of truth" is from Paul Ricoeur. See Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," 68.

[78]Scharfstein's refutation of the historicist's "contextual fallacy" comes close to my point about recognition. He explains: "Taking things out of context is essential, not only to abstract learning, but to life itself. To take things intellectually out of their immediate context is only to continue what happens at every moment of our lives, when ordinary perception convinces us and memory confirms that some one thing or event resembles some other, previously experienced. The very perception which discloses uniqueness discloses similarity." Scharfstein, "The Contextual Fallacy," 86.

criticisms of relativism or radical historicism as self-contradictory absolutisms can be seen in the same way. Even the allegation of the state of affairs of nonrecognition depends upon some form of recognition.

The Pratyabhijñā does not merely adduce the primordial nature of recognition to retrieve the cognitive status of prejudgement/tradition or to put revelation or aesthetic experience on a strong footing in relation to more perceptual forms of knowledge.[79] Indeed, the position as to the transcendental nature of recognition does not provide us with a complete solution to the problems of interpretation. Even if every frame of reference is based upon some sort of disclosure—or "faith"—one is left with the problem of how to arbitrate between them. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers acknowledge this problem and deal with it through considerations of coherence.[80] The Śaivas ambitiously

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[79]As will be seen in chapter three, in many ways their doctrine does come out of reflection on the authority of revelation. In this respect, they are developing the *tantric* application of Bhartṛhari's theories. For the Śaivas, the transcendental recognition is a kind of super-linguistic intuition (*pratibhā*) connecting limited words and objects in the higher unity of revelation. The parallel of Bhartṛhari's views with Western *logos* theology has been treated in several studies, although much more remains to be said. See David Carpenter's comparison of Bhartṛhari with Bonaventure in "The Light of the Word: A Comparative Study of the Phenomenon of Revelation," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1987). An important study of the *tantric* theology of sacred speech is Andre Padoux, *Vāc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras,* trans. Jacques Gontier, The SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey P. Alper (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990).

[80]David Tracy has pointed out that there is sometimes the need for argument to defend what is recognized. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity,* 23-24, 119 n. 43, 121 n. 2. He himself develops criteria of coherence and praxis to evaluate claims to manifestation. (Manifestation functions in the first position of the triad developed from William James—possibility, coherence and ethical consequences.) See Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 560-561, 565-567; and the longer analysis in "The Question of Criteria for Inter-Religious Dialogue: On Revisiting William James," in *Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue,* Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 1 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1990). Some such effort seems required by any disclosure theory.

make the transcendental necessity of recognition the foundational point of their entire philosophical theology.

The Śaivas *interpret their very cosmogonic myth of Śiva emanating a real universe through His power and consort Śakti as an act of recognition.* An important feature of the procedure by which the Śaivas arrive at this conception is the use of arguments of Buddhist idealists to the effect that phenomena which are invariably concomitant are identical. The Śaivas thus contend that the transcendental, linguistically ascriptive recognition in all cognitive states—in perception, reasoning and even within memory—is monistic and constitutive. All experience is held to be nothing but a single process of recognition. It must accordingly be the self-recognition (or self-revelation) of God.[81] Philosophy leads one to participate in this recognition, which interprets the Śaiva myth, through pointing out its necessity and ubiquity. As a conceptually internalized form of *tantric* praxis analogous to the more concrete forms, it recapitulates—is identical with—the myth. In this way the ostensibly detached intellectual dialogue is transfigured through the resources of the soteriology.

Such is the basic structure of the Śaiva epistemological arguments. Their conception of a monistic transcendental recognition is also elaborated in ontological

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[81]Because of its reduction of all phenomena to some form of "subjectivity," the Śaiva theory should be classified as idealist. However the Śaivas should not be understood to be saying that the world is an illusion—like perhaps Vijñānavāda, Advaita Vedānta and Bradley. For the Śaivas, the world is real as Śiva-Śakti. To emphasize this point, K.C. Pandey describes the Śaiva doctrine with the unhappy expression "realistic idealism." In my view, most forms of idealism contain illusionistic as well as realistic moments; it is their ratio and the quality of their interrelation which varies. A realistic moment is found even in strongly monistic thinkers—in the different understandings of emanation in Plotinus and Eckhart; and even in Śaṅkara's understanding of Brahman as the real object in ordinary experience. For Christian (like other sorts of monotheistic) idealism, from the Fathers through Eckhart, Berkeley and Hegel, this moment has a special necessity. The limited degree of illusionism in the Śaiva doctrine will be discussed in later chapters.

terms. The ontological category most directly corresponding to the transcendental recognition is relation (especially important is the semantic relation). The Śaivas contend that relation is undeniable and the root of all other objective categories.[82] Especially interesting as an illustration of the structure of the Pratyabhijñā theory as philosophical rationalization is the following: The thinkers' develop earlier Indian grammatical theories to explain the further differentiation of entities grounded in the semantic relation *in terms of syntax.*

We shall observe that the main currents of Indian linguistic theory have favored a syntax which more-or-less denigrates agency in favor of the nexus of action and its result, expressed in the verb and direct object. This mode of thought may be understood as reflecting upon the pervasiveness and coerciveness of the order of objective ritual behavior (especially for Hindus) as well as what is perhaps the most widespread Indian mytheme—the doctrine of karma. The Śaivas on the other hand endeavor to elaborate a syntax expressive of their *tantric* mythico-ritual drama of omnipotence (i.e., unity of Śiva-Śakti). They explain the generation of phenomena through recognition in terms of a syntax which "absorbs" result into action and that into the agent. The ever-existent mythico-ritual fact explained as this absorption is, again, reenacted by philosophy.

It is in the emphasis on the ubiquitous operation (in idealistic terms) of a monistic agent that the Śaiva rationalization differs from those of the main contemporary Western narratives.[83] In the academy it would be very difficult to invoke so directly a super-empirical, especially a monistic, subject/agent in the explanation of all phenomena. We experience a world of many agents, fragmented in narratives

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[82]I will point out the relevance of this point to the pervasive Western discussions of "universals" and "essences."

[83]In chapter six, I will refer to the initiative of Kenneth Burke for the typologizing of intellectual strategies on the basis of a correlated narrative syntax.

focused around the material and social *contexts* of behavior and considerations of *function/instrumentality.*[84] Most phenomenological and hermeneutic theories of transcendental/primordial recognition reflect this experience. The Pratyabhijñā falls clearly into the culturally significant category of the "traditional." Though more monistic, the Śaiva understanding of a transcendental synthesis has more affinity with earlier forms of Christian-Neoplatonic and Hegelian idealism.

The difficult issues of how much the new emphases of Western thought have resulted from actual epistemic gain, and how much they are—as one may follow a relativizing logic—epiphenomena of our own social, economic and political situations may be seen as crucial in deciding how to respond to a system such as that of the Pratyabhijñā. What are the true consequences of the insight rearticulated by Heidegger? Regardless of anyone's final decision about the case at hand, it should be clear that a comparative-systematic approach to religious phenomena must take seriously, literally, an attempt such as that of the Pratyabhijñā to make itself intelligible. When we approach the Pratyabhijñā system according to its own intentionality as a series of attempts to solve basic philosophical problems, we are led directly towards an appreciation of the central problem: what it could mean for us to allow its soteriology, i.e., ultimately to experience identity with the alleged omnipotent Self Śiva. The dialogical consideration of the Pratyabhijñā in relation to our own contextual "plausibility structures" is the most neutral, critical orientative ground for other interpretations—scientific/historical as well as theological.

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[84]These are scene and agency in Burke's scheme. In my view it is the explanatory recourse to a universal subject or agent which would cause more problems for acceptance than the idealism. Relativism and skepticism are in important ways idealistic.

Interpretive Histories and the Scope of this Study

This section will briefly discuss the religious historical context of the philosophical theology of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. I will comment on recent scholarship in this area. I will also explain the philological scope of this dissertation and how its approach differs from earlier studies.

From around the middle of the first millenium C.E. through the early centuries of the present millenium, Kashmir was a great center of Hindu and Buddhist religious, philosophical and literary activity. The religious culture represented by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta has frequently been designated "Kashmir Śaivism." There are problems with this term. Its referent is actually a group of closely related *tantric* Śaiva and Śākta traditions, which were perhaps once most centered in Kashmir, but also developed elsewhere in North and South India. Another fact obfuscated by the term is that Kashmir was also an important locus for forms of orthodox, non-*tantric* Śaivism.

A better classification of the relevant traditions often used nowadays is "monistic Kashmiri Śaivism." The names of some of the more important traditions which developed a monism are Kaula, Krama, Trika and Spanda. These traditions each comprised complicated esoteric systems of iconographic symbolism and ritual. In scriptures (*āgama* or *tantra*), devotional and theological works composed over hundreds of years, writers in these traditions continuously attempted to encompass the symbolism and practices of the other monistic Śaiva as well as the orthodox traditions. The texts of the different traditions thus register many levels of mutual influence. As the boundaries between the traditions were diffuse, it seems that religious practicioners frequently adhered to more than one of them.

I will characterize some of the central doctrinal and practical orientations in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism which will be useful for appreciating the Pratyabhijñā

system. Although there are innumerable expressions of mythology and symbolism, it will be most useful to identify a pattern characteristic of an even broader range of *tantrism:* The God Śiva, often conceived in His horrific form as Bhairava, emanates and sexually enjoys the universe as His power and consort Śakti.[85] As the Goddess, the universe is both real and completely identical with Śiva.

Again, these traditions contain a plethora of spiritual practices. However, the broad pattern corresponding to the *tantric* mythical structure just explained is the use of sexual rituals to manifest or reintegrate the cosmogonic sexual unity of Śiva and Śakti. These rituals are often actually performed by male and female partners, and sometimes they are performed by an adept alone through visualization. The adept achieves complete identification with Śiva in the enjoyment of the universe as Śakti—power and consort.

Alexis Sanderson describes the central symbolic and practical theme differentiating these traditions from the more orthodox traditions as a valuation of *power over purity.*[86] For the orthodox traditions the Ultimate Reality supersedes the desires and actions of the individual self, and external behavior is rigidly controlled by ritual considerations of purity, particularly of caste. The monistic Śaiva pattern is seen

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[85]The appellation of the Goddess, Śakti, literally means 'power.' In some versions of these traditions the highest deity is understood to be Śakti rather than Śiva. Also, the theologies often describe many different forms of Śiva and Śakti at different cosmic levels. The most prominent understanding of Śiva is in the horrific form of Bhairava, and the most prominent understanding of Śakti is as the horrific Goddess Kālī. Sometimes the highest form of Śiva, including Śakti as identical with Himself, is called the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*) or the Supreme Śiva (*paramaśiva*). Sometimes the emanatory reality of Śakti is described as Śiva's creative vibration or pulsation (*spanda, sphurattā*).

[86]Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power Among the Brahmans of Kashmir," in *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History,* ed. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 190-216.

in the sexual reintegration of Śiva-Śakti just mentioned, the transgressiveness of which is also evinced in that it is often performed by partners of different castes; myths and iconography of horrific deities; and practices involving forbidden "impure" substances—sexual fluids, and corpses in cremation grounds. As is common in *tantric* traditions, below the level of salvation there is also the possibility of attaining limited 'magical powers' (*siddhi*) to enjoy wealth, sexual partners, etc.

Other formulations of characteristic *tantric* patterns which apply to the monistic Śaiva traditions of Kashmir are the pursuit of salvation (*mukti*) combined with enjoyment (*bhoga*) (as will already be understood), meditations on iconographic circles (*maṇḍala*), a metaphysics of Sacred Speech and corresponding *mantra* practices. I will say more about some of the particular monistic Śaiva traditions as it is relevant to the explanation of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics.

I will now mention some of the developments in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism which were precursory to the creation of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics. As the movements became more popular, they went through a process of "domesticization," in which some of the more radical practices (particularly those connected with the cremation grounds) were toned down and symbolically internalized.[87] The orientation became increasingly gnoselogical.[88] The traditions also started to produce increasingly systematic manuals of doctrine and practice following more orthodox models, e.g., the *Śiva Sūtras* and the *Spanda Kārikās.* The commentaries on these works began to address apologetically the alternative traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism.

A full-scale monistic Śaiva philosophical apologetics developed from the Trika tradition, a tradition named for its emphasis on various iconographic-cosmological

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[87]Sanderson has done the important work on this process. Ibid.

[88]Sanderson explained this to me in personal conversation.

triads, particularly triads of Goddesses and cosmic levels, associated with the prongs of Śiva's trident.[89] The first work of this apologetics was the *Śivadṛṣṭi, 'Cognition of Śiva,'* by Somānanda (c. 900-950). In this book Somānanda endeavors to defend monistic Śaivism against a number of competing forms of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Utpaladeva, a student of Somānanda, wrote a commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, the *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*.[90] Utpaladeva also wrote several other works intepreting and furthering the work of Somānanda with greater philosophical rigor. Although Utpaladeva treats a number of Hindu and Buddhist opponents in his works, his chief opponents are the Buddhist logicians. Somānanda had already begun to address the Hindu-Buddhist debates about recognition in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*.[91] However it is Utpaladeva's writings which first present the full theory of the Lord's self-recognition discussed in this dissertation. Utpaladeva wrote several works on philosophical theology. The most comprehensive are the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, 'Verses on the Recognition of the Lord,'*[92] and two commentaries on this, the short *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*,[93] and the more detailed

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[89]In accordance with the synthetic tendency I have explained, other monistic Śaiva traditions were also comprehended within the Trika, particularly the Krama.

[90]*The Śivadṛṣṭi of Srisomānandanātha with the Vritti by Utpaladeva,* ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 54 (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1934). Henceforth these texts will be abbreviated respectively as SD and SDV.

[91]See SD 4.118-124, 182-183. The Hindu-Buddhist discussions of recognition had also already been taken up by the orthodox dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta thinker Sadyojyoti. See *The Nareshvarapariksha of Sadyojyotih with Commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha,* ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 55 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steem Press, 1926).

[92]Henceforth IPK. I will refer to this text in the edition used for the commentary of Abhinavagupta, mentioned below.

[93]Utpaladeva, *Siddhitrayī and the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti,* ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921). The *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* will henceforth

Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti.[94] Utpaladeva also wrote a trilogy of specialized philosophical studies, the *Siddhitrayī, 'Three Proofs'—Iśvarasiddhi, 'Proof of the Lord;' Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi, 'Proof of a Subject who is not Insentient;'* and the *Sambandhasiddhi, 'Proof of Relation.*[95]

Abhinavagupta, widely considered to be one of the greatest thinkers in Indian history,[96] had as one of his teachers Utpaladeva's pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta. Abhinava elaborated Utpaladeva's arguments in brilliant and erudite commentaries, one on the IPK, the *Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī,*[97] and the other on the missing *Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti,* the *Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī.*[98] Despite his

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referred to as IPKV. In referring to it I will indicate both the chapter and verse enumeration found in Abhinavagupta's commentary below, and the page numbers of this edition.

[94]So far there has been general academic access only to fragments of this extremely important text, though some of it can be inferred from Abhinavagupta's commentary mentioned below. It seems, however, that a complete (or almost complete) manuscript exists which is being kept hidden by one or more individuals.

[95]The edition used is the same as that containing the IPKV. The three proofs will be respectively abbreviated IS, APS and SS.

[96]All of the Kashmiri theologians were also considered holy men by their traditions. However, the belief is especially strong in the case of Abhinavagupta. He himself asserts that he was conceived in a *tantric* ritual—something which is supposed to give great spiritual power to the child. In his works Abhinava speaks in a casual factual manner about his spiritual realization and his identity with Bhairava.

[97]*Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit text with Bhāskarī,* 2 vols., ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer and K.C. Pandey (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986). Abhinavagupta's text will henceforth be referred to as IPV and the 18th century commentary on it, *Bhāskarī,* by Bhāskara—will be referred to as BIPV. I note that I will refer to the verses of the IPK in this edition.

[98]*The Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta,* 3vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (Reprint, Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987). Henceforth IPVV.

preeminence in philosophical theology, and the thousands of pages he wrote on it, Abhinavagupta probably placed greater value on his even more voluminous studies in *tantric* symbolism, "systematic theology;" and ritual, "practical theology." In his magnum opus, the *Tantrāloka,*[99] and in numerous other works, Abhinava critically structured the Trika in the light of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy;[100] and he synthesized under its rubric an enormous range of symbolism and ritual from diverse *tantric* traditions. Again, Abhinavagupta's long commentaries on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra,* the *Abhinavabhāratī;* and on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka,* the *Dhvanyālokalocana,* are among the most influential aesthetic writings in Indian history. In these works Abhinavagupta developed Indian studies of literature and literary theory, and linguistic theory—while explaining the character of aesthetic experience as homologous to, and practically approaching, the monistic Śaiva soteriological realization.

Abhinavagupta's pupil, Kṣemarāja (1000-1050), further elaborated the theological insights of his teacher, particularly in a number of commentaries on foundational Śaiva texts such as the *Svacchanda Tantra, Śiva Sūtras* and *Spanda Kārikās.* I believe that it is fair to say that in Abhinavagupta and the other monistic Kashmiri Śaiva thinkers of this period Hindu *tantrism* reached its peak of theological sophistication. This Śaivism was influential on a number of other Indian religious traditions, e.g., Śrīvidyā *tantrism,* Bengali Vaiṣṇavism and Southern monistic and dualistic Śaivism. However, the lineages of theological interpretation of the texts,

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99 *The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha,* 8 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri and Mukunda Rama Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, republication, ed. R.C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). Abhinavagupta's work will henceforth be referred to as TA, and Jayaratha's commentary, *Tantrālokaviveka,* will be referred to as TAV.

100 Cf. the discussion of the role of fundamental theology in systematic and practical theologies in Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination,* 183 n. 26.

crucial to the perpetuation of tradional Sanskritic culture, were mostly destroyed during the Islamicization of Kashmir.

The main textual focus of this dissertation will be Utpaladeva's IPK and Abhinavagupta's IPV. However, I will also be interpreting and referring frequently to the IPKV, IPVV and *Siddhitrayī*. These documents are the chief available expressions of what I undersand as the Pratyabhijñā system per se.[101] It will generally be necessary to treat the ideas of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta together, though I will point to some possible differences between them when the occasion warrants. As is usual in foundational verse and aphorism texts, Utpaladeva's IPK is densely written, and is intended to be expounded in subordinate commentaries. However, there is presently available only the shorter of Utpaladeva's commentaries, which is mostly concerned with clarifying the basic meaning of the verses. Abhinavagupta's commentaries have the quality of deep and original thought; but it is most often impossible to distinguish arguments which had direct precedent in Utpaladeva from those which either further or depart from his discussions. It is also in accordance with the intentions of the Indian genre of text and commentary to treat them as presenting one system.

For the elucidation of the works just mentioned, I will also refer to several other related texts—scriptures; pertinent philosophical writings of other traditions; the SD; the TA and other writings of Abinavagupta; the 18th century commentary on the IPV by Bhāskara; and later writings expressing some of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics,

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[101]Kṣemarāja's well known *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* is not so much a development of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics as a basic manual of spiritual doctrine and practice in the light of this apologetics. Kṣemarāja, *Pratyabhijnāhṛdayam: The Secrect of Self-Recognition,* ed., trans., and with introduction by Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980).

Virūpākṣanātha's *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* with the commentary of Vidyācakravartin,[102] and the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* and the commentary *Mānasollāsa,* wrongly attributed to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.[103]

During the past century, in both India and the West, there has been increasing interest in the monistic Śaiva traditions of Kashmir.[104] The most important progress in scholarship, in my opinion, has been a developing awareness of the historical diversity and complexity of the traditions. The exaggeration of the interpretive scope of limited appropriations has been the main problem. The misconception already explained, that the expression "Kashmir Śaivism" can designate one unanimous tradition, has only

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[102] *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā,* in *Tantrasaṃgraha (Part 1),* ed. Gopinath Kaviraj, *Yogatantra-granthamālā,* ed. Badarinath Sukla, vol. 3 (Varanasi: Sansar Press, 1970), 1-22. Henceforth VPP and VPPV.

[103] *Shankaracharya's Dakshinamurtistotram: With the 'Tattvasudha' of Svayamprakasha and 'Manasollasa' of Suresvaracharya, with the Commentary of Ramatirtha and Pancikarana of Shankaracharya with Suresvaracharya's Vartika,* ed. Vidwan N.S. Venkatanathacharya (Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1972). Henceforth DMS and DMSM.

[104] Some of the more notable points in the development of interest have been: The Western discoveries of the Kashmiri traditions by George Buhler and M.A. Stein. The publication of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. The revival of spiritual interpretation of the traditions in the synthetic mystical theology of the scholar and holy man Gopinath Kaviraj. The scholarship and religious teachings of the holy man Lakshman Joo. The pioneering studies of Abhinavagupta by K.C. Pandey and his student Navjivan Rastogi. The translations and studies of the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli. The translations and studies of the French scholars Lilian Silburn and Andre Padoux. The translations of Jaideva Singh. The advocation of Kashmir Śaivism by the popular guru Swami Muktananda. The Sanskrit editions, and Sanskrit and Hindi scholarship on the scriptures by Brajvallabh Dvivedi. The analytic historical studies of Śaiva symbolism and practice by Alexis Sanderson and Mark Dyczkowski. The SUNY Series on the Shaiva traditions of Kashmir.

gradually been disappearing.[105] The complexly overlapping monistic Śaiva traditions have also been too simplistically reified as distinct schools.[106] Historical simplifications have in particular been made on the basis of Abhinavagupta's theological interpretations and syntheses.[107] The same kinds of problems have occurred in the interpretation of Abhinavagupta alone. Studies of particular features of his thought have over-estimated their descriptiveness.[108]

Alexis Sanderson is the scholar who has most advanced contemporary understanding of the historical complexity of the interweaving Kashmiri *tantric* traditions, and the transformations of them in the theology of Abhinavagupta.[109] Mark

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105The classic expression of the view is J.C. Chatterjee, *Kashmir Shaivism,* Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 2 (Srinagar, 1914; reprint, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

106A brief discussion of these problems may be found in Paul Eduardo Muller-Ortega, *The Triadic Heart of Śiva: Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-Dual Shaivism of Kashmir,* SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 16-18.

107This problem is pervasive. It is found in studies as diverse as K.C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study,* 2nd. ed., The Chowkhambha Sanskrit Studies, vol. 1, (Varanasi: Chowkhambha, 1963); and the studies and translations of Lilian Silburn, e.g., *Kuṇḍalinī: The Energy of the Depths; A Comprehensive Study Based on the Scriptures of Nondualistic Kashmir Śaivism,* trans. Jacques Gontier, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

108Thus Muller-Ortega, *Triadic Heart,* exaggerates the genuinely important explanatory significance of Abhinavagupta's Kaula *tantrism,* the symbol of the heart, and the teachings of the guru Śambhunātha.

109In addition to Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power," see "Maṇḍala and Āgamic Identity in the Trika of Kashmir," in *Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans L'Hindouisme,* ed. Andre Padoux (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), 169-214; "Śaivism and the Tantric Traditions," in *The World's Religions,* ed. Stewart Sutherland et al. (London: Routledge, 1988), 660-704; "The Visualization of the Deities of the Trika," in *L'Image divine: Culte et meditation dans L'Hindouisme,* ed. Andre Padoux (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990), 31-88; and

Dyczkowski has also developed a complementary historical perspective.[110] My understanding of the history of monistic Śaivism is particularly indebted to these two scholars.

On the other hand, I must emphasize that I have been talking here about progress in an *analytic* understanding of history. The diversity of the *tantric* traditions does not refute the validity of interpretations of their spiritual unity, whether by Abhinavagupta in medieval Kashmir, or by Gopinath Kaviraj in 20th century Varanasi. These efforts must be assessed through methods of theology—philosophical, symbolic/systematic or practical.

Some of the more notable scholarship focusing on the Pratyabhijñā apologetics has been done by K.C. Pandey, R.K. Kaw, Steven Kupetz, David Allport and Harvey Alper. The translations and studies of Pandey and Kaw are important pioneering works (particularly those of Pandey).[111] However, their books suffer from the general

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"The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra," in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of Andre Padoux,* ed. Teun Goudriaan, SUNY Series in Tantric Studies, ed. Paul Eduardo Muller-Ortega (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 281-312.

[110]Mark Dyczkowski, *The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,* SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) and *The Canon of the Śaivāgama and the Kubjikā Tantras of the Western Kaula Tradition,* SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

[111]I have already cited K.C. Pandey's monograph *Abhinavagupta,* and his edition, with K.A. Subramania Iyer, of the IPV, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition.* Volume 3 of the latter is a translation of the text by Pandey. R.K. Kaw's works include the edition, translation and study, *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva: Basic Text on "Pratyabhijñā Philosophy" (The Doctrine of Recognition),* Sharada Peetha Indological Research Series, no. 12 (Srinagar: Sharada Peetha Research Centre, 1975); *The Doctrine of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā Philosophy),* Vishveshvaranand Indological Series, no. 40 (Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Institute, 1967); and *Recognition (Pratyabhijñā) of Man's Supreme*

historical misconceptions just mentioned, along with insufficent attention to the the scholastic debates which the Pratyabhijñā addresses, and a general intellectual fuzziness. Their translations are problematic, and opaque to nonspecialists.[112] The worst of these studies, by Steven Kupetz, badly distorts the sources in arguing that Abhinavagupta diverged from Utpaladeva in the direction of Advaita Vedāntin illusionism.[113]

Harvey Alper's translations and interpretations are more careful. However, most of his work is focused on a very limited portion of the Pratyabhijñā writings—the chapter of the IPV on perception. And he moves too much towards characterizing the entire system on the basis of this limited portion, without attending to its overarching agendas and the problem of recognition.[114] The best of these studies, by David Allport (which I managed to look at only after my own study was complete), begins to address

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Inheritance: Voice of Somānanda and Utpaladeva, Sharada Peetha Research Series, no. 15 (Srinagar: Sharada Peetha Research Centre, 1977).

[112]Despite the problems, Pandey's judgements are often valuable. I must acknowledge that sometimes I have found it useful to consult his translations.

[113]Steven Jeffrey Kupetz, "The Non-Dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism: An Analysis of the Pratyabhijñā School" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1972). For an explanation that Kupetz's argument is "entirely spurious," see David Allport, "Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition" (D.Phil. thesis, Wolfson College, Oxford University, 1982), 95-121.

[114]Harvey Paul Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power: A Translation of the Jñānaśaktyāhnika of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* with Commentary and Introduction" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); "Śiva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness: The Spaciousness of an Artful Yogi," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979): 345-407; "'*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ:*' 'Judgement as a Transcendental Category in Utpaladeva's Śaiva Theology: The Evidence of the *Pratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*" [unpublished]. The last study is limited in a different way. It is a study of a particular class of terms (*vimarśa* and its cognates—which will be treated particularly in chapter four of this dissertation) without sufficient attention to the various arguments which contain them.

statements by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta about the purposes and methods of the system, and moves further into the details of some of the technical philosophical discussions, e.g., memory and relation. Nevertheless, it does not go nearly far enough in piecing together the great number of "propaedeutic" statements, the context of debate in the Indian philosophical academy, and the force of the Pratyabhijñā arguments as a whole.[115]

The discussion of problems of interpretation has made clear my position that non-normative interpretation is not possible even as an ideal. This dissertaton is not chiefly an exercise in the particular kind of normative discourse which is philology, but has a philosophical-theoretical agenda. Nevertheless, I believe that my focus on the Pratyabhijñā as an effort of ostensibly universal communication has enabled me to make progress in the philological understanding of the texts.

I have endeavored to organize the entire descriptive aspect of my study around *expressions by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta of what they are doing in their philosophical apologetics.*[116] Western scholarship on Sanskrit philosophy too rarely takes such statements seriously.[117] Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta did not only

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[115]David Allport, "Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition." I note that Raffaele Torella in Rome is working on the Pratyabhijñā system. All I have seen by him is "The Pratyabhijñā and the Logical-Epistemological School of Buddhism," in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of Andre Padoux,* 327-345. This study, which I have just looked at, makes useful points about some of the technical Buddhist theory taken up in the Śaivas speculation. However it does not address the central frameworks organizing the Pratyabhijñā system and the theory of recognition. Birgit Mayer is writing a doctoral dissertation in Heidelberg on the SD.

[116]I begin to interpret Utpaladeva's and Abhinvagupta's frameworks in the next chapter.

[117]Allport did take a laudable beginning step in this direction.

produce a collection of interesting ideas. They were extraordinarly self-conscious and deliberate in pursuing complex agendas throughout their works.

One framework I develop uses the theological concept of "correlation" to characterize the interpretive bridge the Pratyabhijñā thinkers make between Śaiva religious doctrine and practice, on the one hand; and, on the other, the concerns and methods of the Sanskritic philosophical academy—especially debates about recognition. My interpretation attempts to understand some of the deeper ramifications of what the Pratyabhijñā is saying regarding both of the correlated areas. By doing this I have been able to put together a number of technical Śaiva discussions to come up with a new interpretation of the central concept of recognition.

Let me add a personal note, that attempting to understand what Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are really claiming in their philosophy has led me, and continues to lead me, to rethink, further study and discover new things in the Western philosophical and theological traditions. Also a caution in the spirit of the criticisms just registered: There is much more to the Pratyabhijñā philosophy than I am able to present. There is certainly much more to the monistic Śaiva traditions than the Pratyabhijñā apologetics. There is an astonishing amount more in the theology of Abhinavagupta alone—in reflections on symbolism, ritual and aesthetics.

CHAPTER 2

THE TASK OF THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SYSTEM

> Having somehow been caused to obtain servitude [*dāsya*] to the Great Lord and desiring the benefit [*upakāra*] of humanity, I am establishing the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of Him, which is the cause of obtaining all prosperity/has as its cause the comprehension of the establishment of all reality.[1]
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> IPK 1.1 benedictory verse, 1:18

In this section I will endeavor to construct a "propaedeutics" of what Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta understand themselves to be doing in the texts of the Pratyabhijñā system. I will begin by taking a useful description from contemporary theology: the interpretation of a tradition in a new context of discourse, including that made in this dissertation, may be characterized as an effort of "correlation."[2] My concern will be to show how the Śaivas' discourse ambitiously and distinctively correlates their own soteriological traditions with the Sanskritic traditions of inter-religious philosophical discussion. From the point of view of our considerations of rationality, what is important is the nature of the latter traditions of providing a context with standards for publicly assessable argument. The Śaivas' effort is far from disinterested, but is not at all compromised by this fact.

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[1]The two interpretations of the final clause given by Abhinavagupta will be discussed at different points below. The version given first appears to be more literal.

[2]I have already referred to the treatment of the debates betweeen correlational and anti-correlational theology (in some ways related to those between relativism and anti-relativism) in Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance."

Recent analyses of the general nature of the discourse of Sanskrit "academic" texts called *śāstras* have shown the extent to which they are strongly tradition oriented—in most cases tradition, or tradition as interpreted in authoritative works, is simply cited as the basis of beliefs and principles of action.[3] However, there are many other types of *śāstras* besides those occupied with philosophy or fundamental religious reflection in the sense developed in the previous chapter. A large number of *śāstras* are "manuals" didactically summarizing the various areas of human knowledge, from religious doctrines and practices to the art of farming.

Our concern is with examples of a still large subclass of philosophical texts. These comprise much of the polemics of the especially influential Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, along with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa, Buddhist logic and various other schools. Such works are characterized by the effort to justify the authority of a particular tradition by adducing criteria of experience and rationality which are supposed to be acceptable to others. Indeed the academic standards which function in such efforts of correlation themselves constitute traditions. This must be the case with all efforts at philosophizing. Again, new questions can be raised about the assumptions

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[3]On the extent to which *śāstraic* discourse tends to create ancient, ahistorical authority for principles of action, see the articles by Sheldon Pollock, "The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105.3 (1985), 499-519; "The Idea of Śāstra in Traditional India," in *Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts,* ed. Anna Libera Dallapiccola (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989), 17-26; and "Playing by the Rules: Śāstra and Sanskrit Literature," in *Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts*, 301-326. I cannot fully consider these studies here. While greatly elucidative, Pollock's interpretation does not sufficiently address the necessary role of tradition in generating principles of action in all cultures (as is observed in theories of disclosure and particularly emphasized in Gadamerian hermeneutics) or (as a consequence) address the problem of epistemological or ethical criteria for differentiating such principles as valid or invalid. For an analysis of the ways in which doctrines themselves are legitimated on the basis of earlier textual authorities, see Paul Griffiths, *The Doctrine of Buddhahood* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, forthcoming).

of the discursive context of any attempt to achieve more universal intelligibility. This does not undermine my contention that philosophical discourse is the most rigorously dialogical means of dealing with conflicts of views and practices starting from different assumptions. As was argued in the previous chapter, the agenda of philosophy must be intrinsically open ended. In David Tracy's words, reason is only "partly history-transcending."[4]

Observations about the conservative orientations of *śāstras* in connection with particular schools, and not inter-school, traditions still support a very important point about the Pratyabhijñā system. The correlation which the Śaivas endeavor to make is not a connection between two things understood as separate. The Śaivas wish to play the rules of the academic game which does not accept their authority in order to show that it in actuality depends upon their authority.[5] As was stated in the previous chapter, they attempt to situate their effort towards denaturalization fully within their soteriology—through ambitious argumentation which can be understood as transcendental.

As would be expected, the Śaivas take up propaedeutic issues particularly in the first chapter of the Pratyabhijñā texts. In accordance with the Indian *śāstraic* and philosophical customs, many of these issues are densely summed up in the first verse of

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[4]Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance," 567.

[5]It should not be surprising that the Śaivas attempt to do much more than merely acknowledge the role of their tradition in understanding, as in the isolated notion of a hermeneutic circle. The necessarily conservative orientation of the Śaivas' apologetics may be understood as a distinctive form of the "encompassment" of one culture with the categories of another, which has been observed in India and throughout the world. Ideally, the attempt in the philosophical form of encompassment to make views explicit and find universal criteria of experience and rationality for them would make easier our contemporary effort to identify the alienating effects of power in discourse.

Utpaladeva quoted above.[6] They are, however, further developed in a complex manner throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. Also, many of the matters taken up here are elucidated by discussions in Śaiva literature written both before and after the creation of the Pratyabhijñā system. Because of the extremely dense and interconnected nature of Abhinavagupta's comments throughout these and other works, along with the points elucidated in related literature, the subjects now being taken up resist a linear explanation. My interpretation of the Śaivas' "self-consciousness" will be structured partially as appears necessitated by the texts and partially by an effort to make things more amenable to the needs of a dissertation.

To give us a little more of an explanatory rubric, I will sometimes refer to an Indian device of organizing propaedeutic issues into four 'pertinent points' (*anubandha*):[7] 1) Relation to tradition (*sambandha*). 2) Eligibility for studying the system (*adhikāra*). 3) Subject matter (*abhidheya*). 4) Purpose (*prayojana*). Abhinava is himself aware of this tradition and refers to it in his commentary on the aesthetic text *Dhvanyāloka*. [8] The discussions in the Pratyabhijñā texts cover these along with other matters, e.g., the operation of the *śāstra* as both intellectual and soteriological method. The Śaivas' treatment of all these issues may be seen as bearing upon the nature of the Pratyabhijñā as an effort of correlation.

Thus the first of the pertinent points just mentioned concerns the origination of the Pratyabhijñā system in a soteriological tradition. The thinkers provide indications at

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[6]Another tradition is that the first verse expresses benediction. Abhinava finds this meaning implied in Utpaladeva's verse. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17-23.

[7]The gloss of this term is taken from *The "Dhvanyāloka" of Ānandavardhana with the "Locana" of Abhinavagupta*, trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and M.V. Patwardhan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 52, n. 1.

[8]Ibid.

different places of the connection of the Pratyabhijñā system with the Trika form of the monistic Śaiva tradition. Abhinavagupta thus refers to the ultimate reality in the system as Anuttara. This term, meaning 'Unsurpassed,' is a central Trika designation of the unity of the Supreme Lord (Parameśvara/Bhairava) and the Goddess Supreme 'Parā.' Abhinava again refers to Somānanda as "a pearl in the lineage of Tryambaka."[9] Tryambaka was a legendary Śaiva personage whom the Trika attempted to claim as its originator.[10] Likewise in the third chapter of the Pratyabhijñā texts the thinkers explain the modus operandi of the Pratyabhijñā system within the framework of the Trika triad of cosmic levels.[11]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are also concerned to assert their positions directly within the lineage of the initiator of monistic Śaiva philosophical apologetics, Somānanda. Utpala explains that the path which he teaches "has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*...."[12] Likewise Abhinavagupta refers to the system (*śāstra*) as "a reflection of the wisdom of Lord

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[9]IPV 1.1 introductory verses 2-4, 1:7-8.

[10]See a somewhat different understanding of the sources at Dyczkowski, *Vibration,* 18, 229 n. 74. Also see the articles by Alexis Sanderson on the relation of the Pratyabhijñā system and the Trika tradition.

[11]IPK and IPV 3.1.5, 2:226-228. Abhinava here also finds support for Utpaladeva's understanding of the illuminative operation of the system in the Trika text *Ṣaḍardhasāra*. IPV 3.1.7, 2:231.

[12]IPK 4.1.16, 2:309. Abhinava in fact finds Utpala's communication of his guru-succession (*guruparvakrama*) as one of the meanings of the word "somehow" in the introductory verse, and connects it to this explicit assertion. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42.

Somānanda."[13] Abhinavagupta identifies himself as the student of Utpaladeva's own pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta.[14]

Utpaladeva actually states in his introductory verse that his motivating personal situation in composing the text was a religious experience—the attainment of servitude (*dāsya*) to the Great Lord. Servitude (*dāsya*) is a Śaiva term for a state of high spiritual realization. Abhinava interprets this word as indicating Utpaladeva's realization of identity (*tanmayatā*) with the Supreme Lord.[15] He explains this realization in a characteristically tantric manner as comprising the possession of the Lord's Self-enjoyment (*svātmopabhoga*), and the freedom (*svātantrya*) to obtain whatever is desired.[16] According to Abhinava, the gerund construction "having been caused to obtain" (*āsādya*) indicates the immediacy of Utpaladeva's effort after he had this realization.[17] Abhinava further states that Utpaladeva's realization indicates his qualification to teach others.[18] The fact that its motivation is directly consequent upon an experience of salvation points to the Pratyabhijñā philosophy's very strong rootedness in the Trika/monistic Śaiva traditions.

Such are the indications given by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta of the traditional-spiritual context of the Pratyabhijñā system. We now turn to consider their understanding of the system's purpose. The Śaivas' reflections on this topic are complex. It is in the course of these reflections that they explain most of the other

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[13]IPV introductory verses 2-4, 1:7-8.

[14]IPV introductory verses 2-4, 1:7-8; IPV 1.1 concluding lines, 1:79; IPV 4.1.16, 2:309-310.

[15]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17.

[16]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28-29.

[17]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28, and BIPV, 1:28.

[18]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28-29.

propaedeutic issues. Abhinavagupta actually finds a hierarchy of three purposes expressed in Utpaladeva's introductory verse.[19] This analysis is not a pedantic indulgence, because it clarifies areas of discussion throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. For the sake of clarity, I briefly list these purposes before considering them in detail: The highest purpose is the manifestation of identity with the Supreme Lord. The intermediate is the experience of recognition. The lowest is the communication of the knowledge of the means to recognition.[20] We will first move back and forth between the two highest levels of purpose.

The "highest" purpose may be understood as the purpose in the most proper sense. Abhinavagupta finds this purpose expressed in two places in Utpaladeva's introductory verse. It is directly stated in the clause, "desiring the benefit of humanity."[21] Abhinava explains the benefit which Utpala wishes to bestow as none other than the 'servitude' (*dāsya*), the identity with the Great Lord, which he has himself experienced.[22]

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[19]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:40. Abhinava also discusses in various places the relative interpretive objectives of the various levels of commentaries by Utpaladeva and himself on the Pratyabhijñā. Thus see IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:39 and IPVV 1.1, 1:15-17. This is not our main concern here. I note that Abhinava states that he wrote the shorter of his two commentaries, the IPV, which is our main focus chiefly "so that the dull-witted can discern recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]"! IPV 1.1 introductory verse 5, 1:15.

[20]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:41-42.

[21]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33. Abhinava finds corraboration for interpreting Utpala's expression of his purpose in the participle "desiring" (*icchan*) in the Śaiva metaphysics of emanation, according to which the Lord's Power of Desire/Intention (*icchā śakti*), swells into His Power of Action (*kriyā śakti*). IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33.

[22]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:38-39. See also IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33 and on this BIPV, 33.

Utpaladeva's reference to those whom he wishes to benefit as "humanity" (*jana*) addresses the propaedeutic issue of eligibility for using the system. Abhinavagupta interprets the term humanity as indicating "those who are afflicted by incessant birth and death" and who "as objects of compassion, should be helped."[23] He explains that Utpaladeva's general reference means that there is no restriction regarding those who are eligible.[24] Abhinava is most explicit on this point in a statement at the end of the book: "Here there is no requirement of caste [*jāti*]. Therefore the benefit of all is expressed."[25] The subcommentator Bhāskara also explains that Abhinava, contra the Vedāntins, is denying caste restrictions. Those eligible include Śūdras as well as Brahmans.[26]

The Pratyabhijñā is thus intended as a sort of "testimony" promoting the soteriological agenda of the tradition. It is interesting that the very possibility of this motivation is called into question. Abhinava deems it necessary to argue that the good of others can really be a purpose. He explains that it is a purpose because it has the definitive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of a purpose. Even one's own good would not be a purpose if it did not have this characteristic. Abhinava gives a general definition of purpose:

> The purpose [*prayojana*] is that which is aimed at as the chief thing to be accomplished, and thus prompts into actions.[27]

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[23]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

[24]IPV 1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:29-30.

[25]IPV 4.1.18, 2:316.

[26]BIPV on IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:30.

[27]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

He cites for corraboration the classic Nyāya definition: "Purpose is that object aiming at which a person acts."[28] Abhinava explains that: "... There is not a divine curse such that a purpose is only the advantage of oneself and not the advantage of others."[29]

Who did the Śaivas really expect to study and be benefitted by the Pratyabhijñā system? The very fact that their ideas were written in the elite language of Sanskrit would seem to delimit the audience to much less than all humanity. It is unlikely that even Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta really believed that everyone would read the books. We shall see that the arguments of the Pratyabhijñā system receive their immediate intellectual problematic from the skeptical views on epistemology and ontology put forth by the school now often referred to as the Buddhist logicians. Was the system intended to convert Buddhist or other Hindu intellectuals? The history of Indian philosophy does reveal an extensive process of reading and response of various thinkers to texts of other schools, though we will never know how much any of this resulted in conversions.

It must be observed that the impact of the Pratyabhijñā system along with monistic Śaivism in general was severly attenuated by the destruction of most of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions of Kashmir through the Muslim invasions.[30] We do know

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[28]*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.24, quoted at IPV 1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32. My translation is influenced by those of Ganganatha Jha, *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama: With the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 1:339; and Pandey, IPV 3:5. Abhinava understands this definition as supporting the Nyāya view that the good of others is the motive for the Lord's creation and other acts. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

[29]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32. Abhinava also observes that the others are ultimately identical with Utpaladeva's own self. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

[30]It was particularly the educational culture necessary for the perpetuation and development of interreligious polemics which was damaged. The Pratyabhijñā philosophy, however, did have a very wide-ranging indirect impact. Abhinavagupta

that the system was sometimes studied by such distant intellectuals as Mādhavācārya and Bhāskararāya. However, we do not know of any Buddhist philosophical texts before or after the Pratyabhijñā which respond to the monistic Śaiva doctrines. In my opinion we should extend the hermeneutic charity of taking the Śaivas seriously as intending their work to be of benefit to people outside of their tradition.[31] Important to us is that the unlimited potential audience, at least for the "academy," for their soteriologically efficacious discourse creates the need for its more universal intelligibility. We might conjecture that besides convincing those of other traditions, the Pratyabhijñā might have been understood to play the role of increasing the conviction of those already on the path.[32] We know that summaries of ancient debates function in this way for contemporary Buddhist communitities. Even this function would depend upon the ostensibly universal rationality of the discourse.

The deeper significance of the Śaiva conception of recognition can be approached only after I have explained the challenge of the Buddhist opponents. However, because it is the intermediate of the three purposes analyzed by Abhinavagupta, it must be briefly taken up. Abhinava's location of recognition in the middle of his hierarchy of purposes is itself worthy of consideration. It clarifies the

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utilized the theoretical vocabulary of the Pratyabhijñā system for structuring Śaiva symbolism and ritual. This interpretation was passed on in monistic Śaiva cultus and had an influence on other traditions, of Śaivism, *tantrism,* Vaiṣṇavism, etc., across South Asia. Abhinava and others also "cross-fertilized" the Pratyabhijñā and other Śaiva theology with ideas from Indian aesthetics. This ocurred particularly in the area of the philosophy of language. The Pratyabhijñā thus represents an important, although usually unacknowledged, background to later Indian poetic theory.

[31]On hermeneutic charity, see Paul Griffiths, *An Apology for Apologetics* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 20-21.

[32]We will consider in the next chapter on the Buddhist prima facie the Śaivas explanations regarding the nature of doubt as the chief obstacle to spiritual advancement.

nature of the Śaivas' concept as bridging their salvation with a method which is simultaneously religious and intellectual. In this explanation of the recognition which Utpaladeva says in the first verse that he is establishing, Abhinava proceeds from the common epistemological to the soteriological modalities:

> Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] has the nature of the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of that which has appeared[33] with that which is appearing. It is a cognition [*jñāna*] involving synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*] of something which has become present [*abhimukhībhūte*, as may be expressed][34] "This is that very Caitra." [Another sample expression of recognition is] "He is made to be recognized by the king." [As is illustrated in this last example,] recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is understood by ordinary people to be the cognition [*jñāna*] which is enlivened by synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*] on the occasion of the becoming present again [*punarabhimukhībhāvāvasare*] of what has been cognized. [This may have been cognized previously] in terms of either its general or particular character, e.g., as [a man] who is the son of someone, has a particular appearance, or particular characteristics. In the present case also the Lord is well known to have perfect Śaktis by means of the Purāṇas, orthodox Śaivism, scriptures, inference, etc., and one's Self is immediately evident. There arises a cognition [*jñāna*] through the synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*] of these [expressed] 'Indeed I am that very Lord.'[35]

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[33]This verb is from the root *bhā*. It is an example of a group of words that it is difficult to translate uniformly, which includes verbs, nouns and adjectives from the root *bhā*, the root *bhās*, and the prefix *pra* plus the root *kāś*. These words have senses of 'shines/light,' 'appears/appearance,' 'manifestation,' 'awareness.' I will generally translate intransitive verbs as 'appears,' 'appeared,' etc. I must stress that when I do so I intend *no connotations of illusoriness*. For the Śaivas, these appearances are real. Transitive verbs will usually be translated as 'manifests,' etc. Nominal expressions will be translated as 'manifestation,' 'illumination/luminosity,' or 'awareness,' depending on the context. I will discuss the technical meaning of the expression *svaprakāśa*, 'self-luminous' (from the reflexive prefix *sva*, plus the prefix *pra* and root *kāś*), and the abstraction *svaprakāśatva*, 'self-luminosity,' in this chapter. In the context of this technical discussion I will sometimes translate cognate verbs as 'illumines/shines.' In the fifth chapter I will explain more deeply the meaning of the isolated term *prakāśa*, 'light, awareness.'

[34]In this passage the bracketed expressions frequently makes use of the components of the word recognition, i.e., the prefixes *prati* and *abhi*, and the root *jñā*.

[35]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:37-38.

Abhinava interprets the consequence of the final purpose of salvation from the intermediate one of recognition as further developed by one of two meanings of the compound in Utpaladeva's introductory verse modifying the word recognition (*samastasampatsamavāptihetum*). In this, the apparently more obvious sense, the compound means that recognition *is* the cause for the obtaining of all prosperity.[36] Abhinava explains in a manner reminiscent of the Upaniṣads:

> For when there is attaining of the state of the Supreme Lord, all prosperity which flows forth from it is attained, like the prosperity of gems got in the obtaining of Rohaṇa.[37] What use is there of anything else which is obtained by the one who has been distracted from the supreme goal which is his own Self? And there is nothing other to be desired by the one who has attained the supreme goal which is that [Self].[38]

He cites one of his own verses:

> O God [*deva*], ultimately the goal of all actions and injunctions is identity with you. There will always be delusion for those who desire a goal [which is other than this].[39]

The manner in which benefit accrues from the soteriological recognition is further elaborated throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. It is sometimes explained in terms

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[36]See IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:41-42. Abhinava is here interpreting the word as a genitive (i.e., *tatpuruṣa*) compound.

[37]Rohaṇa is a mountain.

[38]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33-34.

[39]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42.

of the practical value of recognition.[40] Abhinavagupta finds this practical value corroborated in the famous analogy of Utpaladeva near the end of the text:[41]

> There may be a woman who has become thin [from pining for a man when she learned of his excellent qualities]. Then, because of her many requests, he [comes and] stands in her presence. However, when he is unrecognized, he seems like the rest of the world, and does not produce happiness. Similarly the Self of everybody, who is the Lord of the universe, when His qualities are not observed, is not is not able to realize His innate Lordship. Therefore, the recognition of Him has been explained.[42]

Abhinava explains that when unrecognized the lover appears just as an ordinary man. He compares the fulfillment obtained from the unrecognized Self to that obtained from a pot! When the woman recognizes her man she experiences "a particular fulfillment [*pūrṇatā*] which is like a wonderful bloom."[43] When the Self is recognized there is "liberation while living [*jīvanmukti*] having the nature of fulfillment [*pūrṇatā*]."[44]

The Śaivas also emphasize, as is characteristic of *tantrics,* that the state accomplished through recognition includes omnipotence. Abhinavagupta says of the practical value of the soteriological recognition:

40See IPV 1.1.2, 1:58-59. The term which I have translated for a limited context as 'practical value' is *arthakriyā*. This is a highly techinical concept in Buddhist and thereby in Hindu philosophy. The Buddhists understood it as a criterion for reality. It may be more exactly translated as 'purposeful action' or 'causal efficacy.' Though the deeper technical ramifications were doubtless in Abhinava's mind, I believe that the gloss as 'practical value' is sufficient and appropriate for the present discussion.

41IPV 4.1.17, 2:312-313.

42IPK 4.1.17, 2:313. I have had to translate this loosely to make the sense clear.

43IPV 4.1.17, 2:314.

44IPV 4.1.17, 2:314-315.

> Here the practical value [*arthakriyā*] is essentially the wonder [*camatkāra*] that 'I am the Great Lord,' which is characterized by the higher and lower powers [*siddhi*] and the Lordliness [*vibhūti*] of liberation while living.[45]

Utpala sums up in the very last verse of the book:

> This *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* has been composed by Utpala, the son of Udayākara, so that humanity may have power [*siddhi*] without exertion.[46]

Utpala and Abhinava explain that from what is accomplished in the system, one knows and does whatever he desires.[47] Abhinava explains that it is because the higher and lower powers are attained without exertion that the system has a great result (*mahāphala*).[48]

Abhinava sometimes mentions in his Pratyabhijñā commentaries the use of practices to attain special powers. It seems that he is ambiguous about whether these practices are required in addition to recognition. Additionally, although he is unequivocal that the result of recognition is liberation while living in which one penetrates through illusion, he sometimes speaks of the attainment of the highest perfection only after death.[49] These complexities do not concern us. What is important is that the Pratyabhijñā system finds its originating motivation in the experience of

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[45]IPV 4.1.17, 2:313. The Śaivas frequently say that the deeper forms of experience are accompanied by mystical-aesthetic wonder (*camatkāra*). For a brief discussion of this wonder see Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic experience of Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), xlv-xlvii. Gnoli compares the Śaiva concept with the Platonic understanding of the wonder involved in the appreciation of Beauty.

[46]IPK 4.1.18, 2:315.

[47]IPK and IPV 4.1.15, 2:308.

[48]IPV 4.1.18, 2:316. On the realization of omnipotence via what is layed out in the system also see IPK and IPV 3.2.11-12, 2:256-259.

[49]On practices to attain qualities or powers vis-a-vis *jīvanmukti* see IPV 2.3.17, 2:146-147; IPV 4.1.16, 2:310-311; IPV 4.1.17, 2:314-315. On the role of death in the transition to the highest perfection, see IPV 2.3.17, 2:146-147 and IPV 3.2.11-12.13, 2:257.

tantric salvation; and leads to the same salvation via recognition. Even the one who does not at first seem to benefit, will do so ultimately:

> He whose [delusion] is not removed in any way, has delusion due to the Śakti of the Lord.[50] However, because it has come to his ears, his latent tendencies [*saṃskāra*] will ripen, and he will certainly at some time attain his essential nature.[51]

We now turn to the system's most immediate purpose—communicating the means (*upāya*) to recognition. In various places in the Pratyabhijñā texts it is asserted that the Pratyabhijñā system itself is a soteriological method. Abhinava describes Pratyabhijñā as a specifically Trika method, as "a means for the goal of the Person who is the Witness, who is none other than Anuttara."[52] Utpala proclaims in the third to last verse of the book: "This new, easy path has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*."[53] Abhinava's explanation of the path's novelty is interesting. He states that "new [*abhinava*] [means] existing in all the secret texts, and not well known because of concealment."[54] Abhinava is here giving the universal hermeneutic device of grounding innovation in the implicit or potential significance of a tradition a distinctively *tantric* character of secrecy.[55]

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[50]That is, it is the Lord Himself who causes the delusion.

[51]IPV 2.3.17, 2:148.

[52]IPV 1.1 introductory verse 3, 1:8.

[53]IPK 4.1.16, 2:309.

[54]IPV 4.1.16, 2:309.

[55]Abhinavagupta glosses the word *nava*, 'new,' as *abhinava*, 'very/ever-new,' which he explains in terms of the path's previous *secrecy*. Abhinavagupta ultimately seems to ground the innovation in the creation of monistic Śaiva polemics—in the metaphysics of Śiva as the transcendent God generating the temporal flux of immanent experience. Also of interest is that Abhinavagupta seems here to be making word play with the meaning of his own name. 'Secret' is one of the meanings of the word *gupta*. There are a number of other such discussions throughout his writings. Perhaps these

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' understanding of the manner in which the system operates as a means towards recognition is remarkably complex. This again may be understood as arising from its ambitious correlational nature. The thinkers' conceptualizations of the system's modus operandi synthesize basic theological considerations, the baroque schema of *tantric* practice and technical philosophical strategies. Thus the Śaiva formulations of procedure are immediately interrupted by reflections upon what, using our own categories, I would characterize as a fundamental religious problem. I would describe this problematic most broadly as the possibility or utility of any finite human behavior, whether linguistic, aesthetic, theological, devotional, ritual, etc., for expressing, affecting or attaining a religious Ultimate Reality.[56] For the Pratyabhijñā this human-Ultimate "structural" issue has two aspects—coming from its nature as both a theistic and a fully monistic system.

The first brings us to the familiar questions of divine will, grace and human works. In theistic traditions, salvation is understood to depend upon some sort of favorable relationship between the divine and the human. Now, the former is some kind of "super-person," with superior value, power and perhaps even reality than the latter (at least prima facie). It would seem either doubtful or impossible for the finite human to be responsible for "making" a positive relationship with the deity. At the same time that they make a variety of moral or ritual prescriptions, theologies often attempt to address this problem by making formulations negating or delimiting the efficacy of human action for bringing about salvation. Probably every attempt to correct the various analogues of "Pelagianism" is slightly different. Sometimes salvation, and even

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hint that Abhinavagupta was given his name because of so well embodying the truth of the Śaiva metaphysics.

[56]Eliade conceptualized this issue in terms of history and the transcendence of history, as the "dialectic of the Sacred."

the orientation of the human which brings about proper actions (e.g., faith), are said to depend entirely on the divine grace (as in conceptions of predestination) or on some sort of combination of this grace with human response. However, the relation of negative and positive conceptions of the salvific value of human choice or actions is not only "quantitative," but depends upon the "qualitative" metaphysics in which they are conceived.

Abhinavagupta addresses this issue in several of his works. On the one hand, he acknowledges that one may discuss the most favorable conditions or actions of an aspirant for salvation. Indeed, a large portion of his writings consist in elaborate descriptions of ritual procedures. At the same time he states emphatically that in the ultimate perspective salvation is entirely accomplished by the divine will. The favorable conditions do not in any way *cause* the grace of Śiva.[57] Abhinava makes the same argument at various places in the Pratyabhijñā texts, although not at length. Thus he takes this issue up when interpreting the causative form of the gerund "having been caused to obtain" (*āsādya*) in Utpaladeva's introductory verse. Abhinava explains that the Lord does *everything.* His grace is therefore unattainable even by means of hundreds of wishes. It is because of the obfuscation of its real nature that the Lord's causation appears as relationships known through observed concomitances and nonconcomitances, such as the relations between means and goal (*upāyopeyabhāva*), accomplisher and accomplished (*niṣpādyaniṣpādakabhāva*), and that which makes

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[57]See the discussion of sections from the *Tantrāloka, Tantrasāra* and *Mālinīvijayavārttika* in Debabrata Sen Sharma, *The Philosophy of Sādhanā: With Special Reference to Trika Philosophy of Kāśmīra,* (Karnal, Haryana: Natraj Publishing House, 1983), 88ff. In Śaivism more generally, Śiva is said to perform five cosmic acts: The creation of the universe, the preservation of it, the destruction of it, the creation of human delusion (which is the cause of suffering in rebirth) and the bestowal of salvific grace.

known and that which is made known (*jñāpyajñāpakabhāva*).[58] According to Abhinava this unconditioned nature of the Lord's grace is indicated by the adverb "somehow" (*kathaṃcit*) modifying the causative gerund.[59]

It is to the second aspect of the human-Ultimate structural tension which I have thematized that the Pratyabhijñā thinkers devote most of their reflection. At the same time that the Ultimate Reality is understood in "super-" personal terms as the deity Śiva, rather than as an impersonal principle, it is understood to contain all reality in a pure unity.[60] How does the general problematic express itself in the case of philosophies or theologies attempting to describe, prove or even evoke the experience of a One? If the Ultimate Reality is nondual the structure and cognitive presumptiveness of its realization must be fundamentally different from ordinary experience.

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[58]I will consider the Śaivas' reduction of all causation to the Lord's agency in the sixth chapter. I will shortly take up an aspect of the Śaiva theory of illusion.

[59]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:24-28. As mentioned above, Abhinava also includes Utpaladeva's relationship with the lineage (*sambandha*) as part of the meaning of the adverb. Abhinava makes it clear that the traditional teacher (*guru*) is himself nothing but the Lord; and the propitiation of His feet is itself an act of the Lord. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:26-28. Cf. the first line of the *Śivadṛṣṭi:* "May Śiva, who has expanded [in emanating the universe] through His innate Śakti, and who has been entered by my form [i.e., Somānanda has realized identity with Him]—pay obeisance to Himself by Himself in order to remove [the obstacle which is] Himself." SD 1.1, 2. The manner in which the theistic problematic is affected by the ultimate identity of human and divine will be taken up next.

[60]One may question how a pure unity can also be a personal God. Central to the Śaivas' understanding of Śiva is His nature as a conscious agent, who has enjoyment. I cannot do justice here to the question of the coherence of a monistic theism. In any event it would seem that this possibility stands or falls with the coherence of the Śaivas effort to explain *all* diversity, and not just that usually understood to constitute "personality," as an emanating pure unity.

Ordinary experience comprises dichotomies between subject and object, as also between different subjects and objects. It includes conceptual/linguistic interpretation. And it takes place as a process in time. On the contrary, the monistic realization must be absolutely simple, conceptless, timeless—perhaps some sort of "intuition." Correspondingly, a system of conceptualization about the experience of a monistic Reality must paradoxically attempt to make epistemological sense about its object while negating its own discursiveness and intentionality. Thus in Neoplatonic dialectic the One is reached after a progressive abstraction through the hypostases of all the features of the sensual experience of matter in flux, equated with nonbeing. The One is more real than Being, more aesthetically valuable than Beauty.[61]

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers were influenced by the previous efforts of the Advaita Vedāntins to understand the nature of the experience of the monistic Brahman/Self, and the role in relation to it of scriptural and *śāstraic* discourse. The Advaitins developed one of the important themes of the Upaniṣads into their classic doctrine of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*).[62] According to this doctrine, the Self knows itself in an atemporal awareness which lacks the subject-object dichotomy and conceptualization (*vikalpa*) inherent to the normal operations of the means of cognition.

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[61]For a useful discussion of this process, one may see Michael Sells, "The Metaphor and Dialectic of Emanation in Plotinus, John the Scot, Meister Eckhart and Ibn Arabi" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1982). What is being described here holds to a degree for the qualified monistic "moment" in many theistic systems—in the Neoplatonist-inspired Christian, Jewish and Muslim theologies, as well as in Indian Viśiṣṭādvaita and Bhedābhedavāda.

[62]Besides the issue connected with the structure of a monistic experience which has here been thematized, the Advaitin as well as the Śaiva theories also address quanderies concerning the validation of cognitions—"knowing that one knows." In this latter respect the Advaitin view was influenced by the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 'self-established-ness' (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) of the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*), as well as the Buddhist logicians' notion of the 'validating self-awareness' (*svasaṃvedana*) inherent to all experiences.

The Śaivas' divergence is as important their indeptedness to the Advaitins. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta develop a conception of self-luminosity informed by their distinctive understanding of the Self as the Supreme Lord emanating a real world through His Śakti.

I cannot now fully treat the Pratyabhijñā conception of self-luminosity because this would anticipate many of the system's philosophical arguments which must wait till later.[63] Important for us is that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are mainly concerned with showing that the Self/Lord cannot in any way be an object of cognition. They attempt to accomplish this by repudiating all the ordinary features of experience associated with such an object. Putting the convoluted discussions in a more linear fashion, the thinkers deny that (1) any cognizer (*pramātṛ*) (2) by any means (*pramāṇa*) could have (3) any cognition (*pramā, pramiti*) or proof (*siddhi*)—of which the object (*prameya*) is the Supreme Lord.

Thus, in an analysis which anticipates perhaps all the major arguments of the system, Abhinava argues that non-Śaiva views of the Self could not explain the nature of awareness. He explains that the Self which the non-Śaivas advocate would really be *insentient.* Abhinava thus attempts to demonstrate that the only subject (*pramātṛ*) who could establish or deny anything would have to be identical with the omniscient and

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[63]The two chief sections where Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta focus on the issue of self-luminosity are IPK and IPV 1.1.1, 1:47-56 and 2.3.15-16, 2:134-39. Abhinavagupta points out the connection between these discussions. IPV 2.3.15-16, 134. Utpala gives his main positive "clue" about the system's modus operandi (which will be discussed below) in the two following sections, at IPK 1.1.2-4, 1:57-70 and IPK 2.3.17, 2:141.

omnipotent Lord Himself.[64] He claims that it is logically ridiculous for a being to to prove or deny his own self.[65]

The repudiations of cognitive means (*pramāṇa*) and knowledge (*pramiti*)/proof (*siddhi*) pertaining to the Supreme Lord are made for the most part on the basis of His epistemologically foundational status. The very nature of the Lord is illumination (*prakāśa*). He is the source and experient of all phenomena. He is eternal; the idea of the nonexistence of that which constitutes existence is self-contradictory. The operation of episodic cognitive means or knowledge/proof with respect to Him would thus invert the dependencies.[66]

Indicating his awareness of the ancient Indian historial roots of the notion of self-luminosity, Abhinava quotes for support the rhetorical question of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* "Indeed by what can one know the knower?"[67] He also quotes one of his own verses, which appears to express something like a "creature feeling" correlated with the abstract idea of self-luminosity:

> And it has been said by me: "Since all are ashamed 'I have been made an object of cognition [*prameyīkṛtam*],' how can the Great Lord be made an object of cognition?"[68]

Despite the negations of the structure of ordinary experience articulated in the Śaiva theory of self-luminosity, Abhinavagupta is sensitive to explain common usage.

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[64]IPV 1.1.1, 1:49-51. Abhinavagupta's discussion of self-luminosity itself is thus structured to lead to the soteriological recognition. It follows the pattern which I will exposit as common to all the arguments.

[65]IPV 1.1.1, 1:55-56.

[66]See IPV 1.1.1, 1:49-51; IPV 1.1.4, 1:71; IPK 2.3.15-16, 2:134-135; IPV 2.3.15-16, 2:135-139.

[67]IPV 1.1.4, 1:72. This is *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.15, in *Upaniṣatsaṅgraha,* ed. Jagadīśa Śāstrī (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), 121.

[68]IPV 2.3.15-16, 2:139.

Thus he acknowledges that there may be the use of a means of cognition regarding the limited subject insofar as he is identified with such objective entities as the body, breath, internal pyschic organs, etc.[69] He also admits that discourse about God is inherently objective. However, an effort must be made to minimize the confusion which may result from this. He informs us that this is the reason Utpaladeva in the first of his verses on self-luminosity has referred to the Great Lord in the locative absolute. The indication of a preestablished condition to some extent alleviates associations with an object of present, perceptual experience.[70]

Thus we see that the Self is really always aware of Himself as the Supreme Lord in a kind of immediate, 'a priori' intuition. Why does the individual not acknowledge this? It would seem necessary that doctrines, spiritual or contemporary-secular, which articulate deeper or esoteric structures of experience must account for their nonacknowledgement in common prima facie awareness through various sorts of delusion. This is also the case with monistic spiritual systems such as the Pratyabhijñā which hold conceptions of self-luminosity.

We are not concerned presently with the technicalities of the Śaiva doctrine of illusion. Important for our purposes is that on the grounds of the doctrines of self-

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[69]IPV 2.3.15-16, 2:138-139.

[70]Abhinava's explanation is interesting: "We will explain that it which is called 'Consciousness [*saṃvid*],' through being the object of dichotomizing conceptualization [*vikalpyatvena*], touches the condition of a cognitive object [*prameyatā*], and is thus something which is created. For this reason it is not the ultimate Consciousness. Even when it is said 'The Great Lord is the agent and cognizer' the same thing results. Therefore, one should attempt in any way practicable to avoid the stain of degrading [the Lord] by bringing [Him] down to the condition of an object of cognition. Thus reference is made with a syntactic termination indicating the past [i.e., the locative]. For, on the occasion of instruction, it is not possible to completely avoid [ascribing] cognitive objectivity to him." IPV 1.1.1, 1:54. Abhinavagupta's interpretation would equally apply to Utpala's later explanation of self-luminosity, where the Lord is mentioned in the same syntax. IPK 2.3.15-16, 2:134-135.

luminosity and delusion Abhinavagupta, like the Advaita Vedāntins, gives a negative formulation of the modus operandi of the system. The system is said only to remove the false conception that one is not aware of His identity. Theists as well as monists, the Śaivas hold that it is the Lord who both creates and removes His self-concealment. Abhinavagupta explains:

> Nothing which there was not previously is accomplished. Nor is what is really not shining [*aprakāśamānam*] illuminated [*prakāśyate*]. [Rather] the conception that that which is shining is not shining is removed. For liberation, which is the attainment of the state of the Supreme Lord, is nothing but the removal of that [false conception]. The cycle of suffering in rebirth [*saṃsāra*] is nothing but the nonremoval of that. For both of these [conditions of liberation and rebirth] are in essence nothing but conceptualization [*abhimanana*]. And both are manifested by the Blessed One."[71]

The Śaivas' negative characterizations of the method towards recognition on the bases of the simplicity of monistic experience and the theology of omnipotence do not prevent them from making a great number of positive statements about the system's modus operandi. Rather they must be understood as "dialectically" complicating their more positive descriptions. The following seems the best way to proceed through the labyrinth of these descriptions: Since our overarching concern is with rationality, we will first take up the nature of the Pratyabhijñā method vis-a-vis Indian traditions of philosophical argument. This will elucidate the basic intellectual form of the Pratyabhijñā method along with its area of substantive inquiry, i.e., 'subject matter' in

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[71]IPV 2.3.17, 2:144-145. On illusion in the context of self-luminosity, also see IPK and IPV 1.1.2, 1:57-59; IPK and IPV 2.3.17, 2:141-143. Cf. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:38. I note that what I have described as the "negative" formulation of modus operandi in terms of self-luminosity is intrinsic to the significance of recognition. This is brought out in some of Abhinava's speculative etymology of the word *pratyabhijñā* in his commentary on Utpala's benedictory verse. He explains that *pratyabhijñā* is the luminosity (*prakāśa*) which is directly evident to the self (*pratīpam ātmābhimukhyena*) because of the Self's nature as uninterrupted luminosity (*avicchinnaprakāśa*). IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1.36. This evinces recognition's transcendental status, which will be treated in later chapters.

the scheme of pertinent points mentioned above. This consideration will provide a setting for critically understanding the most important "clue" by Utpaladeva of the nature of the Pratyabhijñā method, along with Abhinavagupta's comments on it. In the final section of this chapter I will further examine these along with other statements about the Pratyabhijñā methodology in the context of a broader set of themes of *tantric* practice (brought together by Abhinavagupta in a particular classification of spiritual discipline).

To begin—in considering the relation of the Pratyabhijñā method to Indian standards of philosophical argument, we must rely on explanations of Abhinavagupta. Utpaladeva does not seem directly to treat this issue in his available writings. Certainly the classic philosophical standards are in many ways implied in his speculation, and Abhinava's formulations are profoundly elucidative of Utpala's thought. Nevertheless we may see here some of Abhinava's genuine innovations.

Many of the standards of reasoning which came to be accepted by the proponents of various Indian philosophical schools have their loci classici in the texts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, particularly the *Nyāya Sūtra* and its commentaries.[72] Abhinava plainly asserts' the Pratyabhijñā system's adherence to these standards: "There is the correctness only of the method of the Naiyāyikas in the condition of Māyā."[73] Philosophical method may be distinguished particularly by its adherence to the sixteen Nyāya categories pertaining to philosophical discussion adumbrated by Gautama at *Nyāya Sutra* 1.1, and elaborated in the later commentaries.[74] Abhinava

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[72]This is demonstrated in the studies of Matilal. See particularly "The Nature of Philosophical Argument," chap. in *Perception*, 69-93.

[73]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:43. Abhinava also states here that he is explaining the view of Utpaladeva.

explains the very power of the system to convince on the basis of its addressing these categories:

> The ultimate purpose in that [*śāstra*] is nothing but [explanation in terms of] the sixteen categories, such as the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*], etc.... When the sixteen categories are articulated [*nirūpyamāṇeṣu*], another is made to understand completely that which is to be understood.[75]

For understanding the Pratyabhijñā as a correlational enterprise, these classical argumentative standards may be taken as the norms of a critical academic community. They are the "traditions" of denaturalizing sectarian views for the sake of more universal intelligibility.

To give the reader at least an idea of the sixteen categories, I briefly enumerate them, largely following the glosses of Matilal:[76] The first two categories might be broadly taken as identifying the substantive scope of inquiry regarding critical epistemology and ontology (integral to each other in the Indian context). These are the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the objects to be cognized (*prameya*). Then come the seven preliminaries of philosophical debate—doubt,[77] purpose (*prayojana*), observational data (*dṛṣṭānta*), doctrinal bases (*siddhānta*), the schema for argument (*avayava*-the limbs), supportive reasoning (*tarka*) and decision (*nirṇaya*). Next are the

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[74]The list is at *Nyāyadarśanam: With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti,* ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with intro. by Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985), 28.

[75]IPV 2.3.17, 2:140. He specifically cites the support of "the book [where it is said] 'the obtainment of that which is good and denial of that which is not good,' etc." Ibid. This citation is also made at IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182. Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty expressed the view in personal conversation that the text is the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

[76]See Matilal, *Perception,* 71-93.

[77]The next chapter will focus on this important category.

three forms of philosophical debate.[78] Then pseudo-evidence, quibbling, sophistical rejoinders, and situations for courting defeat.[79] I note that the sixteen Nyāya categories are somewhat overlapping in their significance; and they refer to items of different orders—subject matters and proper and improper methods. Their significance may be taken as a variety of concerns which must be addressed, more than as items which necessarily have to be considered separately. Thus most of these categories are not even mentioned by the Śaivas, and must be understood as only implicitly operative in their speculation. This same fact may hold for the majority of Indian speculative systems.

Most emphasized in Abhinavagupta's explanation of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical method is the fifth category, which Matilal calls the "schema for argument." This schema presents the steps of 'inference for the sake of others' (*parārthānumāna*). There developed in Indian philosophy a distinction between two types of inference, that for the sake of oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and that for the sake of others. The latter is given a rigorously explicit formulation in order to make logical justification from experiential and conceptual evidence assessable by any critical person. Abhinava explains:

> What is the purpose with respect to the other? This [work] is for the comprehension of the other. And there is that from inference for the sake of others.[80]

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[78]These are called *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. I will not go into these here.

[79]Matilal, *Perception,* 73-74

[80]IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

Abhinavagupta's conceptualization of the Pratyabhijñā arguments according to this schema further underlines the nature of the Śaiva attempt as the demonstration of truth on the basis of ostensibly universal criteria of experience and rationality.[81]

I will, again briefly, review the classic Nyāya inference for the sake of others. This inference has five members and four or five terms.[82] The following outline uses the common example of the inference of smoke from fire. The numbered items are the members; the other expressions given are the terms:[83] 1) Thesis (*pratijñā*): There is fire on the hill. The hill is the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference. The fire is that which is to be established (*sādhya*) pertaining to it. 2) Reason (*hetu*): Because there is smoke. The smoke itself, like the inferential member which invokes it, is also designated with the word 'reason' (*hetu*); it is the property which justifies the inference. 3) General principle with exemplification (*udāharaṇa*): Where there is smoke there is fire, like in the kitchen and unlike on the lake. The kitchen is the positive example illustrating the

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[81]I note that Abhinava mentions scripture (*āgama*), along with self-experience (*svasaṃvedana*) and proof, as a way in which the Pratyabhijñā system demonstrates the identity of Self and Lord. IPV 4.1 introduction, 2:280. It is particularly in the texts' sections *Āgamādhikāra* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahādhikāra* that the thinkers appeal to revealed tradition to map out details of Śaiva cosmology. Abhinava frames the appeal to scripture as a way of supplementing what can be understood on the basis of direct perception and inference. IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:212-213. The main body of the work is clearly meant to convince through the principles of philosophical debate. As Abhinavagupta says, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* "by means of hundreds of arguments is led to the attainment of the heart." IPV 4.1.18, 2:316.

[82]I note that there were debates between the Indian schools about the precise number of steps and the structure of inference for the sake of others. Abhinava dismisses the Buddhist disputation of the number of parts as mere obstinacy. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

[83]The following account largely follows the interpretations by Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 2, *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 180-181, and *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 60-61; and by Matilal, *Perception*, 78.

concomitance (*sapakṣa*). The lake is the negative example (*vipakṣa*), showing that the property does not have concomitance with a class wider than that which is to be established. (It is not usually cited by the Śaivas.) 4) Application (*upanaya*): The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it. 5) Conclusion (*nigamana*): Therefore there is fire on the hill.

Now, Abhinava goes so far in what might be called his enthusiasm for philosophical rationalization as to contend that the Pratyabhijñā corpus itself is structured as an inference for the sake of others.[84] He attempts to ground this in the classic Nyāya traditions of argument:

> It has been explained by the founder of Nyāya, Akṣapāda, that every academic text [*śāstra*] apart from scripture really consists of the inference for the sake of others, and [thus] brings about the complete comprehension of the other.[85]

Abhinava even indicates correspondences of inferential members with parts of the Pratyabhijñā text. He explains that Utpaladeva's introductory verse states the thesis. The third to last of the concluding verses (announcing "This new easy path has been revealed by me") expresses the inferential conclusion. The middle of the book expresses the "reason (*hetu*), etc.," i.e., steps two through four.[86]

Though the correspondences with particular parts of the text must not be taken too strictly, Abhinava's characterization is quite illuminating. The proposition which the

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[84]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42-43; IPV 2.3.17, 2:139-140; IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182.

[85]IPV 2.3.17, 2:140. Abhinava here cites the precedence for this view of the author (a.k.a. Guatama) of the core text of the Nyāya tradition. However we do not know of such a strong understanding of the construction of a text itself as an inference before Abhinava. Matilal suggested in personal communication that this idea may actually be Abhinava's innovation.

[86]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42-43.

Pratyabhijñā inference demonstrates is that one is identical with the Lord.[87] This may only be understood implicitly within the introductory and concluding verses of the book, which do not at all have the style of an inferential thesis and conclusion.[88] I observe that the reason, general principle and application are stated by Abhinavagupta to occur in the middle of the text. This is largely constituted by the actual technical discussions of various Indian philosophical problems. Here again we may reflect upon the three levels of purpose analyzed by Abhinava. These discussions provide the justificatory section of the system as means, the first level of its purpose. They thus logically ground the closely interrelated middle and final purposes of the system, recognition and salvation.

The framework of inference for the sake of others, along with most of the other Nyāya categories, are *formal* controls upon method. We may now take up a couple of formulations by Abhinavagupta concerning the kinds of substantive inquiry which have been formally delineated, and occupy the bulk of the Pratyabhijñā corpus. These may be associated with our heuristic schemes as follows: They roughly correspond to the means and object of cognition—which again rougly correspond to what we would describe as epistemology and ontology. They also refer to 'subject matter' in the tetrad of pertinent points.

Turning to the first passage—it may be recalled that Abhinava finds two different meanings in the compound modifying the word recognition in Utpaladeva's introductory verse (i.e., *samastasampatsamavāptihetum*). According to Abhinava when the compound is understood in the second sense as a 'possessive' (*bahuvrīhi*) compound,

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[87]IPV 2.3.17, 2:142-143.

[88]Utpala's final verses, however, do parallel and conclude the matters raised in the first verse in a general way.

it expresses the means (*upāya*).[89] In this construal the compound indicates that recognition *has or involves* the cause which is an attaining (*samavāpti*), in the sense of philosophical apprehension. The word *sampat*, rather than prosperity, is also understood as attainment or establishment, in the form of ordinary valid cognition. "All" (*samasta*) is taken to refer to all the objects of experience. Abhinavagupta explains:

> "All" [refers to everything] which is existent and nonexistent, and internal and external, such as blue, pleasure, etc. There is the attainment [*sampat*], accomplishment [*sampatti*] or establishment [*siddhi*] of all this, that is, the awareness [*prakāśa*] of it as such. [Through this system, there is regarding this establishment/awareness] a complete [*samyak*] apprehension [*avāpti*], that is, development of comprehension [*vimarśarūḍhi*]. This [comprehension of the establishment of all things] is the reason [*hetu*] for that recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. There is thus taught here the attainment of the Ultimate Subject by means of the study of the cognition [*pramā*] of the blue, pleasure, etc., which are clearly appearing.[90]

Shortly later Abhinava explains further:

> The object [such as blue, pleasure, etc.], which has been explained to be indicated as all prosperity, is at first the cause [*hetu*] of virtue, sin, etc., which are basic causes of the cycle of suffering in rebirth [*saṃsāra*].... There is explained here the means [*upāya*] for the path beyond the world, by the derivation of cause [*karaṇavyutpattyā*] [of that object]. Thus at the end of the book ... while indicating that Lordship is characterized by the doing of that which is extremely difficult, he explains that the means [*upāya*] is the chief subject of discussion.[91]

These statements are highly significant. Recognition is inferred and evoked through the study of the cognition, and derivation of the cause, of all the features of internal and external experience. I believe that Abhinava interprets the common areas of Indian epistemological and metaphysical/ontological study in a way which may be

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[89]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34.

[90]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34-35.

[91]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:40-41. Abhinava explains that the inquiry into the cosmological principles (*tattva*) on the basis of scripture also has "the intention of making bringing to the heart the condition of the subject. [This condition of the subject] is experienced through subjecting to investigation the universe, and also transcends that universe." IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:213.

understood as delineating a kind of *transcendental* inquiry. As was stated in the introduction, the Śaivas do not merely attempt to support their soteriology in a manner parallel to other items of experience. Rather, they argue that their God is *necessary* to the structure of all experience and items of experience. In the language of David Tracy, God is discovered as a grounding "limit of" beyond the "limits to" the various areas of our experience determined through philosophical study.[92]

Abhinavagupta's comments at the same time illustrate the ambitiousness with which he and Utpaladeva pursue such an inquiry. Grounding themselves in the Lord's omnipotence and employing the transgressive, "transfigurative" approach regarding the normally binding characteristic of *tantrism,* they will make the examination of ordinary experience a means for achieving the soteriological realization.[93] The Śaivas' transcendental method attempts to completely "turn the tables" in the game of public academic discourse.

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[92]See Tracy, *Blessed Rage,* 91-118. I quote a fuller explanation by Tracy: "Yet the dimension of meaning in question for theology (the religious) is not simply a meaning coordinate with other meanings like the scientific, the aesthetic, or the ethical. Rather the religious dimension precisely as such can be phenomenologically described as an ultimate or grounding dimension or horizon to all meaningful human activities. The reflective discipline needed to decide upon the cognitive claims of religion and theism will itself have to be able to account not merely for some particular dimension of experience but for *all experience* as such. Indeed, precisely this latter insight is required to show why the theologian cannot resolve the religious and theistic cognitive claims of theology by any ordinary criteria of verification or falsification.... One clear way of articulating the nature of the reflective discipline capable of such inquiry is to describe it as 'transcendental' in its modern formulation or 'metaphysical' in its more traditional expression. As transcendental, such reflection attempts the explicit mediation of the basic presuppositions (or "beliefs") that are the conditions of the possibility of our existing or understanding at all. Metaphysical reflection means essentially the same thing: the philosophical validation of the concepts 'religion' and 'God' as necessarily affirmed or necessarily denied by all our basic beliefs and understanding." Tracy, *Blessed Rage,* 55-56.

[93]Cf. IPV 1.7.14, 1:390-393.

The limit-of will finally be arrived at in the soteriological recognition of the identity of the person with the Supreme Lord. How does the transcendental investigation transfigure our experience towards this end? Utpaladeva gives his most explicit clue about the Pratyabhijñā's modus operandi at the end of both of his explanations of the issue of self-luminosity. This gives us an understanding of the limit-of as mediated through transcendental philosophical inquiries, within the structure of publicly assessable inference. I quote his first expression of the clue:

> ... This recognition of Him, who though experienced is not noticed due to the force of delusion, is made to be experienced through the revealing of [his] Śakti.[94]

Philosophical study brings about the discovery God's self-identical power and consort as underpinning, or constituting, ordinary experience. For the purposes of different sorts of philosophical and theological explanation, Śakti is often analyzed by the Śaivas into different modalities, which are designated as separate Śaktis. In his summarial formulations, Abhinava usually mentions the modalities of Cognition (*jñāna* or *dṛk*) and Action (*kriyā*).[95] These provide the broad subjects of the two main philosophical sections of the book, the *Jñānādhikāra* and *Kriyādhikāra*—which we shall see, again, to correspond roughly to our areas of epistemology and ontology. We shall also observe that in actual practice these two Śaktis are further subdivided, and additional Śaktis are invoked. The differentions among Śaktis as well as between Śaktis and Śiva are merely heuristic. Abhinava compares such discrimination to the analysis of the powers of fire for burning and cooking.[96]

Śakti is Śiva's power by which He emanates the universe. We shall see that the philosophical transfiguration of ordinary experience as such emanation is made by a

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[94]IPK 1.1.2, 1:57. The same idea is expressed at IPK 2.3.17, 2:141.

[95]See IPV 1.1.2, 2:59.

[96]See TA 1.67-74, 2:107-115.

reduction of all its features to modalities of subjectivity.[97] This point is brought out by a concise formulation by Utpaladeva regarding the philosophically encompassing powers of Cognition and Action:

> ... There is the establishment of insentient entities as grounded in living beings. The life of living beings is maintained to be the [Śaktis] Cognition and Action.[98]

Abhinavagupta explains that by living beings Utpaladeva means subjects (*pramātṛ*). This includes all apparently limited subjects, from Brahma or Sadāśiva to the worm.[99] The system demonstrates that the very existence of objects is the subject's exercise of cognition and action over them.[100] Śakti may be taken as designating a sort of mediate formulation of a "limit of" arrived at through showing the dependence of, "limit to," phenomena on the subject.

Putting things, together, we may now observe that Śakti constitutes the *reason* in the grand inference as which Abhinava conceptualizes the Pratyabhijñā system. Abhinava explains that by the term Śaktis there are indicated the qualities (*dharma*) of the Lord.[101] The reason is a quality which is invariably concomitant with that which is to be established (*sādhya*) of the inferential subject (*pakṣa*). One is inferentially led to the recognition that one is the Lord because the epistemological and ontological studies in the system demonstrate that all the matters of worldly experience inhere in one as

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[97]We must wait until the succeeding chapters to see how this is done. As may be inferred from the introduction, this is accomplished through an argument about the deeper nature of recognition.

[98]IPK 1.1.3, 61.

[99]IPV 1.6.11, 1:141-143; IPV 1.1.4, 1:76-77.

[100]IPV 1.1.3, 1:62-67.

[101]IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182; IPV 2.3.17, 2:146. At IPVV 1.5.21, 2:269, Abhinava explains that in different contexts the same fact may be variously referred to by the terms quality (*dharma*), Śakti, attribute (*guṇa*) and operation (*vyāpāra*).

qualities, operations, etc. Recognizing oneself as the possessor of this emanatory omnipotence, one is able to enjoy it, in accordance with the system's final purpose.

Abhinavagupta provides several informal expressions of the inference which evokes recognition. In order to further elucidate what has just been discussed, I will quote and fully explicate one of these:

> ... The subject *[pramātṛ]*, because he is endowed with the Cognition and Action Śaktis, is to be called [*vyavahartavya*] Lord, like the Lord who is well known in the Purāṇas, scriptures, etc. Even if He is not well known [from such texts], Lordship is established to have the nature of the possession of the Cognition and Action Śaktis over all objects, for [Lordship] is invariably associated with nothing but these. Thus there is the comprehension of the logical pervasion in the case of one such as a king, who is regarded as Lord. Regarding so much as one is the cognizer and doer, like the king—one is the Lord. It is contradictory for one who is not the Lord to be a cognizer and a doer. And the Self is cognizer and doer with regard to everything. Thus recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is established.[102]

This may be put formally as follows: 1) The subject is the Lord. 2) Because he has the Cognition and Action Powers. 3) Whoever has Cognition and Action Powers is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Purāṇas and scriptures, and like the king. 4) The subject, since he has them, is the Lord. 5) The subject is the Lord.

In a later section of the IPV Abhinava gives five additional expressions of the Pratyabhijñā inference, stated in the second person. The first of these is almost identical to that just quoted. It is notable that none of the remaining expressions explicitly mention Śakti as the inferential reason. In fact most of them do not even mention the Lord as the inferential predicate. Instead, various relationships of dependence or absorption are described—the universe is dependent on the self, again like the king over his domain; the self is full of (*pūrṇa*) the universe, like a treasure is of jewels; the subject pervades the universe, again like a casket with jewels; the subject pervades the prior and latter parts of the universe, like the earth in relation to

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[102]IPV 1.1.3, 1:67-68.

sprouts.[103] The substitution of terms brings out more clearly the fundamental structure of the revealing of Śakti as the subjectivization of the various features of experience.

In closing, I will emphasize that the positive conceptualization of the Pratyabhijñā modus operandi as inferentially evoking recognition is not contradictory with the negative formulations considered as addressing the problems of omnipotence/grace and self-luminosity. I believe that we may incorporate another term from Western theology in describing these conceptions as "dialectically" interrelated. The revealing of Śakti is itself framed within the higher, negative framework of self-luminosity. Abhinava explains that it is due to the Lord's Māyā Śakti that one is not aware of his omnipotent capacity of emanating all objects of experience.[104] The system removes one's ignorance about the inferential reasons which establish recognition of identity with the Lord.[105]

The transcendental study of classic problems of epistemology and ontology in the philosophical arguments of the book can be understood as something like a deep phenomenological clarification of the nature of the person as Śiva. This identity-clarification is brought into focus in Abhinavagupta's comparison of the operation of the system with the questioning by which a person is cured of spirit possession:

> This is what has been said: One who is possessed by a demon [*bhauta*], although his Self is appearing [*bhāsamāne*], believes due to delusion "I have been carried off." The delusion is removed [by questioning]: "Who indeed are you?" If [he answers] "One who has such clothing and such a face," then [one replies]: "Look,

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[103]IPV 2.3.17, 2:144-146. There is a corresponding list of expressions at IPVV, 2.3.17, 3:181-182.

[104]See IPV 2.3.17, 2:142-143.

[105]IPV 2.3.17, 2:147-148. Cf. the analogy of the woman recognizing her lover. She recognizes him through seeing/recognizing his qualities which at first she did not notice. IPV 4.1.17, 2:314-315. Also cf. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17. In the actual philosophical discussions there are various descriptions of the recognition of the inferential reason, Śakti Herself.

you have them." The one who explains this again and again does not accomplish anything new. Similarly there is removed the delusion of bound humanity, who, though the Self is appearing [*bhāsamāne*], believe due to delusion, "I am not the Lord."[106]

The Pratyabhijñā Method in the Larger Context of Tantric Praxis: the Śākta Upāya

This section will endeavor to place what has been explained so far as well as some additional methodological statements in the Pratyabhijñā texts into the context of a set of broader patterns of *tantric* praxis. This will further elucidate the nature of the Pratyabhijñā method as ambitiously "correlating" academic traditions of philosophical demonstration to the full agenda of the Śaiva soteriology. I will delimit this undertaking by considering the Pratyabhijñā method (*upāya*) vis-a-vis the typology of spiritual means propounded by Abhinavagupta in his *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*.[107] Abhinavagupta consolidated earlier efforts of systematization by organizing a plethora of yogic and *tantric* spiritual techniques into a grand fourfold typology. His four 'means types' (*upāya*) distinguish by characteristic emphases large and overlapping 'families' of methods and methodological principles. This typology became paradigmatic for monistic Śaivas after Abhinavagupta and was read back into the earlier traditions.

I will first briefly summarize this typology. As has been explained, the highest theological rubric in Abhinavagupta's synthesis of diverse forms of theology is the Trika

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[106]IPV 2.3.17, 2:144. Abhinava reiterates this analogy in an ironic question in the last of the concluding verses of the IPV: "What answer can be given to the question 'Who are you?' by one possessed by a demon, who not having recognized Himself, desires to study something else?" IPV 4.1 concluding verse 3, 2:317. This is quoted in *Mahārthmañjarī of Maheśvarānanda with the Auto-Commentary Parimala*, ed. Vrajavallabha Dviveda (Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya Press, 1972), 20.

[107]*The Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta*, ed. Mukunda Ram Sastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 17 (reprint, Delhi: Bani Prakashan, 1982).

tradition. Abhinava's first three types are framed as operating on the levels of this tradition's distinguising cosmic triads. In ascending order, these are the 'individual means' (*āṇava upāya*), the means of Śakti (*śākta upāya*) and the means of Sambhu, i.e., Śiva (*śāmbhava upāya*)—named after the triad of man (*nara, aṇu*), Śakti and Śiva (a.k.a. Śambhu).[108] These types are similarly correlated with the homologous triads of the states/Goddesses 'Nonsupreme' or Lower (*Aparā*), 'Supreme-Nonsupreme' or Intermediate (*Parāparā*) and Supreme (*Parā*);[109] the conditions of diversity (*bheda*), unity-and-diversity (*bhedābheda*) and unity (*abheda*); and the Will (*icchā*) Śakti, Cognition (*jñāna*) Śakti and Action (*kriyā*) Śakti. As should be evident from some of the terms just given, the means are increasingly "internal" and "unitive." The individual means tends towards more concrete ritual or meditative practices, and the means of Śambhu is more intuitive. These three may be understood as the means proper.

At the top of the hierarchy, Abhinava posits what he calls the 'non-means' (*anupāya*). This designates the direct absorption into Ultimate Reality of the spiritually advanced involving no practice or very slight practice.[110] The 'nonmeans' appears to me to have some of the same import as the doctrine of self-luminosity—the final transition beyond the means system may be nothing but the awareness of the fact that the Supreme Lord is always realized.

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[108]Though the practices which Abhinavagupta describes have very ancient roots, the sources of their triadic classification are very difficult to discern. A similarly designated triad of mystical submersions (*samāveśa*) is described at *Śrī Mālinīvijayottara Tantram,* ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Delhi: Butala & Company, 1984), 2.21-23, 9. At TA 1.167-170, 2:203, Abhinava grounds the three means proper in these sumersions. Dyczkowski contends that Abhinava learned the triad of means orally from one of his teachers, Śambhunātha. Dyczkowski, *Vibration,* 171.

[109]TA and TAV 2.45, 2:347.

[110]E.g., understanding a glance from the teacher.

Some contemporary scholars have assumed that the Pratyabhijñā system teaches the 'non-means' (*anupāya*).[111] As we have already seen, however, the system operates through an elaborate communicative *practice* of philosophical argument. The evidence is strong rather that Abhinavagupta and his successors either understand the Pratyabhijñā system as falling within the *śākta upāya* or at least associate it mainly with its characteristic practical themes.[112] In fact it seems that in some ways Abhinava uses the Pratyabhijñā ideas to structure the broader means-type. We will now examine some of the main practical themes which Abhinava synthesizes in the *śākta upāya*, and their connections with methodological formulations in the Pratyabhijñā system.

We first turn to the practice of the revealing of Śakti itself. The approach to Śiva through Śakti is an ancient and pervasive tradition.[113] As Śiva's self-identical, sexually-united consort, operating as His energy emanating the universe—She provides the way

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[111]See for example, Kaw, *Doctrine,* 264 and Dyczkowski, *Vibration,* 179. Dyczkowski apparently bases his classification on Abhinavagupta's citations of the authority of Somānanda on the nonmeans, and on on the lack of need for practice after Śiva is realized. However, none of the relevant statements by Somānanda or Abhinavagupta state that the Pratyabhijñā system works through the nonmeans. See SD 75b-6, 209; TA and TAV 2.48, 2:349-350; IPV1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:31-32; IPV 4.1.16, 2:311.

[112]The *śākta upāya* classification was first suggested to me by Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty. This well supported my own analysis of practical themes which seemed to contradict the nommeans classification. Pt. Chakravarty and I then spent a considerable amount of time researching the *śākta upāya* classification of the system together. Dr. Navjivan Rastogi later informed me that he also made the *śākta upāya* classification. He provided me with a copy of the unpublished second volume of his dissertation, "The Philosophy of Krama Monism of Kashmir: An Analytical Study" (Ph.D. thesis, Lucknow University, 1967), which elucidates many connections between the Pratyabhijñā and the *śākta upāya.* My understanding of the Pratyabhijñā system in terms of the *śākta upāya* accordingly owes much to the ideas of Pt. Chakravarty and Dr. Rastogi—though I have also researched it on my own. Alexis Sanderson also later supported the *śākta upāya* interpretation in personal conversation.

[113]Alexis Sanderson suggested in personal conversation that this practice reflects the assimilation of Śāktism within Śaivism.

for the approach to Him via ordinary experience. There being much overlap between Abhinavagupta's types, he ascribes a general role to the revealing of Śakti in all the forms of practice.[114] Nevertheless, its special importance in the *śākta upāya* is indicated by the *upāya's* very name, which expresses operation at the intermediate level of Śakti in the Trika triads. As Navjivan Rastogi has explained:

> The element of Śakti permeates all these three in varying measures and is characterized variously as gross, subtle, ultimate, etc., as the case may be. But it is the superabundance of Śakti because of which this Upāya is called Śākta.[115]

A particularly influential version of the practice of the revealing of Śaktis (to shift to the plural) in the traditions of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism was developed out of a procedure from the Krama *tantric* tradition of meditating upon Lordship over circles (*cakra*) of them. It is notable that Abhinavagupta elaborates a Trika interpretation of this procedure in the chapters of the *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra* presenting the *śākta upāya*.[116] In various works, Abhinavagupta's pupil Kṣemarāja makes connections between the Krama mastery of the circles of Śaktis, the revealing of Śaktis, and recognition.[117]

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[114]In personal conversation Sanderson did not wish to make a special connection of the *śākta upāya* with the practice of the revealing of Śakti because this practice is so general.

[115]Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 388.

[116]TA 4, 3:617-923 and TS 4, 21-33. Because of the emphases on Krama Śāktism in the *śākta upāya* as interpreted by Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, Rastogi's dissertation makes a virtual equation of the two. This association is too strong. On the more general importance of Krama in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism see the articles by Alexis Sanderson.

[117]In this, Kṣemarāja utilizes the philosophical concept for structuring more general theological understandings. See *The Spandakārikās of Vasugupta with the Nirṇaya by Ksemarāja*, ed. and trans. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 42 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1925), 1.1, 3-8 and 3.19, 74. (Kṣemarāja's commentary will henceforth be abbreviated SN.). Sanderson follows Kṣemarāja in connecting the *Spanda Kārikā* with the Kālī cults. Sanderson,

I will confine myself here to citing a few other passages, without making the effort to separate out earlier strands of Trika, Krama, etc. First I will give two statements from the *Vijñānabhairava* which vividly illustrate the background to the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā method. Here is the first:

> There is always nondifferentation between Śakti and the possessor of Śakti [i.e., Śiva]. Since She is therefore the possessor of His qualities, She is the Supreme [*parā*] Śakti of the Supreme Self [*parātman*]. [Similarly] the burning power [*śakti*] of fire is not considered to be different from fire. There is this [the analysis of power and possessor of power] only as a beginning in entering into the state of comprehension [*jñāna*]. If one who has entered into the condition of Śakti would meditiate on their nondifference, he would come to have the nature of Śiva. Śiva's consort [*śaivī*] is explained here to be the door. Dear, just as different places, etc., are cognized by means of the light of a lamp and the rays of the sun, so is Śiva [cognized] by means of Śakti.[118]

Another passage is even more interesting. The post-Abhinavagupta commentator Śivopādhyāya explicitly identifies this passage as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijñā and classifies it within the *śākta upāya*. As with some discussions in the Pratyabhijñā texts, this passage does not explicitly mention Śakti, but refers to the realization of the possession of the definitive world-emanating qualities of God. Again, these are the modalities of Cognition and Action which organize the Pratyabhijñā texts:

"Śaivism," 694-695. Mark Dyczkowski interprets the conception of 'creative vibration' (*spanda*) as close in meaning to Śakti. E.g., Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 190. Likewise he observes that Kṣemarāja views the Spanda System as falling predominantly within the *śākta upāya*. Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 179. Cf. Bhāskara's explanation of the process of becoming the Lord of the cycle in BIPV 1.8, 1:399-400. (The last passage was pointed out by Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 417-418.)

[118] *The Vijñāna-Bhairava with Commentary Partly by Kṣhemarāja and Partly by Shivopādhyāya*, ed. Mukunda Rama Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 8 (Bombay: Tatva-vivechaka Press, 1918), 18-21, 13-15. This translation is influenced by that of *Vijñānabhairava or Divine Consciousness: A Treasury of 112 Types of Yoga*, ed. and trans. Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 18-21, 16-17. The passage is cited by Jayaratha at TAV 1.74, 2:115.

> One can become Śiva from the firm conviction: "The Supreme Lord is all-cognizer [*sarvajña*], all-doer [*sarvakartṛ*], and pervasive. I, who have the qualities [*dharma*] of Śiva, am none but He. Just as the waves belong to the water, the flames belong to a fire, and light belongs to the sun, these waves[119] of the universe belong to Bhairava, who is none but me."[120]

I recall the significance of qualities in the Pratyabhijñā inference. The contemplation described here may be seen as having the very "rationality" which is explicated in Abhinavagupta's use of the schema of inference for the sake of others. The "correlational" interpretation really elucidates the presumption of the original practice.

Abhinava describes the revealing of Śakti in the *śākta upāya* in terms of the same modalities of Cognition and Action:

> There is the state of conceptual constructions in the *śākta* [means]. In that [state], [the Śaktis of] acting and cognizing are evident. However, according to the previous reasoning, there is a contraction of them. To the one occupied with removing the burden of the contraction, there is revealed blazing Śakti, which brings about the desired internal illumination.[121]

Perhaps more distinctive than the revealing of Śakti per se, is Abhinavagupta's consolidation in the *śākta upāya* of developing understandings of the religious function of intellectual activity. The *śākta upāya* is the means based upon cognition (*jñānopāya*).[122] This can be understood on the basis of its operation on the middle level

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[119]For this word, *bhaṅgyaḥ*, I follow Singh, trans., *Vijñānabhairava*, 99.

[120]*Vijñāna-Bhairava* 109-110, 95-96. On this practice also see *Śivasūtras: The Yoga of Supreme Identity; Text of the Sūtras and the Commentary Vimarśini of Kṣemarāja*, ed. and trans., Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 3.30, 196-197; TA 1.69-74, 2:109-115; TA 1.202-206, 2:227-231; SN 1.5, 19.

[121]TA 1.217-218, 2:240.

[122]Alexis Sanderson explained in personal conversation that an increasing valuation of knowledge is evident even in the composition of the Śaiva scriptures. It might be conjectured that this evinces an assimilation to more orthodox (*śāstraic*) soteriological models as part of the broader pattern of domesticization. This trajectory may be understood as having a sort of culmination in the "correlational" agenda of the Pratyabhijñā system.

of the Trika cosmic triad, which is in one version the Cognition (*jñāna*) Śakti.[123] Abhinavagupta describes the modus operandi of the *śākta upāya* in a gnoseological manner as the 'purification of conceptualization' (*vikalpasaṃskāra*). As he explains:

> One reaches wisdom[124] through the repeated practice of successive intellectual decisions which are aspects of conceptualization [*vikalpa*].[125] They call this the means of cognition [*jñānopāya*].[126]

Again supporting the *śākta upāya* classification, Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijñā in the same way, as a "means of cognition (*jñānopāya*) by which the Lord gradually comes to be recognized [*pratyabhijnāyate*]...."[127] Likewise in the IPV he refers to the system as a 'path of cognizing' (*saṃvedanapatha*).[128]

The quintessential "tool" of the purification of conceptualization, and thereby of the *śākta upāya,* is good or true reasoning (*sattarka*). Reasoning was increasingly seen as a spiritual means in scriptures before Abhinavagupta. Of greatest importance for

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[123]In this scheme, the more concrete individual means is designated by the corresponding power as the means of action (*kriyā upāya*) and the more subjective means of Sambhu is designated the means of desire (*icchā upāya*). See Sanderson, "Maṇḍala," 173 n. 9.

[124]The word is *parāmarśa*. I will explain in the fourth chapter that this term (along with its cognates) should be interpreted in terms of the Śaiva theory of recogniton. I will there suggest the gloss 'recognitive judgement.'

[125]I am not clear exactly what Abhinavagupta means here.

[126]TA 1.148, 2:186. See TAV 1.148, 2:186-187. Also see on this section of the text Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 416. Though, always evincing "sacred-intellectualization," Abhinava applies this schema to a wider range of practice, it is most distinctive in the *śākta upāya*. Sanderson explains the relation of the wider and specifically *śākta upāya* senses of the purification of conceptualization at "Maṇḍala," 173 n. 9. For more on the purification of conceptualization see Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 431.

[127]IPVV, 1.1, 1:16.

[128]IPV 1.1.4, 1:78. Bhāskara glosses this term as 'way of cognition' (*jñānamārga*). BIPV 1.1.4, 1: 78. Cf. SDV 3.16, 105.

Abhinavagupta were the assessments of reasoning in his most revered Trika scripture, the *Mālinīvijaya Tantra*. This scripture follows Indian academic traditions in explaining the function of reasoning as the discrimination which encourages the movement from that which is to be abandoned (*heya*) to that which is to be pursued (*upadeya*).[129] At the same time it bestows upon it great soteriological efficacy. It states:[130]

> Although it is a limb of yoga, reasoning [*tarka*] is the highest limb of yoga. It is the elucidation of that which is to be abandoned, etc.[131] Therefore effort in that [reasoning] is praised. The mind motivated on a path which, although it should be abandoned [*heya*], has become firm due to desire for it, must be led to a harmless state.[132]

Abhinava uses the notion of good reasoning as the supreme limb of yoga as a point around which to elaborate upon its nature as the gnostic internalization of more concrete forms of practice. He explains all other concrete methods as oriented towards the achievement of good reasoning, and contends that they only derive their efficacy as informed by good reasoning. In this manner Abhinava "reduces" to modalities of good reasoning such diverse religious practices as sacrifice, oblation, recitation, vows and even bathing.[133]

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[129]The role of reasoning and scholarly works (*śāstras*) in bringing about the discrimination is discussed in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1, 1.

[130]These verses are quoted at TA 4.15-16, 3:630-631.

[131]Jayaratha's commentary on the section of the *Tantrāloka* which quotes these verses clarifies that the word 'etc.' (*adi*) after the word expressing 'that which is to be avoided' (*heya*)—indicates 'that which is favorable and is to be pursued' (*upadeya*). TAV 4.15-16, 3:630-631.

[132]*Śrī Mālinīvijayottara Tantram*, 17.18-19, 114.

[133]See TS 4.12-13, 23-24; TS 4.21-24, 25-27; TS 4.42, 31; TA 4.86-96, 3:708-719; TA 4.114b-118a, 3:733-737. Abhinavagupta sometimes identifies as instruments of the purification of conceptualization besides good reasoning—good/true scripture (*sadāgama*) and good/true teacher (*sadguru*). TS 4.1, 21. However, as with the limbs of yoga, he understands good reasoning as the essential factor in the operation, as well as

Abhinavagupta's explanations of the categories of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued enable us to understand the direction of the *śākta upāya* purification. Abhinavagupta formulates a transgressive, *tantric* criticism of orthodox Hindu notions of purity (*śuddhi*) and impurity (*aśuddhi*). Again grounding himself in the authority of the *Mālinīvijaya*, he states:

> One should not to be troubled with the discrimination of that which is to be eaten and that which is not to be eaten, purity and impurity, etc., which does not describe reality and is essentially mere mental fabrication. This has been explained in the *Śrī Pūrva* [a.k.a. *Mālinīvijaya Tantra*], etc. For purity is not a form of the real thing, as is blueness.[134]

Of special importance to us is that he redefines purity and impurity *in terms of the apprehended absorption of the objective universe into the emanatory subject which we have seen is the significance of the revealing of Śakti:*

> The impurity called supreme is the idea that these [things] which have the nature of Śiva are separate from Him. Purity is the destruction of this idea...."[135]

Similarly Abhinava explains the pure and impure forms of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*):

> The mass of things appear clearly in that jewel [the Self/Lord] who is pure, and has the freedom characteristic of an agent.[136] That [conceptual construction] is said to be benighted which comprehends differentiation between [those things] and the Self. However [there is also conceptual construction] having the nature of Pure Wisdom which is concentrated on the Self as containing all objects [as is expressed]: "I am all this." This conceptual construction has the nature of Pure Wisdom and has a clearly manifest nature; it destroys the *māyic* conceptual construction which causes differentiation.[137]

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the goal, of these two factors. See TS 4.11, 23; TA 4.33-47, 3:654-667; TA 4.76b-79, 3:698-700.

[134]TS 4.43, 31.

[135]TA 4.118-119, 3:637-638. Cf. TA 4.218-220, 3:859-859.

[136]This term, *svatantra*, will be explained in the sixth chapter.

[137]TA 4.111-114, 3:730-733.

Good reasoning is an axe which cuts down the binding tree of differentiation of the subject and object.[138] The description of the desirable form of emanation-knowing conceptual construction in terms of Pure Wisdom (*śuddhavidyā* or *sadvidyā*) in the passage just quoted is important. Pure Wisdom is the fifth principle of emanation from the Supreme Lord in the monistic Śaiva cosmology. Sometimes, as in the above statement, Pure Wisdom is framed as the goal. However it must be emphasized that for Abhinavagupta means and goal are ultimately identical. Abhinava thus fully identifies good reasoning with Pure Wisdom: "Good reasoning is nothing but Pure Wisdom...."[139] Pure Wisdom is the insight which informs the purification of conceptualization.

Just such an "operative insight" may be understood as animating the Pratyabhijñā arguments, transforming the academic inquiries into a method of salvation. This view is supported by some less prominent but important methodological explanations in the Pratyabhijñā texts, which we have not yet considered. I will first mention the less, and then the more conclusive of these. Abhinavagupta explains the operation of the system in terms of the discrimination of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued. Because of the ubiquity of this discrimination in Indian scholarly literature, this fact would not have much persuasive force in isolation from the rest of the evidence.[140] Nevertheless it is of note that Abhinava explains salvation itself with these categories:

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[138]TA 4.13, 3:628 and TAV 4.13.1, 3:628-629.

[139]TA 4.34, 3:655. Likewise see TS 4.21, 25-26. Cf. TS 4.12, 23-24. Abhinavagupta frequently utilizes the terms interchangeably—see TA 4.44b-45a, 3:665; TA 4.109-118, 3:729-737.

[140]I have already mentioned that Abhinava quotes a passage of an actual Nyāya text (the *Nyāyabhāṣya?*) speaking of this discrimination. This is in the section where he explains the method of the system in terms of the Nyāya categories and inference for the sake of others. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

> In this *śāstra* there is taught the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of the essential nature of the subject. He who cognizes that which is to be abandoned and that which is to be pursued—his essential nature—attains the essential nature of Śiva, which is identical to his own essential nature and is the supreme thing to be pursued. He becomes liberated while living.[141]

Abhinava also frames Utpaladeva's elaborate discussion in the *Āgamādhikāra* of the sorts of subjects existing on different cosmological levels, their characteristic defilements and states of consciousness in terms of these categories.[142] The principle of discrimination is again that of the absorption or nonabsorption of the object into the emanatory subject. The condition of the subject which should be abandoned is that in which the objects delimited by Māyā are viewed as separate; from this mistake result all the afflictions such as egoism and hatred, and bondage to *karma*. The type of cognizer which one should try to become is the one who has attained the state of recognition and views objects as his limbs.[143]

What makes the connection of good reasoning with the Pratyabhijñā clear is the extensive discussion of Pure Wisdom by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in the texts' *Āgamādhikāra*.[144] Utpaladeva introduces the discussion with a concise linguistic definition:

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[141]IPV 3.2 introduction, 2:244.

[142]IPV 3.2 introduction, 2:244. Utpaladeva himself refers to certain states of consciousness as to be abandoned (*heya*) at IPK 3.2.18, 2:269.

[143]IPV 3.2.2-3, 2:246-247.

[144]See IPK and IPV 3.1.3-7, 2:221-232. In personal conversation Alexis Sanderson in fact suggested that this category may have been utilized by Abhinava for interpreting good reasoning in the *śākta upāya* because of its significance in the Pratyabhijñā.

... The apposition[145] of the notions of I and this is Pure Wisdom [*sadvidyā*].[146]

According to Abhinava the next verse explains why the wisdom (*vidyā*) thus described is pure (*śuddha*).[147] Utpala states:

> For things which have fallen to the condition of objects of cognition and are understood in the condition of "this" are essentially cognition; and are [through Pure Widsom] seen as they really are.[148]

Such knowedge is pure *because it reflects the actual state of affairs of the idealistic emanation of objects from monistic Consciousness.*

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta directly apply the conception of Pure Wisdom to the explanation of the spiritual illumination derived from the Pratyabhijñā system.[149] Abhinava represents Pure Wisdom as a Śakti, working to counterbalance the effects of the Māyā Śakti:[150]

> When there is the development of error regarding both the object of cognition and the cognizer, then the Māyā Śakti [operates]. There is that [Māyā Śakti] in subjects who are bound creatures [*paśu*]. [There is also the situation] when the latent tendency [*saṃskāra*] for error regarding both the cognizer and the object of cognition has not disappeared in the subjects [*pramātṛ*] who are not bound

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145This technical grammatical term, *sāmānādhikaraṇya,* literally means 'the condition of residing in the same substratum.'

146IPK 3.1.3, 2:221.

147IPV 3.1.4, 2:225.

148IPK 3.1.4, 2:225. This translation is influenced by that of Pandey, 3:193.

149IPK and IPV 3.1.7, 2:230-232.

150One of the themes of Abhinavagupta's commentary on this section is the explanation of various cosmological principles (*tattvas*) as modalities of the universal Śakti. Thus he even interprets Sadāśiva and Īśvara as Śaktis. IPV 3.1.3, 2:222. The identification of Pure Wisdom as a Śakti may be further understood as bearing upon the problem discussed earlier in the chapter of the relation of divine perfection/omnipotence to human works; the principle comes to have some of the same meaning as grace.

> creatures, such as yogis, sages, etc. Then the manifestation of the reality of things is the operation of the Wisdom Power.[151]

He leaves no doubt that it operates directly through the philosophical discussions:

> When there is born the condition of the bound creature ... then the Śakti of the Supreme Lord illuminates His Lordship, as has been explained by means of the previously stated arguments. She due to whom some, having accepted these arguments and having their hearts encouraged, become successful—is the Wisdom Power.[152]

Some of the associations made here between key features of the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā may be brought together by considering one of the last of Utpaladeva's verses in the IPK. In the verse before the one in question, Utpaladeva refers to a meditation which seems to typify what became the more "apophatic" *śāmbhava upāya:* "From concentration, through the abandonment of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], there is gradually the condition of the Lord."[153] Then Utpaladeva presents an alternative not requiring the abandonment of conceptualization.[154] In commenting on *Vijñānabhairava,* 109-110 (discussed above), Śivopādhyāya, quotes this verse as illustrating the contemplation of Pratyabhijñā, and further classifies it within the *śākta upāya*. The verse resonates with the themes we

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[151]IPV 3.1.7, 2:230. Cf. DMSM 7.15-16, 142-143.

[152]IPV 3.1.7, 2:230-231. This is also stated at IPK 3.2.2, 2:246 and IPV 3.2.2-3, 2:246-247. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also connect Pure Wisdom with the intermediate supreme-lower (*parāpara*) cosmic level characteristic of the *śākta upāya*. IPK and IPV 3.1.5, 2:227-228. On an apparent apophatic leap beyond the identification inherent to Pure Wisdom see IPV 4.1.14, 2:306-307. I note that Jayaratha connects reasoning/good reasoning with the bringing about of recognition at TAV 4.13.1, 3:628-629. Space does not permit our pursuing a number of further connections of the Pratyabhijñā with good reasoning.

[153]IPV 4.1.11, 2:300. The *śāmbhava upāya* classification is supported by Bhāskara's quotation here of a verse concerning the seal/symbolic orientiation of Śambhu [*śāmbhavī mudrā*]. BIPV 4.1.11, 2:301. This quotation was pointed out by Navjivan Rastogi in personal conversation.

[154]IPV 4.1.12, 2:303.

have considered of the purification of conceptualization, Good Reasoning/Pure Wisdom, the knowledge of Śakti, and again contains the "rationale" constituting the Pratyabhijñā inference:

> The nature of the Great Lord belongs to him who recognizes [*parijānataḥ*] that he possesses the essential nature of the universe [as expressed] "All this is my glory"—even when there is the arising of conceptual constructions [*vikalpa*].[155]

I will now conclude the examination of constellations of features of the Pratyabhijñā method with the practical themes synthesized by Abhinavagupta in the *śākta upāya*. This inquiry has further reinforced the nature of the Pratyabhijñā discourse as an ambitious attempt to play the game of "denaturalized" Sanskritic inter-religious debate at the same time as carrying out the *full* monistic Śaiva soteriological agenda, or mythico-ritual drama. The arguments of the text purify one's delusive conceptualization through embodying the action of the Lord's Pure Wisdom. By this Wisdom He eliminates His self-imposed ignorance of His emanation of all the features of experience through Śakti. The student is thereby led inferentially to recognize His real identity, and re-enjoy His omnipotence. The Pratyabhijñā "correlationism" in the context here provided may be seen as a culmination of the development of themes of a distinctively intellectual, "domesticizing," sort of internalization—of radical practices for reaching God through His immanence.

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[155]IPK 4.1.12, 2:303. It is notable that Śivopādhyāya's version has the word *pratyabhijñātah* instead of the word *parijānataḥ*, which I in any case translate as 'recognizing.' See *The Vijñāna-Bhairava with Commentary Partly by Kṣhemarāja and Partly by Shivopādhyāya*, 109. This discrepancy was pointed out by Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 425 n. In personal conversation Rastogi suggested that Śivopādhyāya's version may have been the original. Rastogi states that, "according to the unanimous verdict of Śaiva authors," IPK 4.1.11 and 12 are understood as treating the *śāmbhava upāya* and the *śākta upāya*. Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 394.

CHAPTER 3

THE CHALLENGE OF THE BUDDHIST OPPONENTS

> We pay obeisance to Śiva, who manifests the differentiated universe as the prima facie argument, and then leads it back to unity as the established conclusion.
>
> IPV 1.2 benedictory verse, 1:81

We now turn to consider the exposition of the challenge of the opponents in the Pratyabhijñā system. This exposition is necessary to the system's simultaneously philosophical and soteriological method, and provides the immediate intellectual context in which the Śaiva theory of recognition is articulated. I characterized philosophy in the introduction as the effort to say something while justifying one's assumptions in terms of ostensibly universal criteria of experience and rationality. The effort to speak or write in a manner which is reflexive about one's assumptions would seem to require some awareness of alternative possibilities. An awareness of "otherness" is thus integral to the ideal-typical nature of philosophy as pursuing more universal intelligibility.

Otherness can take many different forms. There are others inside and outside a given "academy," with its distinctive feature of intertheoretic competition—expressing themselves in both philosophical and nonphilosophical ways. There are philosophical and nonphilosophical expressions from widely different periods and cultures. Many others may be uninterested in communicating or unable to do so. Otherness, in the sense intended here, can also be conceived by the thinker himself or herself. One may

endeavor to argue in a manner which would anticipate objections, by individuals, by a particular alternative "school," or by any critical inquirer.

From an appreciation for what may be called its reflexive-dialogical character, Indian traditions incorporate *doubt* (*saṃśaya*) as an essential feature of philosophical discourse. Doubt is listed as the third of the classic Nyāya categories pertaining to philosophical discussion. As was explained in the last chapter, Indian philosophies are usually developed with a conservative, apologetic stance for the views of particular schools. Philosophy is understood to proceed by considering doubt or indecision about the evidence for a particular view. By employing the schema of inference for others, along with other standard methods of debate, it then endeavors to reach a justified decision (*nirṇaya*).[1]

Most Indian philosophical texts are structured as a series of statements, questions and answers expressing the views of opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*—the 'prima facie') in confrontation with the position being established (*siddhānta*—the 'established conclusion').[2] In the IPK and its commentaries the whole second chapter is devoted to an initial presentation of the views of opponents. The discussions are developed further as the proponents argue their response in the remainder of the book. Abhinava himself is explicit about the intelligibility accomplished through this attempt to answer doubt:

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[1]See Matilal, *Perception,* 53, 74, 80.

[2]Many nonphilosophical *śāstras* are also structured in this manner. For example there may be doubt or debate about interpretations of texts, doctrines or practices which are assumed to be correct. This sort of discussion is common to nonphilosophical academic (and of course nonacademic) discussion around the world. What should and should not be considered philosophical perhaps ultimately depends upon the degree of explicit reflexivity. There are grey areas.

> The nature of Ultimate Reality here [in this system] is explained through the consideration of the views of opponents as doubts, and the refutation of them; it is thus clearly manifested.[3]

The controversial, apologetic character of Indian philosophies does not mean that they are mere invective; there is an enormous amount of influence between schools in progressively developing understandings of various issues. And I believe the fact that many of the discussions may be interpreted (though with difficulty) as bearing directly on our own discussions may be taken as evincing the success of both the Indian and Western thinkers in approaching some truly universal considerations for holding views.

The Śaivas' effort of correlation attempts to achieve universal intelligibility while simultaneously reencompassing the arena of denaturalized discourse within their soteriological tradition. This is evident in Abhinava's benedictory verse to the chapter presenting the views of the opponents, which I have taken to introduce this chapter. In this statement the otherness of philosophical opposition is situated within the traditional Śaiva myth. Here Abhinava is including the process of philosophical argument within the traditional soteriology's understandings of the Lord's acts of producing both delusion and revelation for humanity. Thus, shortly after his benediction in the introduction, Abhinavagupta quotes for support a statement from a devotional work, the *Stavacintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, which more generally describes these acts:

> Homage to God [*deva*] who creating the delusion of the deluded who are within worldy existence, destroys it; and concealing the transoppositional bliss of cognition, uncovers it.[4]

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[3]IPV I.2 introduction, 1:82. Cf. IPV 4.1.16, 2:309-310.

[4]IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:82. The verse is in *The Stava-Chintāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with Commentary by Kṣhemarāja*, ed. Mukunda Ram Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 10 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1918), 71, 80.

As the myth is made to encompass the otherness of doubt, so is the practice. In his expositions of the *śākta upāya,* Abhinava identifies doubt with the propensity towards seeing duality, which is eliminated by good reasoning (*sattarka*).[5] The reader will also recall Abhinava's development of the assertion in the *Mālinīvijaya Tantra* about the operation of reasoning in discriminating between that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued. Abhinava polemically includes within the latter category the paths to salvation taught by rival traditions.[6] Blinded by *māyā,* these schools lack good reasoning and do not understand the purification of conceptualization (*vikalpasaṃskāra*).[7] However, through purifying their reasoning, those who follow other schools can find the right path.[8] Abhinava compares the manner in which the Pratyabhijñā system makes the views of various systems help bring about the

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[5]See TA 4.105, 3:726. Abhinava is again here interpreting traditional conceptions. See the observation in Dyczkowski, *Vibration,* 192 and 259 n. 149, regarding doubt in the revealed text *Yoginīhṛdaya*. The significance of doubt in *tantric* practice is also discussed in Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 593-594.

[6]Among those whom Abhinava mentions are Buddhists, Jains, Vaiṣṇavas, Vaidikas and Sāṃkhyas. TA 4.18-32, 3:636-653; TS 4.43, 31. Abhinava explains that the mistake of the followers of rival systems is that they consider as liberation what are only lower perfections (*siddhis*) of human nature. TA 4.19-22, 3:638-641. Likewise see IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:26. Abhinava compares those who follow traditions other than Śaivism to those who disparage the enjoyment of the sovereignty of a king in favor of lesser ones. TA 4.18b-19a, 3:636-637; 4.22b-24a, 3:641-642. See Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 360, on how "the diversity of philosophic systems ... in fact represent the various stages of freedom of consciousness." See Sanderson, "Purity," 203, on the application of such a view in exegetics.

[7]TS 4.4-5, 21-22. Cf. Jayaratha's discussion of the difference between the good reasoning of the Śaivas and the non-good reasoning (*asattarka*) of others at TAV 4.17, 3:636.

[8]TA 4.39-40, 3:659-660; GN, 98.

recognition of the Self to the way in which the sun unites the essences (*rasa*) of earth and water for the nourishment of grains.[9]

Various rival systems are dealt with in the Pratyabhijñā texts. However, the chief opponents, and the focus in the works' chapter on the "prima facie," are the followers of the school founded by Dignāga and most influentially interpreted by Dharmakīrti.[10] This school is sometimes described as a hybrid of the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, and is now often called "Buddhist logic." This school attempted to defend the Buddhist soteriology in the framework of the Nyāya-inspired game of philosophizing about means of cognition (*pramāṇa* theory). The arguments between Buddhist logic and the Hindu realist schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā were the arena for the advancement of a great deal of sophisticated epistemological and ontological theory.[11]

There are not presently known any texts expressing criticisms of the Śaivas by the Buddhist logic school. It is quite possible that there were either formal or informal debates. At the time of the composition of the classic monistic Śaiva *śāstras,* Kashmir was a great center of both Hindu and Buddhist learning.[12] The monistic Śaiva writers would probably have interacted with intellectuals of various persuasions. Abhinavagupta in particular informs us that he studied with teachers of a number of

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[9]IPV 4.1 concluding verse 2, 2:317.

[10]The Śaivas' understanding of Buddhist logic clearly centers around the interpretation of Dharmakīrti. However, Abhinavagupta mentions various other earlier and later Buddhist thinkers.

[11]This is well demonstrated by Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.*

[12]See Jean Naudou, *Buddhists of Kashmir,* trans. Brereton and Picron (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980). One sees nonphilosophical criticism of the *tantrics* in this period, for example, in the satire of Kṣemendra. This sort of criticism is also found in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the *Rājataraṅgiṇī.*

philosophical traditions. However, we are in the realm of conjecture. Regardless of whether there were actual debates, what is important is that the Buddhist logicians were seen as a great intellectual threat by the large community of Hindu philosophers. By answering the epistemological and ontological challenges posed by them, the Śaivas were giving their soteriology a strong intellectual foundation.[13]

The Buddhist logicians present a challenge which presumes to be much more than the positing of an alternative set of total-interpretations, starting from alternative assumptions. The Buddhist logic may be understood as an exercise in skepticism, in the sense explained in the introduction. It must be granted that this skepticism, classifiable as a form of "phenomenalism," is in some ways more modest than those of the Buddhist Mādhyamikas along with the varieties of contemporary linguistic, theoretical and cultural relativism and deconstructionism. Nevertheless, as with the more radical skepticisms, they deny the validity of the recognitive application of any interpretation in experience—the grounding in some given of anything persisting, substantial or paradigmatic. The analogy of the Śaivas' opponents with contemporary forms of

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[13]Cf. the characterization of the Pratyabhijñā by Alexis Sanderson as "a socially ambitious avante-garde which presented the new idealism to a wider public by clothing it in the philosophically reasoned, anti-Buddhist discourse of high Brahmanism." Sanderson, "Purity," 203. I believe that Sanderson understands monistic Śaivism too exclusively in terms of the currently pervasive analysis of social relations of power. We may observe in the Śaivas some sort of effort of "upward mobility." However, it is my contention that the interpretation of other cultures, particularly of such intellectually self-conscious and sophisticated representatives as the Pratyabhijñā thinkers, must begin at the level of *what they say they are doing.* I have already referred to Paul Griffiths' similar concept of hermeneutic charity. Griffiths, *Apology,* 20-21. Questions about alternative motivations must be integrated into the more primary assessment of the validity of the Śaivas' communicative and soteriological agenda.

skepticism will enable us to understand more clearly how the Śaivas' answer may speak to our dilemmas.[14]

This section will present the views of the Buddhist logicians only inasmuch as this illuminates the intellectual setting within which the Śaiva theory of recognition is formulated. For the sake of manageability, the presentation will largely be based on the Śaivas' own interpretation of the Buddhists' challenge; however, I will refer to some other sources to clarify what is being discussed. I will first summarize the Buddhists' analysis of the manner in which interpretation functions in the construction of experience. Much of this analysis came to be accepted by the members of a number of other schools—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, the Śaivas, etc. This will enable us to appreciate the significance of the Buddhists' "phenomenalistic" denial of recognition. Finally I will take up the Śaivas' interpretation of the critical force of this skepticism against their own tradition. This takes the form of an attempted refutation of the soteriological recognition which the Śaivas wish to impart, by way of a refutation of all

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[14]I repeat the point made in the introduction that the description of the skepticism of the Buddhists concerns the problem of the interpretation of enduring entities in experience, and does not deny their positive soteriological and moral agendas. On the skepticism of the Mādhyamika, see Matilal, "Scepticism," chap. in *Perception,* 46-68. Cf. with what has been said in the present discussion with the point made about the commonality between the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra idealism at Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 28. For an interpretation of Dignāga in the perspective of wider Buddhist orientiations of skepticism and nominalism see Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs,* Studies of Classical India, vol. 9 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). I disagree, however, with Hayes' attempt to distinguish a skepticism proper to Buddhism from "arrogant" polemics and apologetics. (Some unfairly condemning suggestions are also made regarding Dharmakīrti on account of his more elaborate polemics—leaving aside the question of whether Dharmakīrti was less skeptical than Dignāga.) The categories of polemics and apologetics formally classify communicative agendas, and do not make reference to the views in question or the moral states of their authors.

the recognitions of the categories which are understood to constitute this soteriological recognition.

Utpaladeva compactly summarizes the epistemology of Buddhist logic in the first verse of the second chapter of the IPK. He states:

> ... There is one cognition [*jñāna*], which is the manifestation [*ābhāsa*] of that which is self-characterized [*svalakṣaṇa*]. However, other is that called conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], which comprises words [*sābhilāpa*] and [occurs] diversely....[15]

Following Abhinava, the word manifestation (*ābhāsa*) indicates introverted illumining or awareness (*prakāśanam antarmukham*).[16] This is a kind of self-awareness (often designated *svasaṃvedana*) which for the Buddhist logicians is integral to every cognition, validating it, so that one knows that one knows.[17] The Buddhists understand this awareness to be transient with each experience, rather than a characteristic or activity of an enduring subject. The Buddhists also take the idealistic position that this awareness is only artificially distinguishable from its ostensible object.

The term 'self-characterized' (*svalakṣaṇa*) refers to what may be analyzed as its objective counterpart—it designates the ontological given in direct perception. Abhinava explains that the second word of the compound expression *svalakṣaṇa*, 'characteristic' (*lakṣaṇa*—more accurately: 'defining characteristic'), indicates place, time and form (*ākāra*). The first element, *sva*, means 'self.' The place, time and form of the *svalakṣaṇa* belong only to itself.[18] Abhinava later explains that distinctions of place

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[15]IPK 1.2.1-2, 1:85.

[16]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86.

[17]On the Buddhist conception of *svasaṃvedana* in the context of other efforts to explain the validation of cognition, see Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Problems of Knowledge and Perception," chap. in *Logic, Language and Reality: An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 203-268.

[18]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86.

and time are referred to by the Buddhists only as concessions to gross understanding. All difference is of constitutive form (*ākāra*).[19] The forms constituting the *svalakṣaṇas* are the absolutely simple elements in physical sensations, visions of colors and shapes, emotions and even the inner-sensorial aspect of thoughts.

The *svalakṣaṇa* is not known in any sort of qualificative *seeing as.* It is so unique that it cannot even be distinguished from other perceptions![20] The term *svalakṣaṇa* is sometimes translated as 'unique particular' or 'point instant.' Though not literal, these expressions convey some of the idea. I will sometimes use the former for the sake of convenience and style.

From the direct perception of the unique particulars, the Buddhists have distinguished *vikalpa*. This and related words such as *kalpanā* may be understood as articulating conceptions of the interpretive feature of experience. Two other frequent glosses for these terms are 'imagination' and 'conceptual construction.'[21] All of these glosses appear suitable for our purposes.

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[19]IPV 1.2.9, 1:87. The explanation of apparent objects in terms of forms of cognition was advocated by various Buddhist philosophers as an alternative to the in some ways "realistic" views of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. It was however rejected by the more radical Mādhyamika skepticism. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, of the synthetic Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, refuted this view as held by both Sautrāntika "representationalists" and Yogācāra "idealists." For an interpretation of these arguments see Yuichi Kajiyama, "Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice,* ed. Minoru Kiyota, assisted by Elvin W. Jones (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 114-143.

[20]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86. The description of that which is uncharacterized is at least inherently paradoxical.

[21]Matilal has made among the most sophisticated interpretations of the concept of *vikalpa* for Western philosophy. See Matilal, "Imagination, Perception and Language," chap. in *Perception,* 309-354. Matilal has pointed out that the parallel between the terms *vikalpa* and imagination is not restricted to their technical philosophical meanings. *Kalpanā* also has much of the ordinary sense of imagination in

Abhinava explains that according to the Buddhists the (ostensible) objects of conceptual construction are characterized by universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).[22] The Buddhists' concept of the universal is much broader than those of the Hindu realists, as well as of most Western philosophers. Thus according to Dignāga conceptual construction includes the categories of name (*nama*), genus (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*) and substance (*dravya*).[23] Matilal has pointed to the applicability to understanding the concept of *vikalpa* of P.F. Strawson's reconstruction of Hume's and Kant's theories of the operation of imagination in perception.[24] Following Strawson's theory of imagination, we may say that the syntheses of *vikalpa* include all "kind-identity," as well as "individual-identity."[25] These include the features of what may be called "internal, psychological" as well as "external" experience.

Utpaladeva's expression 'comprises words' (*sābhilāpa*) indicates the Buddhists' partial adherence to Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. One of Bhartṛhari's well known positions is that all experience is in some way linguistic.[26] The Buddhists hold that language is not involved in the direct perception of the unique particulars.

English as "an inventive, fanciful or playful application of concepts to things." Matilal, *Perception*, 313.

[22]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:87.

[23]*Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions*, ed. and trans. by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard Oriental Series, ed. Daniel H.H. Ingalls, vol. 47 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1.3.

[24]Strawson's article "Imagination and Perception," was cited in the first chapter. Matilal applies it to the interpretation of *vikalpa* at *Perception*, 312.

[25]Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," 47.

[26]Later chapters will consider in more detail some of Bhartṛhari's views as they were appropriated by the Śaivas.

However, they accept the view that imaginative construction is linguistic in nature.[27] Words express the universals which ostensibly synthesize unique particulars.

Now, for the Buddhists, the application of linguistic interpretation to experience depends on the memory of the acquired referential convention (*saṃketa*). The construction is applied to experience when the latter activates the relevant mnemonic impressions (*saṃskāra*).[28] Thus, in the manner explained in the introduction, the applications of *vikalpa* to experience are understood as instances of a very general sort of *recognition.*

Abhinava explains the recognitive application of linguistic interpretation to experience as having the subject-predicate structure which is typified "This is that."[29] He supports the Buddhist view with a verse from Bhartṛhari:

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[27]I note that Dignāga seemed to understand the correlation of language and construction as invariable. Dharmakīrti, however, in order to account for apparently nonlinguistic constructed experience such as of infants or the dumb, only states that the conceptualization is "capable of coelescence with language" (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogya*). *Nyāyabindu of Acharya Dharmakīrti: With the Commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva and Dharmottara, and Dharmottara-Tika-Tippani,* ed. Dwarika Das Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1985), 1.5, 25. I have only slightly modified the gloss of F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic,* 2 vols. (repr., New York: Dover, 1962), 2:19. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers do not seem to have been concerned with such details as whether Dignāga's view could be defended on Buddhist grounds. It will thus be faithful to their exposition as well as economical for us to keep the issues of language and construction together.

[28]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86-87. The gloss of *saṃskāra* as well as the word *vāsanā* as 'mnemonic impression' is made only for the epistemological context of the discussion of memory and the resources of memory in interpretation. They have other meanings in the broader contexts of "spiritual psychology" and the doctrine of *karma.*

[29]IPVV 1.2.1-2, 1:115.

> That is understood to be linguistic qualification [*abhijalpa*], when the form of the word in its application is made one with the object [as is expressed] "This is that."[30]

The Buddhist logician Dharmottara thus describes the way in which an infant (who seems to remember some language as well as basic facts from previous lives) rudimentarily interprets experience through recognitive judgment (*pratyavamarśa*):

> An infant does not stop crying and does not put its mouth on the breast as long as it does not recognize [*pratyavamṛśati*] the breast being perceived as what has already been perceived. [Such a recognition is expressed] "This is that."[31]

Utpaladeva states in his summarial verse that conceptual construction occurs diversely. Abhinava explains the diversity of *vikalpa* as due to the diversity of words[32] and the universals they express.[33] The recognitive structure of linguistic ascription (*abhilāpasaṃsarga*) may be illustrated with examples from some of Dignāga's categories mentioned above. In the case of a name, it could be expressed "This is Ḍittha." A quality: "This is blue color." A species/genus: "This is a cow."[34] Action could be recognized "This falls"—and so on.

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30 *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, kāṇḍa* 2, ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) 2.128. Quoted in IPVV 1.2.1-2, 1:115.. This statement occurs in the course of Bhartṛhari's presentation of a series of semantic theories. There is a discussion of *abhijalpa* in the Buddhist text *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācarya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary "Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla,* 2 vols., ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981), 888-890, 1:351.

31 *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 1.5, 27.

32 IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:88.

33 IPVV 1.2.1-2, 1:115.

34 These examples are from the interpretation of the *Nyāyabindu* commentaries by Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic,* 2:20-21 n. The passage cited from Dharmottara as well as this explanation by Stcherbatsky were pointed out by Navjivan Rastogi, "Recognition in the Pratyabhijñā School: A Study in Epistemology," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 58-59 (1977-78), 852 n.

Abhinava also explains the diversity of *types of experiences* as depending on the variety of words. What is ordinarily called recognition is only one of several possible expressions of a deeper "This is that" recognitive structure. Thus after he quotes the verse of Bhartṛhari just considered, Abhinava gives examples:

> When there is the synthesis "that," there is memory. When there is the intermixing [*anuvedhe*] "This is that," there is recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. When there is the comprehension [*anurodhe*] "This is like that" there is comparison. When there is the association [*anuyoga*] "This is only that" there is discrimination.[35]

Now, the Buddhist logicians acknowledge the provisional value of conceptual construction for ordinary behavior. However, as I have stated, they make the skeptical argument that the recognitive application of interpretation to experience is ultimately *invalid.* This is the significance of Utpaladeva's description of conceptual construction as "other." Abhinavagupta finds in this compact expression the assertion that the application of the remembered words expressing universals is not grounded in immediate experience. Paradoxically using the expression "blue," to refer to an uninterpreted datum, Abhinava explains:

> That [linguistic interpretation] is not here. For linguistic interpretation is not a quality of blue. And it is not cognized by the eyes. It is something of the past which is the object of memory. And when the mnemonic impression is not awakened, there is no memory. The awakening of that [impression] arises from the cognition of the real thing. Thus there is not the memory of the linguistic interpretation at the time of the cognition of the real thing. Therefore, interpreted cognition is "other." For all interpretation directly or indirectly results from the uninterpreted [cognition]. "Other" means having another nature. The object of that [interpreted cognition] is that characterized by a universal [*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*]. The conventional reference may be known from the behavior of elders or from instruction. It is not possible to make that [reference], which is established through

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[35]IPVV 1.2.1-2, 1:115. The ways in which a deeper sort of recognition may be related to the ordinary experiences of recognition (which seem to depend upon the contingencies of experience and memory) will be further elucidated in the next chapter on the Śaivas' theory of recognition.

extensive conceptual construction regarding the unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*], which is extremely self-confined.[36]

All that we really know is the flux of unique particulars. This doctrine has often been classified as a species of phenomenalism. I believe that this characterization is valid. The degree of the Buddhist logicians' skepticism is necessary limited by its acceptance of the framework of discussing the nature of valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus, at the same time that they deny recognition, they must (paradoxically or contradictorily) attempt to characterize uninterpreted data of perception positively. Here again there is an analogy with the varieties of Western phenomenalism, the skeptical force of which resulted largely from from an effort to carry scientific empiricism to an extreme.[37] Of course the ultimate motivation of the Indian theory is very different from the Western. The Buddhist logic view constitutes a philosophical rationalization of the central Buddhist soteriological doctrine of impermanence. In fact Buddhist meditation cultivates this ostensibly more correct way of cognizing, which Stephan Beyer has described as "cinematographic."[38]

The Buddhist logicians' challenges had a great impact on the development of Indian philosophy. In polemics spanning centuries the Buddhists attempted to

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[36]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:87. Cf. IPV 1.5.19, 1:283-284.

[37]The classic expression is David Hume, "Of Skepticism With Regard to the Senses," chap. in *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects,* 2d. ed., ed. with index by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 187-218. I suggest that there is an analogy between phenomenalism and a historicism which repudiates "essentialism" at the same time that it tries to avoid a full relativism.

[38]Stephan Beyer used this expression to describe the realization of the evanescence of things in a class on Buddhist philosophy at the University of Chicago. Hume of course does not prescribe methods for such cultivation. However, as Mary Warnock has explained, he does seem to believe that we can know our experience as he describes. "If we open our eyes and ears, if we stretch out our hands to feel, what we actually *get* is a series of impressions...." Warnock, *Imagination,* 28.

deconstruct many of the commonsensical and religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schools—external objects, ordinary and ritual action, an enduring Self, God, Bhartṛhari's metaphysical interpretation of revelation as Supreme Speech, and so forth. The application of any of the Hindu concepts to experience was held to be ungrounded. The Buddhist critiques were advanced through a variety of epistemological, ontological and logical considerations, while the question of the validity of recognition was often seen to epitomize the discussions.[39]

The Hindu rivals generally accepted the occurrence of the originally uninterpreted experience identified by the Buddhists, and then attempted to show that the application of conceptual/linguistic interpretation is somehow grounded in it.[40] Thus the Mīmāṃsā thinker Kumārila tried to show that recognition, or synthesis utilizing memory, further elucidates universals or attributes already given through sense contact.

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[39]In personal conversation, Matilal supported my interpretation of the way in which recognition epitomized the debates between the Buddhists and the Hindus. Summaries of the related debates about recognition and memory between the Buddhist logicians, the Hindu realists and other schools may be found in: Jadunatha Sinha, *Indian Psychology,* vol. 1, *Cognition* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 94-103 and 376-409; and vol. 3, *Epistemology of Perception,* 68-76 and 155-177; along with Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,* 144, 201-209, 227-230 and 456-471. Also see Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality,* 203-268 and *Perception,* 309-354. I note that in many discussions recognition and memory were invoked by Hindu thinkers as proofs of a persisting Self functioning as substratum for the impressions of the past. See *Nyāya Bhāṣya, Nyāya Vārttika* and *Nyāya Vārttikatātparyaṭīkā* in *Nyāyadarśanam,* 1.1.10, 184-193. One of these arguments on the basis of memory will be considered shortly. The independence of the persisting Self from the means of cognition was further seen as evinced in cases of intersensory recognition, e.g., the recognition through touch of what was previously seen with the eyes. See the commentaries in ibid., 3.1.1, 697-712. The Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara takes up some of the same arguments for a substratum Self as the realists. Though they are sometimes used to defend epistemological points, these are in themselves arguments of philosophical psychology.

[40]The realist approach changed with the advent of the Navya-Nyāya.

He compared this process to the way in which the items in a dark room become clearer as one becomes accustomed to the light.[41]

Vācaspatimiśra modified the classic Nyāya understanding of perception in contending that

> there is direct perception of what is in the range of the cognition which is born of the senses, and not just what is in contact with the senses.[42]

He thus argued:

> Let it be [conceded] that the range of the senses regarding an object do not include its state at a previous time. Nevertheless that [previous state] is comprehended in perception [*jñāna*] produced by the senses, with the assistance of memory or mnemonic impressions.[43]

Corresponding to the broad defence of recognition, the Naiyāyikas elaborated upon the ontology of the quality-qualified/substance-attribute structure (united by inherence—*samavāya*) in the entities which they claimed that it establishes.[44] Our limited objective of interpreting the Śaivas unfortunately does not make it possible to survey the full range of the different thinkers' understandings of interpretation in experience, its precise relation to recognition, ontology, etc. I only wish to observe that

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[41]See *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: With the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārthi Miśra*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978), 4.111-133, 121-123. This is discussed at Matilal, *Perception*, 323.

[42]*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1.4, 118.

[43]*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1.4, 118. The two passages of Vācaspatimiśra just given were pointed out, and the translations were influenced, by Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 458-459. For another sample of Nyāya arguments about the presumptiveness of recognition for establishing the continuity of objects, see the general discussion of this, amidst other issues, at *Nyāyavārttika* and *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 2.1.16, 432-440.

[44]See Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, 269-371.

it was these debates which provided the intellectual problematics which the Pratyabhijñā thinkers believed they needed to address.[45]

We may now turn to consider the Śaivas' interpretation of the critical force of the Buddhist logic directly against their own views. I will first observe that the very formulation of the soteriological realization the system aims to convey as *recognition* (the intermediate in Abhinava's scheme of three purposes) directly addresses the Buddhist analysis. Our examination of how the Buddhists are understood to deny this recognition will be made easier by bringing in Abhinavagupta's explanation of the operation of the Pratyabhijñā system as an inference for the sake of others.

General Indian reflections about the nature of inference were in fact themselves related to the epistemology of recognition. I draw attention to the fourth step, the 'application' (*upanaya*). It is in this step that the epistemic gain is attained within the meticulously explicit formal structure of the inference. Matilal has explained:

> The most important step here is ... the fourth step, which combines the second and third to formulate what may be called the full-fledged premise of the argument before the conclusion is drawn in the fifth step. This is supposed to show both

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[45]I mention some other interesting issues connected with these discussions: Dharmendra Nath Shastri has shown how the Nyāya arguments for the perceptual character of recognition paved the way for the later theory of 'transcendental contacts' (*alaukikasaṃnikarṣa*). With this theory thinkers moved to the claim, for example, that one can can know the smell of sandal *directly through visual perception.* This conception emphasizes the point already discussed, that there is a basis for the application of qualifications of the past to present perceptual experience. See Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,* 462-471. Not all recognition is valid for the Naiyāyikas. See the refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka attempt to justify the eternality of sounds of *Nyāyavārttika,* in *Nyāyadarśanam* 2.2.31, 624ff. It is explained here that the recognition of sounds depends upon *similarity* rather than identity. The Nyāya theory of error may be interpreted as describing over-extended recognition. See the discussions of what Matilal calls the "misplacement theory," as contrasted with other Indian theories of error, in *Perception,* 180-220 and *Logic, Language and Reality,* 215-228. Matilal supported my interpretation of the concept in terms of over-extended recognition in personal conversation.

> facts, viz. that the evidence adduced is invariant with what we are going to prove and that it is unquestionably present in the case under consideration.[46]

Now this step has itself been interpreted in classical philosophical literature as a sort of recognition (*anusaṃdhāna, pratisaṃdhāna, parāmarśa*).[47] One applies to a case at hand the concomitance known by earlier experience. In the Pratyabhijñā inference, one applies the knowledge of the concomitance of the Lord with Śakti, known from the scriptures and other means, to understanding oneself.[48]

The coalescence of the Śaiva recognition with the formal structure of inference is important. For it clearly focuses the validity of the recognition in question as a matter of philosophical discussion. The Śaivas' soteriological recognition is not taken in the prima facie chapter as merely a general example of what has been denied. The Śaivas elaborate strong Buddhist objections—on the basis of the denial of recognition—against what constitute every one of *the components of the Pratyabhijñā inference.*

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[46]Matilal, *Perception,* 78.

[47]Matilal has described *pratisaṃdhāna* in perception as a "connective-recollective cognition." On *parāmarśa* in inference, see the discussion of Abhinavagupta with Daniel Ingall's explanation in *The "Dhvanyāloka" of Ānandavardhana with the "Locana" of Abhinavagupta* 3.33b, 546 and 547-548 n. 7; and the remarks in Daniel Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic,* Harvard Oriental Series, ed. Walter Eugene Clark, no. 40 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 32-33. Correspondingly, all recognition in conceptual construction was understood to be inferential. See Matilal, "Perception as Inference," in *Perception,* 255-291. The general understanding of connections between inference and recognition are clearly involved in the Pratyabhijñā speculations, though the thinkers are not concerned with spelling these out in an "introductory" manner. Indeed, the understandings may be taken directly from the Śaivas' ideas without the general background.

[48]Statements I quoted in the final section of the last chapter on the connections between the Pratyabhijñā system and the *śākta upāya* approximate the structure of the application step of the inference. Thus from *Vijñānabhairava* there is: "I, who have the qualities [*dharmas*] of Śiva, am none but He." *Vijñāna-Bhairava* 109. Cf. Utpaladeva's advice at IPK 4.1.12, 2:303.

Utpala and Abhinava first formulate Buddhist arguments against the very existence of the inferential subject (*pakṣa*)—the Self. They then present arguments against key features of the reason (*hetu*)—one's possession of Śakti(s) or Lordship. Śakti is analyzed under the two main headings of Cognition and Action, which (as I have been saying) are efficacious in the broad fields which may be characterized as epistemology and metaphysics/ontology. Finally, the Buddhists refute the very possibility of *relation* (*sambandha*)—which Cognition and Action must somehow have with the Self/Lord in order to be considered His Śaktis.[49]

Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's interpretations of Buddhist criticisms against the Śaiva topics were developed from strategies typical of the earlier attacks against the realists, Vedāntins and others. Simplifying, the chief strategies employed in treating the various topics may be characterized as follows: 1. The Buddhists present a description of the elementary phenomenal data underlying the various Śaiva categories. (I have been saying that such an effort is either inherently paradoxical or contradictory.) 2a. They refute the existence of an establishing means of cognition (*sādhaka pramāṇa*) for each construction primarily by denying perception in the unique particulars of grounds for the qualifications from memory. 2b. They further deny inference as establishing means. This is done largely on the basis of the view that inference is made regarding facts instances of which have already been known through perception. 3. The Buddhists also adduce repudiating means (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) against the various topics. These consist of reductio ad absurdum arguments, mainly claiming the logical impossibility of synthesizing into a unity a plurality of unique particulars at different moments.[50]

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[49]See Abhinava's summary of the chapter at IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:82-84.

[50]Another favorite Buddhist strategy is based on the ontological criterion of purposeful action or causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*). The claim is that only the phenomenal

We begin with the inferential subject, the Self. The reality which the Buddhists paradoxically describe as underlying the idea of personal identity is the very series of experiences (*saṃtāna*), of cognitions and particularly of the body. Personal identity arises through the (recognitive) application of the mnemonic impressions (*vāsanā*) of these series to these series. Thus one forms such conceptions as "I am thin," "I am happy" "I conceptually construct," "I remember." Since recognition is invalid, these ideas are *nothing but* mental constructions.[51]

The Buddhists first deny perception as establishing means for the existence of the Self. Abhinava explains:

> It is not correct that there is a Self which has the essential nature of consciousness and is enduring. For there is no awareness of an enduring self-awareness.[52]

The Buddhists then argue for the inadequacy of inference as an establishing means. While considering the ostensible nature of the inferred Self they adduce the repudiating means, i.e., they contend that the Self is logically impossible. The attempt

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data and not the constructions can do anything. This point is referred to by Abhinava at IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:87. However, it is not applied in the chapter of the IPK and IPV focusing on the Buddhist criticisms.

[51]See IPK 1.2.1-2, 1:85; IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86; IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:89-90; IPV 1.2.5, 1:99; IPK 1.2.6, 1:99 and IPV 1.2.6, 1:101.

[52]IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:86. Also see IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:83; IPK 1.2.1-2, 1:85; IPV 1.2.1-2, 1:90-91. Amidst all the differences, the basic position is again very similar to that of David Hume. The following exerpt is representative: "For my part , when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him.... But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." Hume, *Treatise,* 252-253.

to infer the existence of the Self which the Śaivas record follows the lines of typical Naiyāyika arguments. The attempt is to infer a Self as a substratum (*guṇin*) of various psychological attributes (*guṇa*).[53] I will mention only the salient features of the arguments.

The discussion focuses on *memory.* Both sides agree that memory has access to the past *through impressions* (*saṃskāra*) made by an original experience.[54] We may understand the Buddhist conception of an impression as a kind of "pattern" conveyed from moment to moment in the flux of experience. The proponent of the Self, on the other hand, argues that the impressions productive of memory must reside in a substratum (*āśraya*) because they constitute a kind of quality. This substratum is the Self.[55]

The Naiyāyika inference could be described as an inference of material cause from effect.[56] The Buddhists severely criticize the conception involved. They contend that if the Self were something which endured apart from the changing qualities which we actually know in immediate experience, it would have no value in explanation. As Abhinava explains the argument (while glossing some words in a verse):

> If it is accepted that qualities [*dharma*] are different "from that," i.e., the Self, then there is no modification[57] in the essential nature of the Self. Therefore that

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[53]IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:83-84.

[54]IPK 1.2.5, 1.98. For the realist the access to the past is valid. For the Buddhist, though it has provisional value, it is invalid.

[55]IPV 1.2.6, 1:99.

[56]The Naiyāyikas believe that material cause and effect/residing quality are different, and that they are united by the relationship called inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence is covered by the Buddhist refutation of relation which will be considered below. See IPV 1.2.6, 1:100.

[57]This is a loose gloss of *viśeṣa*, 'special/intrinsic quality,' to convey the idea in the context. The idea is further explained in the text.

> Self does not operate in memory. For it is not deprived of its previous nature of being non-rememberer and unimpressed [*asaṃskṛta*]. Therefore, there is the accomplishment of memory from only the impression.[58]

On the other hand, the impressions may be considered intrinsic properties (*viśeṣa*) of the Self. Because they change, such properties would actually turn out to be modifications. The Buddhists thus argue that this suggestion would entail that the Self is *changing* rather than enduring.[59] One would then be left with the Buddhist doctrine that memory occurs through nothing but impressions transmitted in the phenomenal succession.[60]

According to Abhinava, this reductio ad absurdum, that if the Self were of any explanatory value it would not be eternal, constitutes the repudiating means of cognition (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) regarding it.[61] The Self is both a useless hypothesis for the understanding of experience and impossible. The ideas are nicely summed up in an old Buddhist maxim quoted by Abhinavagupta:

> What is the result of rain and heat on the ether and the skin? If that [Self] is like skin, it is not eternal. If it is like the ether, it is as much as nonexistent.[62]

The Buddhist logicians then turn to what constitute the reasons in the Pratyabhijñā inference. These are the definitive characteristics of Lordship—the Śaktis.

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[58]IPV 1.2.6, 1:100-101. Also see IPK 1.2.5, 1:98; IPK 1.2.6, 1:99; IPV 1.2.6, 1:99-100.

[59]See the interpretation of BIPV 1.2.6, 1:98-102.

[60]IPV 1.2.6, 1:99-100.

[61]IPV 1.2.6, 1:101. Abhinava explains that there would be the same problems for the Self serving as substratum to other qualities such as cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, hatred, *dharma* and *adharma*. IPV 1.2.6, 1:100.

[62]IPV 1.2.6, 1:101. I here follow the different order of lines in this verse in *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva with the Vimarśinī by Abhinavagupta,* 2 vols., eds. Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Delhi: Butala & Co., 1984), 1.2.6, 1:67. Pt. Srinarayan Mishra stated in personal conversation that he has seen this maxim quoted many times in Naiyāyika and Advaita Vedāntin texts.

The Buddhists examine the two chief Śaktis—Cognition and Action. They first take up the Cognition Śakti.[63] I have already explained the character of Buddhist logic as a phenomenalistic position in the context of Indian epistemological (*pramāṇa*) theory; the Buddhist logicians accordingly do not wish to repudiate the existence of cognition altogether. The reality of cognition is the flux of experience.

In considering cognition in the present context, the Buddhists only wish to exclude any conception of cognition which could be meaningfully considered a Śakti of the Self/Lord. They do not elaborate arguments denying experience and inference as means establishing such a cognition, as with the other Śaiva categories. Their attack rather consists only in the repudiating reductio ad absurdum (*prasaṅga*) of such a notion of cognition.[64]

This section is complex and obscure, but I believe that the main thrust of the arguments remains the impossibility of uniting a plurality of unique, episodic awarenesses in a reified "cognition" or "knowledge" existing at different points of time. Thus the problem of qualification which affected the value of an alleged Self for memory is invoked. If cognition as a Śakti were eternal, it could be associated neither with the transient objects of cognition nor with another eternal entity, the Self. Another problem is mentioned for the notion of a single enduring cognition. Because it could not be delimited, all objects would be comprehended at the same time, and in a confused manner.

Much attention is given to showing the unsuitability of an understanding of cognition taken from the Sāṃkhya school, which would seem to be viewed as the most likely of the proposals. This conception attempts to bridge the Self and objects by

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[63]IPV 1.2.7, 1:102.

[64]IPV 1.2.7, 1:102.

describing cognitions as the modifications of an insentient faculty of cognition (*buddhi*). The insentient faculty is explained to take on the nature of cognition when it receives the reflections of both the self-luminous Self (*puruṣa*) and the object. The Buddhists argue that cognition cannot be insentient; its validation must be integral to it.[65] Furthermore, the problem brought up against the Self would affect the faculty of cognition. If eternal, it would not be associated with its objects. It must therefore be transitory. The Buddhists succeed in this way in turning the Sāṃkhya theory back into their own view of a phenomenal flux of experience.[66]

The Buddhist discussion of action again follows the complete pattern of refuting recognition outlined above. There is the denial of perception and inference as establishing means, and the putting forth of a reductio ad absurdum as repudiating means.[67] Conceptually constructed action is refuted by the Buddhists as having the features of a *unity apprehended in an enduring substratum-object,* which also occurs in a *temporal sequence.* The Buddhists give the minimalist description of what really lies behind such constructions as "the origination of an object such as a body, etc., at various places."[68] For example, underlying the construction "Devadatta goes" are the observations of Devadatta inside the house and then outside of the house; behind "The milk is transformed" are the experiences of a sweet liquid and a sour, firmer substance.[69]

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[65]That is, it must be self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*).

[66]IPK and IPV 1.2.7-8, 1:102-111.

[67]IPV 1.2.9, 1:113.

[68]IPK 1.2.9.pt.1, 1:111.

[69]IPV 1.2.9, 1:111-112.

We first turn to the Buddhists' treatment of perception as an ostensible means for establishing the existence of action. Here the two features identified in action are denied separately. Perception is thus denied as a means of establishing the unity of action in a persisting entity:

> No substratum is perceived which is different from those moments. For only moments in a phenomenal succession appear.[70]

The recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of such continuity makes out only *similarity* rather than a real identity.[71]

The Buddhists next take up the question of the perception of the other feature of action—sequence. One might expect that this would be acceptable to those who hold that everything is impermanent. However, the determination of sequence in terms of before and after depends upon the recognition of extrinsic qualifications in the flux of experience. The perception of the unique particulars themselves does not establish it:

> ... The priority and posteriority of moments is due to synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] by the intellect through conceptual construction [*vikalpa*]. However, nothing is before or after in its essential nature. For there is the mere [i.e., isolated and evanescent] entity [*vastu*]. Thus the the condition of sequence, the coming before and after, in action, which is brought about through conceptual construction [*vikalpa*]—does not touch the momentary entity. For those moments are not qualified by relation to each other.[72]

The Buddhists also briefly take up and deny inference as a means of establishing action. They mention particularly the attempt to infer the existence of action from its effect. For example one may infer an action (of movement) from the effect of arriving at the village. However, inference depends upon concomitances

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[70]IPV 1.2.9, 1:114-115.

[71]IPV 1.2.9, 1:112. Cf. David Hume: "The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity." Hume, *Treatise,* 205.

[72]IPV 1.2.9, 1:114-115.

between things which have already been directly perceived. There has never been a perception of action from which to infer it in other circumstances. The effect of arriving at a village is nothing but the final moment in the perceptual series.[73]

Besides denying the positive means of establishment, the Buddhists formulate a repudiating means alleging that action is logically contradictory. The two features of action, the denials of the perception of which have just been considered, are inconsistent with each other. Abhinava explains the argument:

> ... Sequence is logically concomitant with diversity, because it is absent in that which is undifferentiated. Unity is contradictory to diversity. Therefore, how can [action] be sequential and unitary? ... How can the substratum affected by such moments of action, which have different places, times and forms, be unitary? Therefore the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], "This is Devadatta; he has arrived at the village," cannot establish a real unity.[74]

The Buddhists then turn to consider a more abstract but nonetheless essential issue for the success of the Pratyabhijñā inference of the person's Lordship. Cognition and action (along with the other features of experience), in order to be comprehended as Śaktis, would have to have a *relation* to the Self or Lord. The Buddhists accordingly proceed to criticize the general notion of relation (*sambandha*).[75] The Buddhists are here attacking the very possibility of the concomitances of subject and predicate with the linking quality in the Pratyabhijñā inference. Without relation, the recognitive application, "I who have Lordly qualities am the Lord," would be impossible.

More generally, relation may actually be understood as epitomizing what Buddhist logic is trying to deny. Like universals, relations may be taken as a description of the ontological counterpart of recognition. They are ostensible connections,

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[73]IPV 1.2.9, 1:113.

[74]IPV 1.2.9, 1:115. I have elided statements concerning the point already made that perception is not a means of establishing action.

[75]IPV 1.2.10, 1:116; IPVV 1.2.10, 1:197.

conditions seeming to endure, between the particulars experienced in different circumstances. On the basis of their fundamental doctrine of impermanence, Buddhists have generally taken a "deconstructive" approach to relations as enduring conditions.[76]

At the same time, ordinary life depends upon the understanding of connections or regularities between circumstances. This is also of importance to Buddhism as a soteriological path. There must be a way of describing what inhibits and what furthers the way to salvation. The Buddhists attempted to comprehend such connections with a theory which may perhaps be described as an attempt to characterize a relation which is not a relation. This is the special Buddhist understanding of the causal relation, the well known conception of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). With respect to our explanatory rubrics, this constitutes the Buddhist attempt to describe the phenomenal data underlying erroneous constructions of relation.

This doctrine describes causality as a mere regularity of succession. Utpaladeva explains in a characteristic manner: "It is only cognized that when there is such and such [*tatra tatra*], such and such becomes."[77] Abhinava elaborates:

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[76]Two texts presenting the views which the Śaivas outline in this section are Dharmakīrti, *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, in *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntaraksita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972), 139-163; and "*Sambandhavicāra*" in *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary 'Vritti' of Acharya Manorathanandin*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1984), 4.232-241, 328-332. For some surveys, of varying quality, see: *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (1925), s.v. "Relations (Buddhist)," by C.A.F. Rhys Davids; David J. Kalapuhana, "The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism (1)," *University of Ceylon Review* 2 (1962): 19-47; N.S. Dravid, "The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 5 (October 1977): 39-52; and Chhote Lal Tripathi, "The Idealistic Theory of Relation," chap. in *The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism* (Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1972), 222-239.

[77]IPK 1.2.10, 1:116.

> The fixed priority of one entity with another entity, is made the the object of worldy understanding by means of conceptual construction. Thus is what is explained as the relation of cause and effect.[78]

In this way, one might see a lump of clay followed by a pot; there is no "substantial" connection between them. Even relations which we might not expect are reduced to this characterization of causality. Thus the reality behind the container-contained relation of bowl and jujube fruit is held to be nothing but the perception of them separately and then contiguously.[79]

Again this minimalist redescription of phenomenal data precludes means for validating the recognition of more substantial relations. "There is no relation other than the relation of cause and effect [as described by the Buddhists]."[80] Abhinava explains:

> Thus only momentary entities are experienced. Nothing additional appears through direct perception. Nor [does anything additional appear] through inference, as should be explained like [the denial of the inference of] action."[81]

Bhāskara clarifies that the idea in the last assertion is again that there is inference only regarding what has already been perceived.[82]

The Buddhists further apply their denial of establishing means to what was at issue in the Pratyabhijñā inference. It is not only that there can be no enduring relationships; not even the Buddhists' own minimalist causal relation is observed

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[78]IPV 1.2.10, 1:117. I note that in the mere reference to priority and posteriority the Buddhists have already contradicted their denial of temporal sequence in the construction of action. The discussion of even a very minimalistic causal relation necessitates more reified categories. What I view as the inevitable contradiction in a skeptical account becomes more obvious.

[79]IPV 1.2.10, 1:116-117.

[80]IPK 1.2.10, 1:116.

[81]IPV 1.2.10, 1:116-117.

[82]BIPV 1.2.10, 1:117.

between the Self and cognition and action. Taking into consideration some of the Buddhists' previous refutations, the argument is rather overdetermined:

> There is no cause-effect relation of the Self with cognition and action, because they are not effects of the Self, because cognition is an effect of its own collection [of causes], and because action does not exist. Thus there is no relation [of the Self] with cognition and action by which it could be cognizer and actor.[83]

The Buddhists again adduce considerations refuting all more "substantial" relations as contradictory.[84] This is approached from two angles. Firstly, relation, as a unity, would lose its own nature by becoming associated with dual relata.

> Relation is the attaining [*prāpti*] of each other of two things which each partake of the attaining, [while at the same time relation] remains unitary.... How can that be? For that the entire body [*śarīra*] of which exists in one location cannot exist in another. For there would then be the undesirable consequence of its differentiation from its own nature.[85]

Abhinava compares the logical problem here to what would be involved in a jar existing in two houses.[86]

Secondly, ideas of dependence (*pāratantrya*) or expectation (*apekṣā*) between particulars are held to be involve contradictions. The Buddhists claim that it is impossible for particulars which are already established to depend upon or expect anything else. And there could never be such relations between particulars which do not exist.[87] The two parts of this logical critique may be taken as pointing out the impossiblity of one being many and the impossibility of many being one. For the

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[83]IPV 1.2.10, 1:117.

[84]IPV 1.2.11, 1:118.

[85]IPV 1.2.11, 1:118.

[86]IPVV 1.2.11, 202-203.

[87]IPV 1.2.11, 1:118-119.

Buddhists, the conceptions of the Self as cognizer and agent are *nothing but* imagination.[88]

Such, in brief, is the Śaiva interpretation of the challenge of the Buddhists to their doctrine. The Buddhists do not merely pose the threat of any set of alternative assumptions. They make the skeptical claim that all recognitive applications of interpretation to experience are ungrounded. They argue in detail that the recognitions of the chief components of the vision which the Śaivas wish to impart are both invalid and logically impossible.

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' articulation of this criticism against the realization which they wish to impart is essential to their communicative agenda. Sanskrit denaturalized discourse requires the reflexivity granted by such a "foil" in the demonstration of views. Perhaps the extreme, skeptical character of the Buddhist challenge is itself necessitated by the Śaivas' even greater "optimism" about the use of transcendental argument to convey the *tantric* salvation. The following three chapters of the dissertation concern various aspects of the Śaivas' answer.

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[88]IPK 1.2.11, 1:118; IPV 1.2.11, 1:119.

CHAPTER 4

A SUMMARY OF THE ŚAIVA THEORY OF RECOGNITION

> The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness, makes His own Self into an object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, because the Cognizer is unitary.... As He recognitively apprehends [*parāmṛśati*] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as blue, etc.
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> IPV 1.5.15, 1:267-268

How do the Śaivas answer the challenge of skepticism? Before the Navya-Nyāya,[1] the Hindu realists remained locked in the problematic defined by the Buddhists—that is, they attempted to justify the interpretation of an uninterpreted datum. Their final recourse often was just to deny the value of the skeptics' questioning the validity of constructions we all accept in daily life—in effect stipulating that there cannot be such doubts.

Chapter two has shown, however, that the Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition is articulated within an ambitious correlational agenda—of radical encompassment. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers attempt with their theory of recognition both to make their *tantric* tradition philosophically intelligible to others and, ultimately, to convey to them the soteriological realization. They follow the approach of Śiva described in Abhinava's

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[1]The Navya-Nyāya in some ways parallels the Pratyabhijñā in its development of Bhartṛhari's ideas (to be treated below) on the impossibility of making sense of cognition without interpretation. Their thought however is a species of direct realism, rather than a monistic-idealism. On the approach of the Navya-Nyāya, see Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Conception-free Awareness: Gaṅgesa," in *Perception,* 342-354.

verse quoted at the beginning of the third chapter. That is, they turn everything back into Him. As is evinced in the passage heading this chapter, the central myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti is explained as a *process of self-recognition.* Such recognition, thereby given a primordial status, is recovered through transcendental inquiry as *constituting the very facts of epistemology and ontology which the Buddhists say preclude it.*[2] The primordial status of this recognition in turn makes the philosophical inquiry which realizes it into *tantric* ritual.

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' theory of recognition is a brilliant synthesis of the understandings developed in the debates between the Hindu realists and the Buddhists, their traditional symbolic and ritual resources, and the linguistic idealism of Bhartṛhari. As is the case with many apects of their thought, this theory is so complex and multivalent that it resists a linear presentation. Nevertheless, I must endeavor to impose an appropriate order in presenting and interpreting some of their statements.[3]

I will first comment on the vocabulary in which the Śaiva theory of recognition is expressed. Next I will give some basic explanation of two related complexes of ideas contributing to the Śaiva theory not yet treated: Bhartṛhari's interpretation of Indian traditions of sacred language, and *tantric* ideas about memory as the repository of such language in the form of *mantras.* Then I will take up in a broad structural manner the ways in which the model of the Lord's self-recognition is related to ordinary

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[2]Kṣemarāja explains that there is the self-recognition (*ahaṃvimṛśya*) of even the nothingness of the Mādhyamikas. SN, 1.12-13, 28.

[3]Indeed this chapter only attempts to summarize some central features of the Śaiva theory of recognition. The whole dissertation, from the methodological introduction through the discussion of narrative ontology, and the conclusion, may be taken as an attempt to understand its significance in a broader way.

experience, from the two directions of *emanation* and *return.*[4] Thus I will first discuss how the Śaivas appropriate Bhartṛhari's own scheme of levels of the concretization of speech in explaining the emanation of the Lord's self-recognition. I will then examine how the theory of recognition elucidates features of the system's simultaneously philosophical and soteriological modus operandi of return examined in chapter two—e.g., transcendental philosophical investigation, the revealing of Śakti, the inference for the sake of others, and the structuring of the system in terms of the gnoseologically internalized *śākta* means-type. Finally I will explain the strategies the Śaivas use to respond to the Buddhist reductio ad absurdum arguments against recognition, and the relation of these strategies to their own positive theory of recognition. This summary of central features of the Śaiva theory of recognition will enable us to to proceed in the next two chapters to considering the ways in which it is implemented in epistemology and ontology. It is in considering such implementations that the question of justification becomes important.

First, comments on vocabulary. The Śaiva theory of recognition is elaborated with three sets of terms. The first is the word *pratyabhijñā* itself along with cognates such as *abhijñā,* which are usually unproblematically translated as just 'recognition.' The second set comprises various derivatives from the root *mṛś,* such as *vimarśa, parāmarśa, pratyavamarśa, āmarśa,* etc. Alper has designated this class the *"mṛś* terms." There has been much discussion about the internal relations of this set.[5]

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[4]The emanation and return of Śiva-Śakti should not be confused with these processes in Neoplatonism.

[5]After much analysis Alper came to the conclusion that, though there may be some differences of connotation, the *mṛś* terms basically have the same meaning. Alper, "*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ.*" The same view was supported by Alexis Sanderson in personal conversation. Rastogi suggested in personal conversation that there are slight differences of connotation in some contexts. I will say more about the meaning of *vimarśa* and related terms in treating the Śaiva approach to perception.

Whether or not there are some differences in connotation between these terms themselves, previous scholars have not appreciated their significance in the context of the debates about imagination (*vikalpa*) and recognition treated in the previous chapter. The words derived from *mṛś* convey notions of linguistic interpretation, judgement, reflection, apprehension, etc., *all of which have a recognitive structure.*

The third set of terms is derived from attaching various initial prefixes to the second prefix *sam* and the root *dhā*, e.g., *anusaṃdhāna, pratisaṃdhāna* and *abhisaṃdhi.* Again these *develop the significance of recognition* through notions of synthesis or association, particularly the synthesis between different moments of experience (as analyzed by the Buddhists)—under the rubric of language. All these terms have extensive backgrounds in linguistic and epistemological speculations before the Pratyabhijñā school.[6]

In the Pratyabhijñā texts, these terms are variously defined by one another, used interchangeably, and placed in close functional relationships. They are also employed disjunctively. The task here of summarizing the complex Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition before considering its implementations is already difficult; it is not possible to engage in a tortuous philological examinination of usages in the abstract. The following presentation will be made on the basis of the synonymies and homologies between the classes of terms.[7] I will make my translations according to the contexts of

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[6]The term *anusaṃdhāna* also has some backgrounds in spiritual practice.

[7]Here I may record some textual support for my interpretation: I have already discussed Abhinavagupta's definition of *pratyabhijñā* in terms of *anusaṃdhāna* and *pratisaṃdhāna* at IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36-38. Abhinava similarly defines *pratyabhijñā* in terms of *anusaṃdhāna* at IPV 1.4.8, 1:188-189. The later Pratyabhijñā text, *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā,* simply classifies the "This is that" experience as *anusaṃhiti.* VPP 3.38, 16. The commentator Vidyācakravartin again makes the equation: "*Anusaṃhiti* is *pratyabhijñā.*" VPPV 3.38, 16. Also see VPPV 3.39, 17. The

use, leaving the important Sanskrit terms in brackets. I will often direct the attention of the reader to the overarching problematic in my glosses of the *mṛś* and *anusaṃdhāna* terms, e.g. as, 'recognitive ascertainment,' etc. On a few occasions it seems best to translate these terms simply as 'recognition.'

We may now take up two important sources of ideas incorporated into the Śaiva theory of recognition, which have not yet been focused upon. The first of these is the

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free alternation between the terms *pratyabhijñā* and *anusaṃdhāna* is seen in the discussions of action, e.g., at IPV 2.1.5, 2:17.

Bhāskara equates the terms *parāmarśa* and *pratyabhijñā* in commenting on IPV 2.2.2, 2:39. Bhāskara on 1.5.20, 1:294 uses the word *pratyabhijñā* to describe the means (by using the instrumental case) by which *parāmarśa* unifies word and object. (I must recall, however, the ultimate identity betweens means and goal in monistic Śaivism.) At 2.3.10-11 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use the words *vimarśa* and *pratyavamarśa* identically to *pratyabhijñā* as invoked by the Naiyāyikas against the Vijñānavādins. They explain through it the knowledge "This is that thing" regarding objects which appear successively as far and near, inferred and directly perceived, external and internally imagined, and as seen in incorrect and correct cognitions. IPK 2.3.10-11, 2:117; IPV 2.3.10-11, 2:117-119 and BIPV 2.3.10-11, 2:117-119. Abhinava similarly uses the expression *pratyavarmṛśyate* to describe the recognition of the continuity of material cause and effect at IPV 2.4.18, 2:194. *Parāmarśa* and other *mṛś* terms are used to describe the soteriological recognition at IPV 4.1.16, 2:310-311 and IPV 4.1.17, 2:314-315.

Bhāskara identifies *anusaṃdhāna* with *pratyavamarśa* in his commentary on IPV 1.6.10, 1:340. *Anusaṃdhāna, anusaṃdhi,* etc., are employed in synonymous or intrinsic functional relationships with *vimarśa, parāmarśa,* etc., at IPK 1.5.19, 1:284; IPV 1.5.19, 1:291-292. In commenting on IPV 1.6.1, 1:301 Bhāskara identifies *anusaṃdhāna* as the effect (*kārya*) of *pratyavamarśa.*

The terms are used disjunctively in analyses of states with different degrees of contingent empirical, rather than transcendental, recognitive synthesis. In elaborating a typology of cognitive states, Abhinava thus describes a form of direct experience (*anubhava*) which lacks synthesis (*abhisaṃdhi*), despite his usual stress on the invariable concomitance of synthesis with consciousness. He is endeavoring to describe what seems to be the most discrete, uninterpreted sort of experience. However, Abhinavagupta emphasizes that even here there is (recognitive) judgement (*parāmarśa*), which is necessary for awareness. IPV 1.4.8, 1:187-188. On the basis of differentiation of such an underlying or transcendental judgement (*parāmarśa*) he analyzes in this section a great variety of sorts of direct experience, memory and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). IPV 1.4.8, 1:187-189 and IPVV 1.4.8, 2:58.

linguistic monism of Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari's system represents a philosophical development of ancient Indian understandings of sacred language—important from the Veda through the Tantras.[8] It is articulated in the context of grammatical and linguistic speculations of the Pāṇinian school. Bhartṛhari metaphysically interpreted the sacred language of revelation as the monistic Word Absolute (*śabdabrahman*). Another term for the highest level of language in Bhartṛhari's thought, which the Śaivas often use, is Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*).[9]

For Bhartṛhari, the Word Absolute is much more subtle than what is ordinarily understood as language—words in sentences, etc., referring to separate objects. It is the essential source from which the semantic dichotomy is idealistically emanated. In the first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari extols this principle as the Ultimate Reality generating the very sounds of speech along with the entire world of objects:

> Brahman, the Word-Principle, which is without beginning or end, is the cause of phonemes, and manifests itself as objects. From it there is the creation of the universe[10]

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[8]For a survey of speculation about Speech from the Vedas through *tantrism,* see Padoux, *Vāc.*

[9]The term *parāvāk* comes most directly from Somānanda's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's analysis of the levels of concretization of language. It is not clear whether Bhartṛhari actually intended to indicate such a level. See Gaurināth Śāstrī, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari,* Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. 5 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959). A level of Speech which is "Supreme" is easily homologized with the Trika Goddess/cosmic level Supreme (*parā*). This will be discussed below.

[10]*Vākyapadīya* 1.1, 1. This translation is influenced by both *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari,* chapter 1, trans. K.A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College, 1965), 1.1,1; and Carpenter, "The Light of the Word," 120. With the former, I follow the *Vṛtti* in taking *akṣara* as referring to the cause of the phonemes; I follow the latter in glossing the word *śabdatattva* as 'Word-Principle.'

On the basis of his exalted understanding of language Bhartṛhari maintains that, through its proper use and the understanding of it in the discipline of grammar, one can achieve liberation.[11]

This monism posits an intrinsically linguistic character of experience, on the basis of which one is able to make conventional references of words to objects. As Bhartṛhari explains, the linguistic plenum thus grounds knowledge and communication:

> If there were to end the eternal condition of cognition having the nature of speech, awareness could not be aware.[12] It is this [condition that cognition has the nature of speech] which makes possible recognitive judgment [*pratyavamarśinī*]. This [condition] secures [*upabandhinī*] all the branches of learning, the crafts and the arts. Due to it, everything created is classified.[13]

The ordinary interpretation of experience gains access to the higher level of language through flashes of intuition (*pratibhā*), and communication is successful through its manifestation (*sphoṭa*). It should be clear that Bhartṛhari's understanding of the revelatory unity of reference can be classified for our purposes as a theory of transcendental recognition or disclosure.

Bhartṛhari's ideas have obvious analogies with the Christian-Stoic-Platonist *logos* theology—with respect to both the "cosmogonic" positioning of revelation/language and the manner in which this positioning grounds all knowledge.[14] Such theology resonates in Kantian and romantic understandings of imagination and

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[11]See K.A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartṛhari on Vyākaraṇa as a Means of Attaining Mokṣa," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 28 (1964): 112-131.

[12]*na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta.*

[13]*Vākyapadīya* 1.116-117, 190-192. The commentaries suggest that in referring to recognitive judgement (*pratyavamarśa*), Bhartṛhari is talking primarily about the judgement about the meaning of a sentence from the combination of its words. This is understood to include a recognition of reference, i.e., of meaning in experience.

[14]References have already been made to David Carpenter's comparison of Bhartṛhari with Bonaventure in "The Light of the Word."

hermeneutic ideas of tradition. Heidegger was aware of the way its logic points towards his own conception of truth as disclosure. The following passage which endeavors to recover the medieval roots of contemporary formulations of truth as correspondence makes the epistemological point clearly:

> *Veritas* as *adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum)* guarantees *veritas* as *adaequatio intellectus (humani) ad rem (creatam).* Throughout, *veritas* essentially implies *convenientia,* the coming of beings themselves, as created, into agreement with the Creator, an "accord" with regard to the way they are determined in the order of creation.
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> But this order, detached from the notion of creation, can also be represented in a general and indefinite way as a world-order. The theologically conceived order of creation is replaced by the capacity of all objects to be planned by means of a worldly reason [*Weltvernunft*] which supplies the law for itself and thus also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible (what is considered "logical").[15]

This order is the disclosed comportment of things.

Tantric scriptures and other writings predating the Pratyabhijñā system already reflect an appropriation of the system of Bhartṛhari. The originator of monistic Śaiva philosophical apologetics, Somānanda, on the other hand, devotes substantial space in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* to defending Śaivism against Bhartṛhari's school. He is not concerned with repudiating it, but only limiting its scope as a description of the ultimate nature of things and a soteriological path. Somānanda "encompasses" or "imperializes" Bhartṛhari by identifying Supreme Speech with Śiva's creative Śakti.[16]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta elaborate greatly on the positive aspect of the interpretation of Bhartṛhari in Somānanda as well as the earlier *tantric* traditions. They

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[15]Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 120-121.

[16]See SD 2, 36-93. Somānanda also devotes much space to showing the ultimate identity of Śiva and Śakti. He argues, nevertheless, that it is more correct to speak of the highest deity as the former rather than the latter. See SD 3, 94-142.

identify Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition (*ahampratyavamarśa*).[17] Whereas the Buddhists denied the validity of recognition, the Śaivas hold—like Bhartṛhari does of its particularly linguistic aspect—that it is necessary to the very structure of experience. Abhinava explains that "having the nature of synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] is invariably concomitant with consciousness."[18] He describes recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as "the root of any of the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*], i.e., perception, inference and scripture,"[19] or simply says that it "is any of the means...."[20] This is expressed in the later text following the Pratyabhijñā school, the commentary

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[17]For Utpaladeva's identification of self-recognition with Supreme Speech see IPK 1.6.1, 1:302 and IPKV 1.6.1, 22. Utpaladeva lists Supreme Speech along with recognition (*pratyavamarśa*) and Lordship as descriptions of consciousness at IPK 1.5.13, 1:250. Utpaladeva even identifies the Lord Himself as semantic intuition (*pratibhā*). IPK 1.7.1, 1:341. The thinkers keep the significance of a deeper interpretation of revelation in the epistemological theory. Abhinavagupta states that "... it which is called scripture has the form of internal verbalization and has the nature of very firm recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]...." IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:84. On the further identity of self-recognition/Supreme Speech with *mantra*, see IPV 1.5.14, 1:262-264 and IPVV 1.5.14, 2:206; on the identity with *mantric* sound (*dhvani*) see TA 4.181, 3:827. For further discussion of these identifications in additional sources see Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 458, 753-755. Cf. the discussions by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta of the recognition of the relation of poetically suggestive language and sense, along with Ingalls' comments, at *The "Dhvanyāloka" of Ānandavardhana with the "Locana" of Abhinavagupta* 1.8, 124-126.

[18]IPV 2.4.15, 2:190. This conception recalls the Upaniṣadic quest for the thread persisting through and connecting together the world. Abhinavagupta is aware of the theme: "... The subject, who has the nature of self-consciousness, is like the inner thread and the life of the garland of cognitions." IPV 2.2.3, 2:42.

[19]IPV 2.4.18, 2:195.

[20]IPVV 2.4.18, 3:233. The two expressions referred to, respectively *pratyakṣānumānāgamānyatamapramāṇamūlaṃ pratyabhijnām* and *pratyakṣānumānāgamādyanyatamamānapratyabhijñānabalena*, could be interpreted differently. These interpretations were supported by Rastogi and Matilal in personal conversations.

Mānasollāsa on the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra:* "Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is the means of establishing [*sādhana*] all the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*]."[21]

Before taking up the Śaiva explanation of emanation in terms of self-recognition, which futher appropriates the thought of Bhartṛhari, one other area of constitutive influence in their theory must briefly be considered. Though it may seem something of a digression, the topic is important, and this is the most logical place I can find to discuss it. Another pan-Indian and especially *tantric* theme closely related to that of sacred speech is the religious valuation of *memory.* [22] Most obviously, memory operates in the perpetuation of sacred language along with other culture. Abhinava refers to this operation in stating that the succession of memory (*smaraṇaparamparā*) regarding Ultimate Reality (*brahman*) known from the scriptures and other sources is a spiritual means.[23]

More profoundly, memory is the means of access to the essential level of language. The adept gains such access through the memory of the exemplars of this level of language in the form of *mantras.* This gives him salvific-"cosmogonic" as well as lower, derivative powers. Abhinavagupta explains:

> ... The followers of scripture maintain that memory, which is enlivened by *mantra,* etc., is like a wish-fulfilling gem which is capable of bestowing all powers [*siddhi*]. Thus [it has been said]: "Memory itself, attaining the nature of contemplation [*dhyāna*], etc., is the wish-fulfilling gem which manifests your Lordship."[24]

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[21]DMSM 7.16, 143.

[22]Sacred memory is often understood to pertain more generally to higher realities, rather than to sacred speech per se. The Śaivas seem usually to connect it with sacred speech.

[23]IPV 1.4.2, 1:160-161.

[24]IPV 1.4.1, 1:154. The note in the edition of Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, 1:120, glossses *mantrādiprāṇitam* as *śuddhavidyāparāmarśaprāṇitam.* I follow Pandey's gloss of *vitaraṇacatura.* IPV 3:42.

When conceived as the repository of sacred language, memory is accorded a metaphysically primordial nature. In the course of a discussion of *mantra* in the *Tantrāloka,* Abhinava quotes the authority of scripture in positing memory as the very origin and synthesizer of all experienced diversity:

> In the *Triśirobhairavatantra,* before the extraction of the *mantras,* it is explained: "Memory is the remembering which is there from the beginning in all things, and has the nature of *mantra.* It effects the essential nature of the object of cognition." Memory generates the essential nature of, and brings about the attraction between all things with multiple forms established everywhere. It establishes each essential nature and ultimately has the nature of consciousness. It is grounded on the manifestation [of a previous object of experience]. Therefore one should know that it is called Being [*sattā*].[25]

The same notion is expressed by Abhinava in a benedictory verse to a chapter on memory in the IPV, using the Upaniṣadic metaphor of the cosmic thread:

> We pay obeisance to Śiva, who strings together in an orderly series on the string of memory, the heap of jewels which are the object of words [*padārtha*], which are heaped up in the jewel room which is His heart.[26]

These exalted valuations of memory do not usurp but support the transendental nature of recognition. The Buddhists attempted to refute recognition by denying the groundedness of the application of the mnemonic resources of interpretation to present experience. The conception of memory as primordial in effect says that all experience is the reexperience of what is remembered—this *is recognition.*[27] This way in which a

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The verse is also cited at IPVV 1.4.1, 2:4, where the author is identified as one Divākaravatsa.

[25]TA 5.136b-139, 3:1065-1068. Unfortunately I am unsure about this translation. But I think the basic idea comes through.

[26]IPV 1.4 introductory verse, 1:147.

[27]The nature of recognition as reexperience is articulated in the doctrine of self-luminosity, which we took up in the discussion of the Śaiva propaedeutics. The self-luminous reality itself fills the "counter" of memory. This is brought out in a passage which interprets recognition from the soteriological (rather than epistemologically/ metaphysically primordial) angle. In the same context in which Abhinavagupta

formulation of recognition as transcendental may be related to an understanding of memory as transcendental is important to keep in mind. It enables us to understand how a transcendental recognition would not depend upon the contingencies of creation and activation ordinarily experienced in memory.[28] We shall see that in expounding their theory of ordinary memory in response to the Buddhists, the Śaivas actually reduce it to a deeper sort of recognition.[29]

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explains the soteriological recognition as the application of the knowledge of the Lord from the scriptures to one's present experience, he states: "There is the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of Him, i.e., of the Great Lord. Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is the cognition, i.e., awareness [*prakāśa*], which faces back [*pratīpam*] to the Self. It [faces] "back" because the manifestation of one's Self was not unexperienced previously, since that [Self] is undelimited awareness [*prakāśa*]. It will be explained, however, that by means of His Śakti He is experienced as if conceptually dichotomized [*vikalpita*], i.e., as if delimited." IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36. One may compare my treatment of memory with the discussions in Padoux, *Vāc,* 198-199, 397-398.

[28]Other formulations of the transcendental nature of disclosure, recognition, etc., are spared this problem in various ways—deliberately or just by nature. It is well known that Plato believed that the soul remembers the forms from before birth. In Neoplatonic Christian theology the Word or ideas of God precede immediate experience in that they underlie the very structure of both experience and things; in mystical prayer it is the eternal God or Christ who is recovered. Heidegger's understanding of historicity actually emphasizes the contingencies of disclosed frameworks. On the other hand his idea of the call of Being suggests something noncontingent. See Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?,* trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). The Kantian understandings of synthesis (an important background to Heidegger) also reflect the structural issue. Kant did not equate the transcendental synthesis of the imagination with ordinary recognition. For him, because the latter formally approximates the latter, it is only "the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 146-147. On Kant's understandings of the transcendental versus the empirical types of imaginative synthesis, also see Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," 54-55; and Warnock, *Imagination,* 30ff.

[29]Correspondingly, ordinary recognition depends upon ordinary memory. See IPV 1.3.6, 1:136-137; IPV 1.6.6, 1:326-327.

Next on our agenda is considering, in a broad structural manner, how the Pratyabhijñā thinkers relate their conception of the Lord's self-recognition to ordinary experience—by explaining the processes of emanation and return. I say that we are considering this area of their thought in a broad structural manner because we are interpreting its presumption "intratextually" as the interpretation of myth and philosophical/ritual practice. The final aspect of the Pratyabhijñā correlation, the ostensibly universal explanation of ordinary experience, is made in the epistemological and ontological arguments to be taken up in the next two chapters.

We first turn to the Śaivas' interpretaton of the myth of emanation as a movement from the Lord's self-recognition into recognitions transcendentally constituting ordinary experience. In explaining emanation in terms of self-recognition, the Śaivas incorporate Bhartṛhari's own account of the fragmentation of the unitary Word Absolute. Bhartṛhari described this process in a series of either 3 or 4 stages, depending upon whether one understands him like the Śaivas to have actually posited Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*) as the highest stage identical to the Word Absolute.

The Śaivas identify three of Bhartṛhari's stages (they skip a lower one) with the main cosmic levels of the Trika. We considered the Trika levels in the second chapter, as locating the spheres of operation of Abhinavagupta's spiritual means-types (*upāya*). To remind the reader, I list some of the homologous items corresponding to each of the stages in the descending order of emanation: 1) Śiva. The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Supreme (*parā*). The Śakti of Will (*icchā*). The condition of nondiversity (*abheda*). The means of Śambhu, i.e., Śiva (*śāmbhava upāya*). 2) Śakti. The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Supreme-Nonsupreme or Intermediate (*parāparā*). The Śakti of Cognition (*jñāna*). The condition of simultaneous diversity and nondiversity (*bhedābheda*). The means of Śakti (*śākta upāya*). 3) The individual person (*nara/aṇu*). The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Nonsupreme or Lower

(*aparā*). The Śakti of Action (*kriyā*). The condition of diversity (*bheda*). The 'individual means' (*āṇava upāya*).

Because of its intrinsic difficulties, and since our task is already complicated enough, I will not present Bhartṛhari's scheme of speech stages independently. We will consider it only as it is appropriated by the Śaivas.[30] In their synthesis, the Śaivas describe emanation as a move from a unitary state of self-recognition to the concrete structure of reference involved in the applications of interpretation in multiplistic experience. For the sake of simplicity, this process will be described in terms suggesting present perceptual experience. However the same process occurs in all types of outer and inner experience and reflection.[31]

I will now present a long passage in which Abhinavagupta describes the process of emanation. This will be followed by some general remarks about each of the descending stages. I will further discuss various points made in this passage in relating the paradigm of recognition to the Pratyabhijñā modus operandi of return. For greater clarity, I will divide the continuous discussion according to the Trika levels:

> Recognition [*pratyavamarśa*] has the nature of verbalization [*śabdana*], which has the nature of inner talking [*antarabhilāpa*]. That verbalization does not at all depend upon the establishment of reference by convention [*saṃketa*]. It has the nature of unlimited wonder; it is like an inward nodding of the head, and it is the life of language sounds such as "a," etc., which in the realm of *māyā* have their reference fixed through convention. It is called Supreme because it is the inner foundation of recognitive judgements [*pratyavamarśa*] such as 'This is blue" and

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[30]On Bhartṛhari's scheme and the interpretation of the Śaivas, one may see Gaurinath Shastri, "Correspondence of Form and Matter," chap. in *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, 66-82; along with Padoux, "The Levels of Word," chap. in *Vāc*, 166-222. For a discussion of some other sources on the levels of speech, see Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 227 n. 1.

[31]The Śaivas believe that the Lord differentiates His self-recognition into types of experience such as cognition, memory, decision and doubt through His Māyā Śakti. IPK and IPV 1.5.18, 1:280-283. Cf. BIPV 1.6.10, 1:340 on the subtle judgement (*pratyavamarśa*) in all forms of experience. Also cf. IPK and IPV 1.5.21, 1:296-298.

"I am Caitra," and because it is perfect. It is called Speech because it speaks the universe by means of recognitive judgement [*pratyavamarśa*]. For this reason, "as its own essence," i.e., in the form of Consciousness, and as resting [*viśrānti*] in itself—it is the "arisen," i.e., continuously unset, eternal "I." Therefore it is said to be the chief "freedom of action" of the Supreme Self, and "Lordship," i.e., the condition of one who lords, and non-dependence on another.[32]

However, there is the Supreme-Nonsupreme [*parāpara*] in the condition of Seeing [*paśyantī*], at the level of Śrī Sadāśiva. Here there arises the recognitive judgement [*pratyavamarśa*] having the form "this," which [because it begins to fragment the Self] involves ignorance. Nevertheless there is still the [proper understanding that the judgement "this"] rests [*viśrānti*] on the condition of "I."

There is the Lower state when there is rest on the condition of 'this.' This state belongs to Viṣṇu, Viriñca, Indra, etc., who rule over the womb of māyā.[33]

In the first section Abhinavagupta identifies Supreme Speech, which is the transcendent ground of concrete reference, with the Lord's self-recognition at the Trika level of Supreme. This takes the form of a completely unfragmented "I."[34] The next section concerns the second level of speech according to the Śaiva exegesis of Bhartṛhari, called 'Seeing' (*paśyantī*). Abhinava identifies this level with the Supreme-Nonsupreme level of the Trika triad. Here there is the awareness of the object as dependent upon the subject. It has the expression "I am this."[35]

In the third section, Abhinava identifies Bhartṛhari's lowest level, called 'gross' (*vaikharī*), with the lowest member of the Trika.[36] This level comprises ordinary

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[32]In the last two sentences Abhinava is glossing words from Utpaladeva's verse.

[33]IPV 1.5.13, 1:252-255. Cf. IPV 1.8.11, 1:423-424; IPK and IPV 4.1.13-14, 2:305-307.

[34]There is a related discussion at IPK and IPV 1.6.1, 1:301-305. Here Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are concerned to show that the higher nature of self-recognition/Speech lacks the distinctively bifurcative nature of conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*), though it is their source and inner reality.

[35]This is the awareness of Pure Wisdom, which was discussed in chapter two. I will develop this point below.

[36]Thus he skips Bhartṛhari's 'Middle' (*madhyamā*) level.

interpreted experience, from the recognitions of external objects (such as "This is that pot") to those constituting the components of the physical and psychic person. At this level self-recognition is fragmented in various ways. In order to emphasize that the interpreted object is apparently separated from the subject, this level of experience is typified with the expression "this." The Śaivas also follow Bhartṛhari in characterizing this level by the apparent separation of language from its objects. From this point of view, it may be more fully expressed with the phrase used to typify the recognitive structure of linguistic ascription: "This is that." It is also characteristic of this level of experience that recognized objects are distinguished from each other.[37]

We may now turn to relating what has been said so far to the frameworks of the Pratyabhijñā system's modus operandi of return. This will greatly deepen our understanding of the system as both soteriology and philosophy. We may begin with the central positive formulation of the modus operandi as the revealing of Śakti through transcendental epistemological and ontological inquiry. The Śakti which the subject is discovered to possess is the reason in the inference which establishes his self-recognition as the Lord. Now, in the passage above equating Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition at the Supreme level, these principles are also equated with the freedom and Lordship. The latter are other terms for Śakti.

Thus Śakti, the mythological description of Śivas' sexually-united consort, power and mode of emanation *is self-recognition.*[38] Utpaladeva explains this clearly:

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[37]See IPK 1.6.6, 1:324; IPKV 1.6.6, 24; IPV 1.6.6, 1:324-327. The entirety of IPK and IPV 1.6, 1:299-344 is about differentiation inherent to ordinary conceptual constructions.

[38]This equivalence has already been indicated by the discussion above in another way. I have explained that Somānanda identifies Śakti with Supreme Speech, and that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta identify Supreme Speech with self-recognition.

> The ascertainment [*adhyavasā*] "This is a jar" is the Śakti of the Supreme Lord, who transcends name and form; it appears as the Self and not as "this."[39]

Abhinava elaborates:

> The ascertainment [*adhyavasā*] judges [*parāmṛśanti*][40] word and object, characterized by name and form, as one, in the form "This is that." [That ascertainment] is the Śakti of the Supreme Lord, who has the nature of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. It appears only "as the Self," that is, non-separately from "I." However, it never appears as "this," that is, as separate [from the Self].[41]

Some repetition may help in developing the next point. The transcendental inquiries to be taken up in the following chapters are concerned to show the nature of experience as Śakti. They will take the form of showing that the recognition of interpretation is fundamental to ordinary experience—and that such recognitions are forms of the Lord's self-recognition. Śakti, again, is the reason in the inference which structures the Pratyabhijñā system. Thus we may now understand that *one is inferentially led to the recognition that one is the Lord, because everything is one's self-recognition.* Utpala explicitly places the interpretation of the two chief Śaktis of Cognition and Action in terms of recognition, in the position of inferential reason:

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[39]IPK 1.5.20, 1:294.

[40]Bhāskara explains this word: "'Judges' [*parāmṛśanti*] [means] brings to the condition of object of judgement [*parāmarśaviṣayatām*] by means of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], which has the nature of the unification of word and object [*śabdārthaikīkaraṇarupa*]." BIPV 1.5.20, 1:294.

[41]IPV 1.5.20, 1:294-295. Likewise Utpaladeva states: "His Śaktis of Cognition, etc. are the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] between the cognitions of the numerous things." IPKV 1.3.7, 10. Abhinavagupta explains that: "The creatorhood of the Supreme Lord has the nature of such synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*]." IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:301. Abhinava also explains the status of judgement (*vimarśa*) as the Lord's fundamental power of creation at IPV 1.5.15-16, 1:266-273. Here is a passage from Utpaladeva's APS which places Śakti and synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) in a sort of close functional relationship: "She is explained to be one due to [Her] synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of all experiences. She is the beginningless essential nature of the subject, which is synonymous with self-consciousness. That synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] is the pervasion [*vyāpitvam*] of that possessingI-hood, on which depends the establishment of things...." APS 25-26, 10-11.

> He [the subject] is the Great Lord since he is necessarily recognitively judging [*vimarśattvena niyatena*], and since that very recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] is the pure Cognition and Action of God [*deva*].[42]

We see here the principle of the identity of means (*upāya*) and goal (*upeya*) emphasized in many contexts by Abhinavagupta, an identity necessitated by the Śaiva monism. Ritual, which enacts or manifests the myth, is identical with the myth. In the Pratyabhijñā system, rationale and conclusion are the same. This paradoxical fact does not make the arguments circular as long as Śakti is not presumed but discovered in the transcendental inquiries following the rules of denaturalized discourse.[43]

All of this may be approached from another angle. The lower and intermediate stages of the emanation of self-recognition further define the course of the purification of conceptualization (*vikalpasaṃskāra*) which (as we saw in the second chapter) typify the *śākta upāya* in general and the Pratyabhijñā system in particular. I will further develop some ideas in the passages recently considered. First, it is notable that in the passage on emanation Abhinavagupta explains the awareness at the middle level as belonging to Sadāśiva. Sadāśiva in a more elaborated account of cosmic levels is supposed to possess Pure Wisdom (*śuddhavidyā*)—the operative insight in the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā system.[44] Abhinava describes the structure of awareness at this level in the manner I explained Pure Wisdom in chapter two—as the emanation-knowing awareness *of the object resting on the subject*, i.e., "I am this."

At the lower level recognition takes the form of gross conceptual constructions. Here there is a loss of the emanation-knowing structure of Pure Wisdom in experience;

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[42]IPK 1.8.11, 1:1:421. See also IPV 1.8.11, 1:423-424.

[43]I will offer some further comments on this point below.

[44]The account of levels referred to is the scheme of principles (*tattva*) which the monistic Kashmirians hold in common, with some variations, with other Śaivas. Sadāśiva and a lower deity called Īśvara both possess Pure Wisdom, in different ways.

objects are differentiated from the subject, from language, from each other, and occur in differentiated circumstances. Again, experience at this level is typified "This"/="This is that." E.g., "This is that pot." Because such constructions are unifications of what appears as differentiated, Abhinavagupta describes them as instances of reflected recognition (*chāyāmayī pratyabhijñā*).[45] He also describes them, *in the manner of what must be cognitively refined* in the *śākta upāya*, as impure (*aśuddha*).[46]

Now I direct the reader to the two passages where Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta state that the recognitions of ordinary experience are Śakti. Both passages also assert that the recognition which is Śakti appears as the Self rather than a separate "this." *These passages are expressing the insight of the middle level of Pure Wisdom about the reality informing the lower level of fragmented experience. That is, they are endeavoring to bring about the purification of conceptualization.* This endeavor is thematized by Abhinavagupta. In the same section where he talks about the impurity of ordinary conceptually constructed experience, he states:

> ... Thus the [lower] condition of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] should be understood in the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of the pot, etc., [expressed] "This is that pot." However, in these levels of synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*], the Wisdom Power [*vidyāśakti*, a.k.a, *śuddhavidyā*, Pure Wisdom] flashes abundantly, like lightning. Thus the gurus admit them to be first means for contacting the Supreme State.[47]

Using the body as an example of a differentiated object, Abhinava states:

> If, cognizing the perfection in every way [*sarvataḥ pūrṇatvam*], i.e., the lack of separation, of the body, etc., one could perform the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] "I am this," he would be at the level of Sadāśiva.[48]

45IPVV 1.6.6, 2:314. This description seems to made on the basis of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti*.

46IPV 1.6.6, 1:324-327; IPVV 1.6.6, 2:314.

47IPV 1.6.6, 1:326-327.

48IPV 1.6.6, 1:325-326.

Abhinava later makes the rhetorically marvelous statement:

> The means [*upāya*] to be depended upon to know the nonduality which is Ultimate Reality is nothing but cognizing the nondiversity in the diversity of the manifestation of a pot.[49]

We may now understand the operation of the Pratyabhijñā system—an inference working through revealing Śakti in transcendental inquiry, and a purification of conceptualization—as a sort of reintegration of the self-recognition fragmented in ordinary linguistic ascription.[50] This may also be put in the negative-modus-operandi language associated with self-luminosity. The Pratyabhijñā only removes the obstacles which obscure the ever-existent fact that everything is one's self-recognition as Śiva.[51]

The character of the Pratyabhijñā system as a correlation of the Śaiva soteriology with the questions and procedures of philosophical discourse can be further elucidated with a few additional passages. The soteriological reintegration-clarification

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[49]IPV 2.3.13, 2:129. All of this is the operation of Pure Wisdom. I will provide here another interesting passage from the *Tantrasāra*. This is from the section where Abhinavagupta reduces the limbs of yoga to the gnoseologically internalized practice of good reasoning/Pure Wisdom. He further explains this gnoseological conception of yoga: "Thus yoga is a particular sort of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*]. It is one which has the nature of the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of the essential nature of that essential Ultimate Reality, in order to produce the development of always appearing such. [This ultimate reality] is the conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] not dependent on another—which appears as diverse conceptual constructions [*vikalpa*] which have the nature of aspects of Pure Wisdom." TS 4, 27. One may also relate what is being treated here to the discussion by the thinkers of the three levels of experience of the bound, liberated and the Supreme Lord at IPK and IPV 4.1.13-14, 2:305-307.

[50]I note that Proust also believed that the self can recognize itself in its extra-temporal nature in perceptual recognition, although he is not so strongly monistic-idealistic nor, of course, philosophically systematic as the Śaivas. See the discussion of Proust at Warnock, *Memory*, 99-100.

[51]The recognition found in understanding the recognitions constituting experience is held to be filled with wonder (*camatkāra*). This is brought out in the discussion of memory at IPK 1.4.3, 1:162 with IPV 1.4.3, 1:165-166. I will treat this section in the next chapter.

of self-recognition through the Pratyabhijñā system is cast by the thinkers in a manner which may be described as *teleological.* I recall the section treated in chapter two where Abhinava describes the scope of the Pratyabhijñā system as the comprehension (*avāpti*) of all the features of internal and external experience.[52] Abhinava here describes this comprehension as a 'growth of recognitive judgment' (*vimarśarūḍhi*).[53] He then cites a verse from Utpaladeva's *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* which make the point clearly. This is perhaps the most frequently cited verse throughout Abhinava's commentaries. Utpaladeva says:

> The accomplishment of purpose [*kṛtārthatā*] of the differentiated recognitive judgment [*vimarśa*] "this"—is the recognitive judgment [*vimarśa*] of rest [*viśrānti*] in its own essential nature [expressed] 'I am He."[54]

The early twentieth-century Sanskrit commentator Harabhatta Shastri elaborates:

> The insentient object of recognitive judgement [*vimṛśya*] is differentiated [from the Self, as is expressed] "this." That accomplishment of its purpose [*kṛtārthatā*], is its rest [*viśrānti*] in its essential nature, which is consciousness. [That accomplishment of purpose] has the nature of the self-recognition [*ahampratyavamarsātmā*] due to identification with the illumination of consciousness [*caitanyaprakāśa*], [expressed] "I myself who appear as the splendrous diversity of various things am He." [And this] exists in what is enlivened.[55] On this basis, the insentient thing, by rest [*viśrānti*] in I-hood [*ahambhāva*], by unification with the subject [*pramātṛ*] who has the essential nature of the recognizer [*vimṛśtṛ*]—attains noninsentience [*ajaḍatva*]. Noninsentients really have the unitary essential nature of the Supreme Subject

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[52]I interpreted this and another passage as delineating a sort of transcendental inquiry.

[53]IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34.

[54]APS 15, 6. Among Abhinava's references to APS 15 are IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:35; IPV 1.5.11, 1:1:244; IPV 1.5.17, 1:279; IPVV 1.1, 1:54.

[55]I am uncertain about this expression, *jīvitasthānīyo.* I guess that he is saying that the self-recognition takes place in the living being.

> [*parapramātṛ*]. Thus only the nondual, noninsentient Subject appears as perfection [*pāripūrṇyena*] everywhere. This is the purport.[56]

Shastri's passage is notable for elucidating that Utpaladeva's expression of the soteriological recognition ("I am He") comprehends the structure we know as the application (*upanaya*) step of the Pratyabhijñā inference ("I myself who appear as the splendrous diversity of various things am He"). The philosophical arguments, as has been explained, are the means for the fruition/return of phenomena in the Lord's self-recognition.

Now the teleology of phenomena *towards self-recognition* is nothing but a clarification of their ultimate nature *as self-recognition. Cosmogony and teleology are the same.* Abhinavagupta clearly reflects upon such a conception. He compares ordinary experience to a point of rest in a journey, between an origin and goal which are identical:

> That which is called recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] is the place of rest [*viśrāntisthānam*]. It is the ultimate limit [*pāryantikam eva pāramārthikam*]. And it only has the form "I." The middle point of rest [*madhyaviśrāntipadam*] in traveling to a village, which is at the root of a tree, is explained to be created, as expectant of that [ultimate limit].... Thus even blue, etc., existing in the middle recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] as "This is blue," are established to be constituted of the Self, because they rest upon the root recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "I."[57]

This idea of ordinary experience as a midpoint between an identical origin and goal should not be confused with the midpoint of the Trika cosmic triad, the location of Pure Wisdom. As has been explained at length, the Pure Wisdom which animates the

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[56] *Vṛtti* on APS 15.1-2, 6-7. I mention a couple of other passages more modestly illustrating the "teleology" of phenomena in self-recognition. Abhinavagupta explains: "... All judgements [*parāmarśa*] really only rest [*viśrānti*] upon the pure and unitary judgement [*parāmarśa*] 'I.'" IPV 1.5.18, 1:280. Similarly, Bhāskara describes recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) as "having the nature of rest [*viśrānti*] in the Self. BIPV 1.4.8, 1:187-188.

[57] IPV 1.5.17, 1:278-279.

Pratyabhijñā system is located at a stage of the homologous emanation and return. It is located at the midpoint between origin/goal and ordinary experience—as it were, a midpoint to the midpoint.

These passages further our understanding of the Pratyabhijñā correlation of soteriology with philosophy as one of radical encompassment. The Buddhist skeptics contend that the Pratyabhijñā inference-realization is a false conclusion on the basis of the (phenomenal) facts. For the Pratyabhijñā thinkers, on the other hand, their inference (see Harabhatta Shastri's explication) is written into the very nature of the facts. In a journey constituting ordinary experience, in which there is never really a departure from the Lord—the inference is as it were a light showing the endpoint, located 3/4 of the way there. The inference is an interpretation, in the arena of philosophical inquiry, of the consequences of the all-encompassing mythico-ritual drama of Śiva-Śakti.

The character of the Śaivas' effort of communication illustrates a general point about philosophical discourse stated in chapter one. Philosophy can only make an open-ended effort to find universal criteria of experience and reasoning for views. Therefore, despite great areas of consensus or overlap between philosophical methods, specific applications of method are inseparable from the substantive positions advanced. The radical encompassment involved in the transference of the monistic *tantric* principle of the identity of means and goal into the philosophical arena as an identity of rationale and conclusion—only gives a particulary strong illustration of this fact. In attempting to articulate views in a manner which will make sense to others with different assumptions, one can never eliminate his or her origination and termination in particular theoretical-practical assumptions.

As I have stated, the Pratyabhijñā effort does not necessarily suffer from a vitiating circularity, inasmuch as the soteriology is not presumed but is supposed to be discovered in transcendental inquiries following common rules of Sanskrit

denaturalized discourse. These inquiries constitute or provide "reasons for the reason" which is Śakti/self-recognition. If there is a circularity in the effort to correlate the soteriology with the concerns and criteria of a denaturalized discourse, it is a cognitively advancing *hermeneutic circularity.* Thus philosophical expression can genuinely approach more universal intelligibility.

One other issue must be considered. There were two phases of the Buddhists' attacks against the Śaivas. The first was the denial of recognition as the establishing means (*sādhaka pramāṇa*) for the Śaiva soteriology. We have so far in this chapter considered how the Śaivas attempt to subvert this criticism with their theory of recognition. Second, the Buddhists attempted to adduce repudiating means (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) against recognition. These consisted of reductio ad absurdum arguments, alleging the impossibility of unifying a multiplicity.

The thinkers deal with this phase of the Buddhist arguments in a manner which is more occasional and less systematic than the other. Many of their more substantial comments regarding it are made in the section on action, which, as we shall see, deals with the ontological issues of the nature and structure of what exists. It should be obvious that the logical possibility of the coexistence of unity and multiplicity is important to a consideration of the structure of things. At the beginning of the section on action, Abhinava discusses the challenge of the Buddhists' reductios. Reflecting summarily about all the philosophical arguments with the Buddhists, he states:

> ... In all of the prima facie view, this is the crux: How can a multiplicity be unitary?[58]

I will present some of the Śaivas' approaches to dealing with this problem in my own order. The fundamental strategy by which one avoids contradiction is distinguishing the applications of contradictory attributes. While it is impossible that

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[58]IPV 2.1.1, 2:8-9.

something is both a and not-a in the same aspect, it is possible that it is both in different aspects. The Śaivas do resort to this strategy of claiming that there is a differentiation of the spheres (*viṣayabheda*) of unity and multiplicity.[59] In the second chapter on action, Abhinavagupta situates an assertion of Utpaladeva to this effect by formulating the following objection of an opponent:

> There may be this doubt: Unity and multiplicity are mutually contradictory. How can they exist in a single thing? Such is the method of destroying the soundness [of a unity of multiplicity] with a repudiating means of cognition [*bādhaka pramāṇa*].[60]

Utpaladeva's verse answers:

> The internal reality [*tattvam*] in that is unitary. That very [internal reality], upon obtaining the condition of the sense objects, goes to the state of multiplicity with respect to place, time and essential nature.[61]

In the respect in which everything is internal and ultimately identical with Śiva, it is one; in the respect that it is emanated, it is many.[62]

The Śaivas attempt to extend this understanding of a differentiation of spheres to cover cases such as universals, substances, wholes, etc., which apparently have external unity as well as multiplicity. For example, one recognizes a group of external particulars with the single word "cows," or recognizes the body of Caitra as unitary amidst changes of place, time and form.[63] Such categories are the objects of the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) fragmented from the Lord's self-recognition in the manner explained in the body of this chapter. For the Śaivas these syntheses of external

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[59]IPV 2.2.2, 2:37-38.

[60]IPV 2.2.2, 2:35-36.

[61]IPK 2.2.2, 2:36.

[62]Also see IPV 2.2.2, 2:37-40.

[63]IPV 2.2.5, 2:52; IPV 2.2.1, 2:33-34.

multiplicity, as engaged in by the subject, ultimately derive their unity from their internal source.[64]

What seems to me to complicate this explanation is that the Śaivas do not want to say that the ostensibily external unities-of-multiplicity are illusory. The Śaiva *tantrism* is concerned not with a denial but with a transfiguration of experience as Śakti.[65] For the Śaivas, whatever is experienced is real; the only exceptions to this reality are things which appear, and are then sublated by later experience, such as perceptual illusions. Abhinava explains the case of the recognition of action in a unitary and multiple substratum:

> ... The body of Caitra appears as multiple and differentiated with respect to various places, times and forms without at all losing its unity as is expressed "This indeed is he." And that very [body of Caitra] is an object[66] having a single and multiple nature. It is the same with action. Because there is a manifestation of it, it is real. [Illusions such as] two moons, etc., though appearing in this manner, are unreal. For at a later time there is the destruction of their stability, that is, of the continuation of the operation of cognitive means [*pramāṇa*] regarding them.... However, the recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] having the form "Caitra goes" continues and is not experienced to be sublated by anything.[67]

I understand the difficulty as follows: It may be granted that experienced unity and multiplicity have different spheres. However, how can it be claimed that

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[64]IPK and IPV 2.2.3, 41-46; IPV 2.2.4, 2:51; IPV 2.2.6, 2:55. Also see IPK 2.2.1, 2:33.

[65]As explained in this chapter, this is philosophically accomplished through a clarification of the recognitions transcendentally constituting all experience as the self-recognition of the Lord.

[66]This follows the edition of Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, 2:30, which has *ekanekarūpo 'rthaḥ kriyā,* instead of *ekanekarūpa kriyā.*

[67]IPV 2.2.1, 2:33-34. Utpaladeva also mentions the criterion of usefulness (*upayoga*) as indicating the reality of these external categories. IPK 2.2.1, 2:33. Abhinava explains that even if, as the Buddhists claim, the conceptual construction of such categories were illusion (*saṃvṛti*), this illusion itself belongs to reality! IPV 2.2.3, 2:46.

everything is one at the same time that multiplicity is real?[68] Would not the the problem of unity and multiplicity persist on a cosmic scale? If external unity-and-multiplicity is in some sense real, would not the logical problem remain there? On the other hand, perhaps there is a "synergistic" relation between the understanding of unity as the essence of multiplicity and the differentiation of spheres—together these ideas may account for what needs to be accounted for. Perhaps the differentiation of spheres avoids the contradiction as a provisional notion, which is comprehended in the understanding of everything as unitary. It is hard to come to a clear decision about these matters—perhaps because of the difficulty of conceiving of any sort of absolute unity!

Sometimes Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta make assertions to the effect that it is the special *nature* of the Lord which enables Him to unite multiplicity. Thus they claim that only pure Consciousness (*svaccha/nirmala cit*), as they understand it, could unite the diversity of action.[69] In the following passage, Abhinavagupta suggests that the Lord's *power* avoids the difficulty:

> ... Recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] is will [*icchā*], which has the nature of the desire to act. Everything which is to be created exists within that [will] in the condition of nondifferentiation.... This universe is nothing but [the Lord's] own Self, is real [*satyarūpa*], ultimately has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], and is nothing but the unity of unbroken awareness [*prakāśa*]. The Great Lord manifests it in a condition of differentiation which itself is ultimately nothing but awareness

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[68]The following statement of Abhinava reveals the puzzlingly direct transition from the idea of the reality of all that is experienced to that of its ultimate nature as unity: "Therefore, as much anything unsublated is recognitively apprehended [*vimṛśyate*]—so much it thus exists. Therefore substance, action, relation, etc., though extended across places, times and forms—exist in Ultimate Reality [*paramārthasanta*] as unitary." IPV 1.1.3, 1:62.

[69]See IPK and IPV 2.4.19, 2:197-200.

> [*prakāśa*]. Thus His Lordship is explained to be agential freedom [*svātantrya*] having the character of the bringing about of that which is very difficult.[70]

This solution really is a deus ex machina! It would be circular to argue that the special *nature* of the Lord allows Him to resolve unity and multiplicity—unless there were other reasons to believe that there is such a Lord.

Another frequent strategy by which the the Śaivas deal with the alleged contradictoriness of unity and diversity is *analogy.* Various instances of the apparent coexistence of unity and multiplicity in ordinary experience are adduced to support the possibility on a more cosmic scale. In the first passage quoted above where Abhinava epitomizes all the reductio arguments, he continues:

> To this it has been replied: There is the possibility of a diversity of appearances which does not contradict the unity of He who has the essential nature of consciousness, who is like a mirror. What is the contradiction? Therefore, Reality,[71] though unitary by force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], accommodates within Himself contrary divisions of His essential nature.[72]

Besides reflection, other analogies used to lessen the paradox of the one and the many are a painting on a wall; the unitary vista from the top of a mountain; the movements of a dancer; and the relationships between waves, rivers and the ocean.[73]

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[70]IPV 2.4.20, 2:204. I note that the chief adversaries being addressed here are the Advaita Vedāntins.

[71]The word is *padārthātmā*. In the parallel discussion at IPVV 2.1.1,3:2, Abhinava glosses this word as "the essence of manifestations [*ābhāsasāra*]." Bhāskara glosses it as "the essence of [experienced objects] such as blue, yellow, etc. [*nīlapītādisārabhūta*]." BIPV 2.1.1, 2:9.

[72]IPV 2.1.1, 2:9. Also see IPVV 2.1.1,3:2.

[73]For other examples of the analogy of reflection see IPV 1.6.3, 1:309 and IPV 2.4.19, 2:199-200. On the unitary view of the diverse things in a city from a mountain, see IPV 2.4.19, 2:200. Abhinava compares the Lord's manifestation of the universe to a painting on a wall of a woman with a deep navel and elevated breasts. IPV 2.3.15-16, 2:135-136. On the dancer see IPVV 2.4.19, 3:244. On the waves of a river see IPV 2.1 benedictory verse 1, 2:1. On streams uniting in the ocean see IPV 1.7.2, 1:356-357. For a general survey of Abhinavaguptas' uses of analogies, see Navjivan Rastogi, "Some

Like the assertions of the Lord's special nature, these uses of analogy are not sufficient to answer the Buddhists' logical objections. The Buddhists have challenged the possibility of a unity of multiplicity not only at the cosmic level, but as comprising all the features of ordinary experience. It begs the question to have recourse to ordinary experience when that is included in what is in dispute. However, granting a realist view, the analogies do support the Śaivas' theology. The possibility of a monistic Lord emanating the universe would be strengthened by instances of unity-and-diversity familiar to everyone.

The fact that the Śaivas do not focus on the Buddhist reductios in the same consistent, systematic manner as they focus on the recognitive interpretation of experience per se suggests that they had difficulty with them. I have expressed the opinion that their recourse to a differentiation of the spheres of unity and multiplicity is not definitely unsatisfactory, although it is opaque. The arguments considered do not appear able to remove all of the logical doubts suggested by the Buddhists.

However, I believe that all three classes of argument have a secondary status in relation to the chief Śaiva theory of the transcendental recognition of the Supreme Lord. If it is compelling to believe that all experience is constituted from a primordial and personal unity as understood by the Śaivas—then their suggestions would be helpful in working out some of the likely consequences. The weight the Śaivas give to working out their theory of recognition in relation to considering the reductios suggests that they may have understood the situation in the same way.[74] Perhaps difficult logical

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More Nyāyas as Employed by Abhinavagupta," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 65 (1984): 27-42.

[74]Utpaladeva comes close to putting things in this manner. In the first verse of the book on action, he suggests that the topic has already been established by the epistemological discussion of the Lord's self-recognition in the previous book: "Thus the assertion that there is no action, which is sequential, unitary and belonging to the

puzzles or paradoxes are inevitable in any grand account of the world, and other factors can dictate which ones it is best to live with.

As I have already stated, I believe that the success of the Śaiva demonstratation of a universal rational foundation for their soteriology depends upon the validity of their implementations of their paradigm of recognition in the areas of epistemology and ontology, to be considered in the next two chapters. The next chapter will examine the Śaivas' treatments of three important epistemological topics—cognition, memory and conceptual exclusion. The success of the Pratyabhijñā system in the arena of epistemology depends upon the reduction of these experiential processes and their ostensible objects to modalities of the Lord's self-recognition.

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unitary has been refuted—because the unitary has been established." IPK 2.1.1, 2:7. Abhinava's comments on this verse, already considered, bring out Utpaladeva's concern with the logical problems of action. IPV 2.1.1, 2:7-9. We shall see that in the book on action the emphasis is again on working out the positive ontological implications of the theory of recognition, regarding relation, syntax, etc.—rather than answering the reductios.

CHAPTER 5

EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION

> Thus there would be destroyed the affairs [*sthiti*] of humanity, which are born from the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of experiences [*jñāna*] which are different from one another and do not apprehend one another, if there were not the Great Lord who creates within the infinite forms of the universe, is unitary, has the nature of consciousness, and possesses the Cognition, Memory and Semantic Exclusion [*apohana*] Śaktis.
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> IPK 1.3.6-7, 1:136-139

We now turn to the Śaivas' attempt to demonstrate the theory of recognition explained in the previous chapters in the arena of epistemology. This chapter will not attempt to survey the enormous range of epistemological issues treated by the Pratyabhijñā thinkers.[1] It is concerned rather with the implementations of a

[1]One important area outside of our focus should at least be mentioned. Much epistemological discussion in India centers around the concept of *pramāṇas*, 'means of cognition.' For the Śaivas a means of cognition has the characteristic of bringing about a recognitive judgement (*vimarśa*) which is uncontradicted. IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:82-83. Because, as we shall see, the Śaivas maintain that there is no external, uninterpreted world for interpretation to conform to, the specification that cognition is uncontradicted becomes in effect a criterion of coherence. The Śaivas do not give much attention to the details of defining and cataloguing the means of cognition. Abhinavagupta mentions the three commonly accepted *pramāṇas* of perception, inference and scripture. Aspects of the Śaiva understandings of perception and scripture, as Supreme Speech, will be taken up in this chapter. I note that Abhinava has much of interest to say about scripture in the ordinary, concrete sense, aside from its transcendental nature. Thus he describes it as "having the nature of very firm recognitive judgement (*vimarśa*)." IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:84. He admits that for people who "have taken heart" and

simultaneously argumentative and ritual agenda. I remind the reader of some of the homologous schemes in terms of which we have come to understand this agenda. The Śaivas endeavor inferentially to elicit the recognition of identity with the Supreme Lord by showing through transcendental inquiry that all the items of experience are one's Śakti—who is Herself one's self-recognition. This is a purification of conceptualization, which reintegrates the Lord's self-recognition fragmented in ordinary linguistic ascription. It is a removal of the obstacles which obscure the ever-existent fact that everything is one's self-recognition as Śiva.

As explained in chapter two, the two chief Śaktis which are invoked in summaries of the Pratyabhijñā inference—operative in the areas of epistemology and ontology—are those of Cognition and Action. In the two main philosophical sections of the Pratyabhijñā texts, the Book on Cognition and the Book on Action, a number of subsidiary topics are treated; the reality underlying these topics is often given designations as various subsidiary Śaktis.

The passage of Utpaladeva quoted above divides the modalities of the Lord's self-recognition operative within the area of epistemology into three chief Śaktis. These are Cognition per se, Memory, and Semantic Exclusion (*apohana*) (which will be

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"have firm conviction" there is the status of revelation for the Veda as well as orthodox Śaiva Siddhānta, Buddhism and Jainism. IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:84-91. Abhinava follows both Bhartṛhari and Vātsyāyana in stating that both scripture and direct perception can sublate inference. IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:89. He also states that more can be known about the categories of reality (*tattva*) from scripture (*āgama*), which has as its ultimate nature the recognitive judgement of the Great Lord, than from direct perception and inference. IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:212-214. For a concise discussion of inference, see IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:84. I also note that *pramāṇas* are focused upon in the book on action of the Pratyabhijñā texts. This is, firstly, because of their pertinence to the discussion there of the reality of synthesized ontological categories. More particularly it is because *pramāṇas* are undertood to have the structure of *relation.* IPV 2.3 introduction, 2:66-67; IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:82-83. In their character as relation, as will be seen in the next chapter, they are structured with the special *syntax* which the Śaivas use to interpret the ontological implications of their theory of recognition.

explained below).[2] This chapter will consider the basic arguments by which the Śaivas attempt to explain each of these topics in terms of modalities of the Lord's self-recognition designated as separate Śaktis. Like the Śaivas, I will devote most attention to the Cognition Śakti.[3]

I will begin the discussion of the first topic with some general remarks. The main word being translated as cognition is *jñāna*.[4] This word is a derivative of the root *jñā*, and is related both to the word 'knowledge' and to the word 'cognition.' In treating the subject of cognition, the Śaivas are mostly concerned with *perception* (referred to as

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[2]It is notable that this triad is taken directly from *Bhagavadgītā* 15.15, which Utpaladeva quotes in IPKV 1.3.7, 10. Here is the actual verse: "I make my dwelling in the hearts of all: from Me stem memory, wisdom, the dispelling [of doubt]. Through the Vedas it is I who should be known, for the maker of the Vedas' end am I, and I the Vedas know." *The Bhagavad Gītā: With a Commentary Based on the Original Sources,* ed. and trans., R.C., Zaehner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; paperback, 1975), 366. This is from a section of the *Gītā* describing the immanence of Kṛṣṇa in both the world and the human being. The meaning in the *Gītā* verse of the last term, *apohana,* is mysterious. It could not have been a reference to the philosophical concept of exclusion, which was not developed by the Buddhists until much later. Zaehner admits that he is uncertain about his translation.

[3]I note that I am changing the order of the Śaivas' treatment of these topics. The Śaivas' order parallels the Buddhist attacks on the Pratyabhijñā inference, where memory was considered first as evidence for the existence of the inferential subject—a continuous self. Though there is an extra emphasis on the continuity of the self in the Śaiva discussion of memory, it seems best to treat cognition first. I believe that their dicussion of cognition best typifies their epistemology, most directly pertains to the problems of interpretation considered in the first chapter, and is the most impressive of their efforts to demonstrate the person's Lordship. Abhinavagupta himself asserts the primacy of the treatment of cognition over the other epistemological topics. Thus he states that "The life of memory, excluding-conceptualization (*vikalpa*), etc., is direct perception [*anubhava*]." IPV 1.5.1, 1:195. Also see IPV 1.4.8, 1:191-192; IPV 1.5 introduction, 1:194 and IPV 1.4 introduction, 1:147.

[4]Other terms used to indicate cognition in the most general sense are *pramā* and *pramiti*. These are derived from the same root and prefix as the word *pramāṇa*.

pratyakṣa, 'direct perception,' and *anubhava,* 'direct experience').[5] For the sake of convenience, I will use the terms cognition and perception somewhat interchangeably.

Another point is that cognition is understood in Sanskrit epistemological discussions to occur *in an episodic manner—it is not a disposition.*[6] Though cognition is episodic, information gained through it can be retrieved through memory. A further characteristic of Indian understandings of cognition is that each episode must yield new information. Thus, although memory may be completely valid in its recovery of the information from an original cognition, it is not classified as a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).[7]

Here I will quote a definition by Abhinavagupta of the Cognition Śakti, which describes the Lord's emanation of the characteristic features of cognition:

> Thus it is established that He, comprehending a particular object from the multitude of objects which are merged in His essential nature, as having a different form, manifests it as having emerged from His essential nature. This is that Cognition Śakti. The ever-new cognition is explained to have the essential nature of consciousness, but to be differentiated from that [object] which has emerged. Because of its extroversion, it is affected by [the object's] reflection.[8]

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[5]I note that Abhinava also places the cognition of inner feelings such as pleasure and yogic cognition in the category of direct perception. IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:83. However, the Śaivas' discussion focuses on the ordinary sense perception of objects.

[6]See Matilal, "Knowledge as a Mental Episode," in *Perception,* 97-140. I have chosen the gloss as cognition rather than knowledge to lessen connotations of a disposition.

[7]See Matilal, "Memory" in *Logic, Language and Reality.*

[8]IPV 1.3.7, 1:140-141. The texts provide many similar descriptions of the Cognition Śakti. See IPV 1.5 benedictory verse, 1:193; IPK 1.5.1, 1:196 as explained by IPV 1.5 introduction, 1:194; IPV 1.5.1, 1:197. Cf., IPV 1.5.18, 1:282.

The Lord creates the episode as a paradoxically *self-identical* manifestation of a *separate* object.[9] As will be explained, this is accomplished through His self-recognition.

The arguments by which the Cognition Śakti is demonstrated may roughly be divided by two terminological focuses. Firstly, there are arguments centering around the term *prakāśa.* This is the same word as "self-luminosity" without the reflexive prefix *sva;* it may accordingly be translated as 'light, illumination' or 'awareness.' Generally I will use the latter gloss, and I will gloss cognate verbs as 'appears.' Secondly, there are arguments centering around the term *vimarśa* and cognates derived from *mṛś,* which have been discussed in the previous chapter.[10] Despite much attention to these two categories of terms in studies of the Pratyabhijñā theory of cognition, I believe that they have not been properly understood. Even where there is acknowledgement of their ultimate identity, they are discussed almost like two separate epistemological "juices" which are being mixed.[11] There has not been a careful examination of the precise logic of their relation in the context of the overarching problematics of the system.

I would characterize the relation of the arguments about perception centering around the different terms as follows: The arguments utilizing the term *prakāśa* are largely concerned with a reduction of perceived entities to the fact of awareness itself. *Vimarśa* and related terms do not describe a factor in experience *supplementing*

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[9]See the end of the previous chapter on the ways the Śaivas deal with the logical problem of the relation of the one and the many.

[10]Sometimes these *vimarśa* arguments also use *anusaṃdhāna* and its cognates.

[11]Alper has gone so far as interpreting the Pratyabhijñā epistemology as comprising separate *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* theologies. See Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," "Śiva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness," and "*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ.*"

prakāśa. Rather they clarify that the awareness to which objects have been idealistically reduced *is necessarily recognition.* The force of the arguments together is that the perception of objects is an expresson of the Lord's self-recognition.[12]

We may now turn to the arguments centering around the term *prakāśa*. I note that these arguments seem to be most directly inspired by the idealistic Buddhist school of Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda.[13] The opponents in these discussions are those who believe in the existence of objects external to awareness, particularly the Naiyāyikas in the Hindu tradition and the Sautrāntikas in the Buddhist. The formulations of the Buddhist logicians, whose ambiguity about whether objects are external to awareness has given them the epithet Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas, are temporarily left aside.

The Śaiva discussion of *prakāśa* develops some of the meanings of their doctrine of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*). As stated in chapter two, the backgrounds to the Śaiva understanding of this concept include both the Advaita Vedāntin understanding of self-luminosity and the Buddhist logicians' understanding of the component of self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) integral to each experience.[14] Our present concern is not the Śaivas' utilization of this idea to explain the simplicity of monistic experience. Important now is the Śaivas positing in this concept, like the other

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[12]The relation of the concepts will be further elucidated in the discussion of ontology in the next chapter.

[13]However the Śaivas conspicously avoid the Vijñānavāda arguments trying to raise doubts about the validity of ordinary experience on the basis of the occurence of perceptual illusions.

[14]Alper speculates about aesthetic backgrounds of the term. Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 70, n. 4.

two schools, a self-aware subjectivity which epistemically grounds every cognition, so that one "knows that one knows."[15]

The thrust of the *prakāśa* arguments is that this component of subjective awareness integral to every cognition *constitutes the objects of these cognitions.* Utpala states:

> If the object did not have the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], it would lack illumination [*aprakāśa*], as it did before [its appearance]. Awareness [*prakāśa*] cannot be different [than the object]. Awareness [*prakāśatā*] is the essential nature of the object.[16]

The argument is based on the analytical fact that we can only be aware of that of which we are aware. For this reason, it is held to be impossible for there to be an object outside of awareness. An object is nothing but the awareness of it.[17]

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[15]On different Indian approaches to the validation of cognitions, see Matilal, "Knowing that One Knows," in *Perception,* 141-179. Abhinava explains that a cognizer who is not self-luminous would be not be able to establish anything else. IPV 1.1.1, 1:49. He would be like a stone. IPV 1.1.1, 1:55.

[16]IPK 1.5.2, 1:198.

[17]Abhinava emphasizes in the IPVV that the object which of which there is awareness (*prakāśamāna*) is not different from the awareness (*prakāśa*), and the awareness is not different from the object. IPVV 1.5.2, 2:68. I note that Abhinavagupta offers in the first portion of the chapter on cognition some additional ontological criticisms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understandings of external objects. Thus he argues that their conceptions of the part and whole and of the union of atoms are inherently contradictory. Many of these criticisms can be found in such classic Vijñānavāda works as the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu. Abhinava explicitly refers for further details to the *Prajñālaṃkāra* of Śaṅkarānanda, an important mediator of the critiques of Vasubhandhu and Dignāga in Kashmir. IPV 1.5.6, 1:223-225. The details of these ontological criticisms need not presently concern us. However, they are notable for indicating the Śaivas' explicit willingness to proceed part of the way with the Vijñānavāda idealism. On Śaṅkarānanda as a mediator of the critiques of Vasubandhu and Dinnaga in Kashmir, see Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 140-141 n. 5; Raniero Gnoli, introduction to *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary,* Serie Orientale Roma 23 (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), xiii-xxvii; and Jean Naudoux, *Buddhists of Kashmir,* 121-127.

The Śaivas further take up an attempt to infer the existence of external objects. This follows the epistemology of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, which may be classified as "representationalist." According to these thinkers, awareness is in itself without any differentiation.[18] On the other hand our experience does present a diversity of appearances—for example of different colors such as blue and yellow. External objects are inferred as the *causes* of this diversity. Utpala states the basic Sautrāntika inference:

> Any of the variety of manifestations, the cause of which is not known, necessitates the inference of the external [object]. For awareness, which is undifferentiated, cannot cause the diverse manifestations.[19]

These external objects cause such manifestations as their *reflections* (*pratibimba*).[20]

The Śaivas respond on the basis of the understanding held by the majority of Indian philosophical schools that the inference of a relationship between a cause and an effect depends upon the observation of their invariable succession in a series of direct perceptions.[21] As Utpala explains, the Sautrāntika inference simply lacks the necessary experiential foundation:

> Inference regarding that which has not previously appeared is definitely not accepted.... There has never in any way been the manifestation of an object

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[18]These thinkers are being interpreted as holding the view that awareness is intrinsically without forms (*nirākāra*), which was noted in chapter three.

[19]IPK 1.5.4, 1:210.

[20]IPV 1.5.4, 1:210-212. I note that the Śaivas also present a Sautrāntika refutation of a Vijñānavāda effort idealistically to account for the multiplicity in experience on the basis of latent tendencies (*vāsanā*). At this point the discussion sounds like an inter-Buddhist debate. This is again of interest as evincing the Śaivas' indebtedness to the Buddhist idealists. Apparently the Sautrāntika objection is allowed to stand, as the Śaivas hold a different theory of the cause of diverse manifestations. IPK and IPV 1.5.5, 1:210-221.

[21]IPV 1.5.8-9, 1:230-235.

external to manifestation. Therefore there is also not the establishment of it by inference.[22]

Abhinavagupta makes an additional *reductio ad absurdum* argument based on the understanding that inference itself is a kind of awareness. This *reductio* shows the necessity of the Śaiva alternative. Abhinava explains:

> Therefore, if the object such as blue, etc., is not attained by awareness [*prakāśa*], even such as has the nature of the conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] which is inference, then it cannot be inferred. If [the object] is attained [by awareness], then it has the essential nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], according to the principle "The object would lack illumination [*aprakāśa*], as it did before."[23] It is not external. Therefore any means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] which is adduced to prove that there is an external object proves, on the contrary, nothing but its non-externality. Thus it is contradictory.[24]

According to the Śaivas, the representationalist inference is not only unfounded and illogical, but also epistemologically useless. Ordinary behavior can be accounted for without the hypothesis of external objects. Abhinavagupta states:

> You attempt to establish external objects with a conjecture [*kalpanā*, i.e., the inference]. Nothing can be accomplished through those [external objects]. For worldly behavior is established solely through those manifestations [*ābhāsa*], which you have admitted. There is no worldly behavior through that which is always an object of inference.[25]

Allowing for all of the differences, these *prakāśa* arguments are quite analogous to Bishop George Berkeley's classic formulation of the central dictum of Western idealism that *esse est percipi*. Basing himself on the notion that all we directly experience are "percepts" or "ideas" (in the broad sense including percepts), he

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[22]IPK 1.5.8-9, 1:230. I note that Utpaladeva and Abhinava also attempt to defend the consistency of a desired inference of sense-faculties with the restriction of inference. The discussion is found at IPK 1.5.8, 1:230 and IPV 1.5.8-9, 1:230-235. This issue is not important to the present discussion.

[23]Abhinava is referring to IPK 1.5.2, quoted above.

[24]IPV 1.5.9, 1:235.

[25]IPV 1.5.6, 1:222. Also see IPK 1.5.6, 1:221.

contended that it is impossible to posit the existence of such ideas apart from a subject. Here is a representative explanation:

> That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow.—And to me it is no less evident that the various SENSATIONS, or *ideas imprinted on the sense,* however blended or combined together (that is, whatever *objects* they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them—I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by anyone that shall attend to *what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things.* The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all I can understand by these and like expressions.—For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi,* nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.[26]

As the Śaivas refuted the Sautrāntika representationalism, Berkeley contended that Locke's position that separate substances cause ideas is unfounded.[27] Berkeley also held that the very conception of an object external to awareness is a "manifest repugnancy."[28] As the Śaivas contended that valid worldly behavior can be accounted for solely in terms of experiences—so did Berkeley understand his immaterialist

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[26]George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* in *The Principles of Human Knowledge, With Other Writings,* ed. with introduction by G.J. Warnock (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), 66.

[27]For an example of Berkeley's argumentation against the inference of substance (rather different than the Śaivas' refutation of inference) see *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* 73-74.

[28]He explains: "When we do our utmost to conceive of the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of *material substance.*" *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* 76.

hypothesis as supporting common sense and behaviors, along with science, on the basis of ideas alone.

Here I will digress to consider an important point which is connected with the *prakāśa* arguments, but discussed in other sections of the Pratyabhijñā texts. This point also marks an important divergence of the Śaivas from Berkeley, and puts them more in line with some of the 18th-20th century Western idealists. The Śaivas contend that there is in the ultimate perspective only one subject. In the introductory chapter, while discussing the presence of the Cognition and Action Śaktis in all beings, Utpaladeva and Abhinava explain that the cognition of others is supposed or trusted (*ūhyate*) from their observed action.[29] However, this understanding of the cognition of others is only provisional. Abhinava reduces the presumed awareness of others to one subject in the same way that objects have been reduced:

> Cognition does not [ultimately] appear as "this." For "thisness" [understood as genuine externality to awareness] is the condition of non-cognition. Something which has appeared could not have appeared with another form. Therefore, only cognition appears. And that which appears has only the form "I." Even the cognition of others is nothing but one's own Self. Otherness is entirely due to contingent properties [*upādhi*] such as the body, etc. And that [a contingent property] has been determined to be not other [than awareness]. Thus everything falls under the category of the subject. The subject is really unitary. And He alone exists. Thus it has been said: "There is only the awareness of one's Self as oneself and others."[30] Therefore beginning from "Bhagavan Sadāśiva cognizes" and ending "The worm cognizes"—there is only one subject. Consequently, that subject has the nature of all subjects.[31]

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[29]IPK 1.1.4, 1:70; IPV 1.1.4, 1:78.

[30]This is APS 13, 5. It is quoted in full in a note below.

[31]IPV 1.1.4, 1:75-77. Abhinavagupta says that agency is to be explained in the same manner. IPV 1.1.4, 1:77. Abhinava also touches upon these issues in his *Tantrasāra*. He explains that awareness (*prakāśa*) is unitary because it is impossible for it to have an essential nature which is other, i.e., as nonawareness. Awareness again is not differentiated by place and time because it is their own essential nature. TS 1, 5-6. Elsewhere Abinava explains that the modifier *sarva*, 'all,' does not add any additional meaning to the terms 'cognizerhood' (*jñātṛtva*) or 'agency' (*kartṛtva*). IPV 1.1.1, 1:49-50.

The Śaiva arguments are so strongly idealistic that a repugnant solipsism is replaced by a conception of a universal awareness. Individual selves are only the apparent delimitations of this awareness. Once the principle of *esse est percipi* is accepted, it appears more economical to argue in this manner than to attempt to justify the existence of other selves.[32]

We may now return to the discussion of perception per se. According to Abhinavagupta, the refutation of external objects as causes of the diversity of perception establishes the Śaiva doctrine of the Lordship of awareness.[33] The idea that objects are nothing but a single awareness entails that they are emanated by it. The capactity of emanation was explained in the second chapter to be the basic significance of Śakti, the definitive characteristic of Lordship.

Utpala presents the Śaiva explanation, supporting the theory with a widely accepted analogy:

> Indeed God [*deva*], whose nature is only consciousness, can, from the force of His will and without material, cause the mass of objects which are situated within Him to appear [*prakāśayet*] as external—like a yogin.[34]

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[32]Abhinava also adduces a logical consideration for the unity of selves. He explains that just as living beings partake of differentiation due to the differentiation of accidental properties such as objects of cognition and the body, so such insentient things partake of differentiation due to the differentiation of living beings. Because such reciprocal dependence for differentiation is not valid, there is really no differentiation of living beings. IPV 1.1.3, 1:66-67.

[33]IPV 1.5.4-5, 1:209-210 and IPV 1.5.9, 1:235.

[34]IPK 1.5.7, 1:226. Cf. Utpaladeva's APS: "Thus insentient things, which in themselves amount to nonexistent, exist belonging only to awareness [*prakāśa*]. There is only the awareness of one's Self as oneself and others." APS 13, 5. This is quoted by Abhinava at IPV 1.1.3, 1:64; IPV 1.1.4, 1:76; IPV 1.5.3, 1:208; and IPVV 1.1, 1:97. Kṣemarāja also quotes it at SN 1.5, 18.

Abhinava explains Utpala's analogy as follows: The creations of a yogi are held to be real, and not mere fantasy, dream, etc.[35] The yogi produces them without material and other external causes such as are observed in a potter's production of a pot. Again, Abhinava explains that it is because consciousness creates objects through mere will, that Utpaladeva uses the expression "God."[36]

Thus the *prakāśa* arguments, as demonstrating that the subject has the character of emanation which is called Śakti, in themselves already point towards the inferential conclusion of the identity of the perceiver with the Lord. However, the Śaiva position has not been fully distinguished from that of the Vijñānavāda/Yogācāra. The arguments of the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika Buddhists against recognition considered in the second chapter have not been answered.[37] They are answered with the arguments centering around *vimarśa* and other terms derived from the root *mṛś*—which show that awareness is necessarily a process of recognition.

Now, corresponding to the identification of Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition (as explained in the last chapter), the Śaivas develop these arguments out of earlier discussions of Bhartṛhari. Thus Abhinava supports the Śaiva thesis with excerpts from the *Vākyapadīya:*

> It has also been said by that honorable Bhartṛhari: "There is no cognition in the world which is not accompanied by speech. Every cognition is experienced as if penetrated by speech. If there were to end the eternal condition of cognition having the nature of speech, awareness could not be aware. It is this [condition

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[35]Such illusions are used as paradigmatic in the Vijñānavāda conception of (latent-tendency activated) generation of objects as forms (*ākāra*) of awareness. See Matilal, "Analysis of Perceptual Illusion," in *Perception,* 183-190, 229-233. Here the Śaivas are indicating that they part from the views of the Vijñānavāda.

[36]IPV 1.5.7, 1:226-229.

[37]The Buddhist argument that the application of language is a kind of secondary reaction ungrounded in phenomenal experience is repeated in the chapter on cognition at IPV 1.5.19, 1:283-284.

> that cognition has the nature of speech] which makes possible recognitive judgment [*pratyavamarśinī*]." And also: "It [speech] is the consciousness of all beings subject to transmigratory existence, and it exists both internally and externally. If there were an end to that [speech], one would be oberved to be unconscious, like wood or a wall."[38]

One of the arguments of Bhartṛhari developed by Abhinavagupta is that cognition must be intrinscially linguistic to account for the possibility of the *learning* of conventional language.[39] Abhinava explains that initially a small boy will have a series of cognitions lacking gross conceptual construction (*nirvikalpaka*). For example, he hears language as a series of incomprehensible sounds, and he sees the ground with and without a pot. It is due to the fact that objects are generated from the higher form of speech, that the connection is possible:

> ... According to this system, the object really consists entirely of speech, because it consists of recognitive judgment [*vimarśa*].... Thus things can be verbalized [*śabadanam*] by the entire collection of words. Then a fixed association with a word is created.[40]

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[38]IPV 1.5.14, 1:265. Following Iyer's edition, the first quotation is *Vākyapadīya* 1.115-116, 1:188-190. (1.16 was quoted in the previous chapter.) The next two sentences are 1.118a, 1:193, and a close approximation to the second half of a verse quoted by the *Vṛtti* at 1:118, 1:193. It is possible that these formed one verse in the version of the text which Abhinavagupta used. Abhinava also cites the *Mālinīvijayatantra,* along with an unidentified scripture, on *mantra* as intrinsic to experience. IPV 1.5.14, 1:264. In the discussion of means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), Abhinavagupta likewise makes the claim that scripture (*āgama*) "amounts to the life of direct perception." IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:84-85.

[39]According to Bhartṛhari, it is the innateness of the subtle form of language which accounts for infants' beginning to move their vocal organs. See *Vākyapadīya* with *Vṛtti* 1.114, 187-188.

[40]IPV 1.5.19, 1:288-289.

Abhinava compares the linguistic interpretation intrinsic to experience to pointing with the finger. On its basis the boy comes to learn the reference of expressions such as "This is a pot" and "Fetch it."[41]

Another of Bhartṛhari's arguments concerns the necessary retrievability of the information gained from cognitions in memory. He gives as examples very simple perceptions such as the sensations of earth and grass while walking quickly, along with states of unconsciousness such as sleep and stupor. It is only if there is linguistic interpretation even in such experiences that one is able to remember them.[42] Abhinavagupta only briefly mentions this idea in the IPV. He states that one could not recall that one was in a state of stupor if there were not such an inner judgement (*parāmarśa*).[43]

The chief argument made by Utpaladeva for the linguistic-recognitive nature of cognition recalls Bhartṛhari's discussion of walking rapidly through the grass. Utpaladeva's argument draws attention to the need for a kind of recognitive ordering in the perception accompanying *rapid behavior:*

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[41]IPV 1.5.19, 1:284-288. Another argument given by Bhartṛhari for the presence of linguistic interpretation in all experience is the purposeful behavior of newborn children and animals, which would nowadays be explained in terms of instinct. This idea is actually mentioned by Bhāskara. He explains that recognitive ascertainment (*pratyavamarśa, anusaṃdhāna, yojanā*) is the basis for the baby's seeking pleasure in sucking the breast of his mother. BIPV 1.6.10, 1:340. I recall the passage of Dharmottara using this example which was quoted in chapter 3.

[42]See *Vākyapadīya* with *Vṛtti* 1.115, 1:188-190. Cf. the discussion of Norman Malcom's ideas on the role of linguistic interpretation in making memory possible at Warnock, *Memory,* 44.

[43]IPV 1.5.19, 1:289.

> There is recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] even at the moment of direct perception. Otherwise, without recognitive synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*], how would running, etc., be possible?[44]

Abhinava states that in the case of running there must be a continuous recognition of the destinations which one successively aims for and attains. The same is the case with other rapid behaviors such as speaking and reading, in which one moves the tongue between the places of articulation.[45] In these behaviors there is not time for the activation of gross linguistic reference. Abhinava explains:

> In these cases, there is not experienced the gross conceptual construction which occurs later. Therefore, rapidity must be due to subtle recognition [*pratyavamarśa*] consisting of the ascertainment [*bhāvanā*] of contracted speech.[46]

There is a further area of the Śaiva theory of cognition which is a direct outcome of their understanding of the transcendental character of recognition. This mode of thinking is elaborated in a complex manner in a variety of terminologies throughout the texts, and I can only give an idea of it here. The Śaivas invert the Buddhist understandings of the relations of the experiences of universals and particulars. The Buddhists hold that the primary awareness is of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), and that the synthetic linguistic constructions invalidly applied to them take the form of universals (*sāmānya*) or relations (*sambandha*). The Śaivas, on the other hand, make the recognition of linguistic syntheses primary, and hold that particulars are constructed at a secondary level through the synthesis of these

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[44]IPK 1.5.19, 1:284.

[45]IPV 1.5.19, 1:291-292.

[46]IPV 1.5.19, 1:292-293. I note that besides these arguments about the necessity of recognition in the perception of objects, the Śaivas make some claims that the self-luminosity which validates cognitions has the nature of self-recognition. Thus they assert that it is this self-recognition which distinguishes the subject from insentient reflective things such as crystals. IPV 1.5.11, 1:242-243. If there were not such self-recognition, the universe would be intense darkness or worse. IPV 1.1.4, 1:71.

syntheses. I will quote a passage from Abhinavagupta's discussion of means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). This explains the construction of particulars through the synthesis of universals with location and time—which, as will be seen in the next chapter, are themselves understood as conceptual syntheses:

> There is a means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] through the power of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. Recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] is animated by the word [*śabda*]. And the word [*śabda*] is employed regarding a single unitary manifestation which is untouched by other manifestations such as place, time, etc. [Example expressions of such isolated manifestations are] "pot" and "red." Therefore, the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] operates regarding a manifestation which attains the condition of a universal; for there is no mixture with it of place and time, which would make it into a unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*].... However, the unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*] is another, different unitary manifestation; it has the form of the manifestation of the location in the same substratum of the manifestations of those [i.e., place, time, etc.].[47]

In this mode of explanation the Śaivas attempt to achieve a double victory. The perceptions of both sorts of entities are shown to depend intimately on synthesis.[48]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta further develop the force of this mode of explanation against the Buddhists in a variety of ways. Thus, they deny the Buddhist

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[47]IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:75-77. In the course of a discussion of another issue, Abhinava explains: "It has been stated that here [in the Pratyabhijñā] objects are nothing but manifestations. They are sometimes mixed by unification of recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*], when they have the form of the particular. And sometimes they are recognitively judged [*parāmṛśyante*] as unmixed, when they have the form of the universal." IPV 4.1.7, 2:292-293.

[48]Edward Farley makes an analogous point about the primordiality of the experience of universals in his interpretation of the Heideggerian understanding of truth in terms of the surpassing of time. He does not, however, invert universals and particulars like the Śaivas: "*Even as there is no manifestness without enduring, neither is there a manifestness without the expression of enduring.* Even as manifestness is the primordial sense of truth, *the expression of enduring is the primordial sense of the universal.* Hence, all cognitive acts (apprehending the sense of something; perceiving; or grasping structural makeup, causal connections, and implications) presuppose the initial capacity to grasp the enduring (that is, the manifestness of things) and thus also depend on and make use of expressions of enduringness." Edward Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," 71.

position of the givenness of the unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) by contending that they are synthesized according to taste, purpose and education.[49] For example, a pot will appear as very different things according to its conceived uses as a container for water, a source of profit or a hard object. One who for some reason is broken-hearted will only see that "It is"![50] The Śaivas also subvert the Buddhist criterion of the reality of unique particulars, i.e., causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*)—the capacity to do things. A classic example is that only the phenomenal, particular rather than the conceptual fire can burn. For the Śaivas, causal efficacy is just one more concept synthesized into the particular. They further emphasize its secondary character by specifying that it can only be included in the synthesis of an entity when there is also included its apparent externality.[51]

Such are the basic arguments on cognition centering around the term *vimarśa,* and some of those closely connnected with them.[52] Now, as I have already suggested, the idealistic *prakāśa* arguments make the recognition integral to the experience of an object *constitutive of it.* The following passage from Abhinava's summary of Pratyabhijñā system in the first chapter clearly places *vimarśa* in the algebra of *esse est percipi:*

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[49]IPK, IPV 2.3.3, 2:92-94.

[50]IPV 2.3.4-5, 2:97-98.

[51]See IPK and IPV 1.8.5-9, 1:408-421. There is discussion relevant to the syntheses of universals and particulars throughout IPK and IPV 2.3.1-14, 2:67-134. On this also see IPV 1.5.19, 1:293; IPK 2.3.1-2, 2:68; IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:214.

[52]As I have said, the Śaiva treatment of memory provides the most focused considerations for the continuity of the predicate of the Pratyabhijñā inference—the Self. However, I note that the nature of cognition as recognitive is also understood as precluding the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of awareness. For example, see IPV 1.5.2, 1:203; IPV 2.3.15-16, 2:135-136.

Here, as the multiplicity of things is recognized [*vimṛśyate*], so it exists [*asti*]. This is so because: Being [*astitva*] depends upon awareness [*prakāśa*]. There is the manifestation of this Being as depending on the recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] referring to what is brought about through this awareness [*prakāśa*]. For if a thing is not recognitively ascertained [*avimṛṣṭa*], then what could be the answer to the question of why it is not blue, not yellow, not existent, not nonexistent.[53] Therefore, in whatever way something is recognized [*vimṛśyate*], so long as it is unsublated [*abādhita*]— in such a way and so much it exists.[54]

It is this idealism which gives the Śaiva theory greater purport than the mere refutation of the skeptics. Because the awareness to which everything has been reduced is monistic, recognition must be self-recognition. Because this self-recognition emanates everything, it has the primordial explanatory and soteriological character described in the previous chapter. The way in which the epistemological argumentation demonstrates the reality of Śiva-Śakti is brought out in a fuller excerpt from the passage quoted at the beginning of that chapter:

The Śakti of being Creator,[55] which has the nature of Lordship, encompasses all the Śaktis. And that [Śakti of being Creator] has the nature of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. Therefore it is proper that only it is predominant.... The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], makes His own Self into an object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, because the cognizer is unitary. This is supposed [*sambhāvyate*] by means of a firm inference making the supposition [*sambhāvanā*], which has shown the impossibility of another cause.[56] "Therefore"[57] means this is the case for the reason which is [His] agency, having the character of Śakti which is recognitive

[53]The idea is that there would be no way of knowing anything about something which is unrecognized.

[54]IPV 1.1.3, 1:61-62. For statements of the identity of awareness and recognition (*vimarśa*) also see IPK and IPV 1.5.11, 1:241-244; and IPV 1.5.17, 1:273.

[55]This word, *kartṛtvaśakti*, could also be translated as 'the Agency Śakti.' As such it addresses the syntax of self-recognition to be taken up in the next chapter.

[56]Bhāskara states that such causes include material causes (*upādāna*). BIPV 1.5.15, 1:268. Abhinava is referring to the refutation of external objects as the causes of the diversity in perception. (He may also be referring to the Sautrāntikas' refutation of the Vijñānavāda theory that latent tendencies cause such diversity.)

[57]He is interpreting a word in Utpaladeva's verse.

> judgement [*vimarśa*]. As He recognitively apprehends [*parāmṛśati*] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as blue, etc.[58]

The epistemological argumentation constantly leads one to recognize that one is the Supreme Lord on the basis of seeing that all things are nothing but one's self-recognition. This is illustrated by a casual remark of Abhinavagupta on a verse of Utpaladeva. Though very brief, I will mention it here because it parallels a more explicit statement by Abhinavagupta in the section on memory. This verse follows a verse in which Utpaladeva identifies consciousness (*citi*) with self-recognition (*pratyavamarśa*) and Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*).[59] According to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva in the verse in question supports his position on the basis of the principle scriptures.[60] It will be recalled that in explanations of the soteriological recognition treated in the second chapter, Abhinava places the knowledge of the Lord from the scriptures in the position of memory. Utpaladeva's verse actually predicates of consciousness some traditional theological qualifications:

> She is Creative Trembling [*sphurattā*], Great Being [*mahāsattā*] and is unqualified by time and place. As the Essence [*sāratayā*], this is She [*saiṣa*] who is said to be the heart of the Supreme.[61]

Abhinavagupta comments: "'This is She' [*saiṣa*] indicates the recognition [*pratyabhijñāna*] of Śakti."[62] Means and goal are of course identical.

We now turn to the Pratyabhijñā theory of memory. The Śaivas again explain the ordinary, as opposed to the transcendental, memory as a modality of recognition designated as the Memory Śakti. The person is demonstrated to remember because of

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[58]IPV 1.5.15, 1:267-268.

[59]IPK 1.5.13, 1:250.

[60]IPV 1.5.14, 1:255.

[61]IPK 1.5.14, 1:255.

[62]IPV 1.5.14, 1:262.

possessing the Memory Sakti of the Lord.[63] By elucidating this, the Pratyabhijñā enables the student to participate in the Lord's self-recognition.

To proceed, I recall the Buddhists' refutation of the Nyāya understanding of the self as a substratum for mnemonic impressions (*saṃskāra, vāsanā*). The Buddhists argued that memory is accomplished through impressions alone, in a phenomenal series without a substratum. The Śaivas in turn demonstrate the self-recognitive nature of memory through pointing out features of it which cannot be accounted for by impressions alone. Firstly, they acknowledge that impressions could account for the *similarity* (sādṛśya) *of memory with the original experience of an object.*[64] Abhinava explains:

> So much is accomplished by the impression [*saṃskāra*] which was produced by the previous experience: Although that cognition [which is memory] is not produced by the object [of the original experience]—nevertheless [memory] has that object.[65]

Abhinava analogizes the function of impressions in memory to the way elasticity enables a branch which has been bent to return to its previous position.[66]

However, there is more in memory to be explained than its mere similarity to an original experience of an object. If memory were only a sort of copy of the original experience of an object, it would still have the expression typified "this." "This" is an ascription having the significance of something which is present to perception.[67] The

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[63]IPV 1.3.7, 1: 143. Cf. IPV 1.4.7, 1:183.

[64]IPK 1.3.2, 1:126; IPV 1.3.2, 1:128-130.

[65]IPV 1.3.1, 1:125.

[66]IPV 1.3.2, 1:128-129. Elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*) is itself a kind of impression (*saṃskāra*), as is momentum (*vega*). The analogy of the elacticity of the branch is also brought up in the presentation of the Buddhist position. IPV 1.2.5, 1:99.

[67]The previous chapter along with the treatment of cognition above should make it clear how this is itself a recogniton.

memory of the object however has the typical expression "that." That is, it is *qualified as previously experienced.* Now, according to the Śaivas, such a qualification requires that there is some sort of awareness in memory of the previous experience itself as well as its object.[68]

In the inquiry regarding this awareness, special considerations for the continuity of the self are brought in, which address the Buddhist challenge to the subject in the Pratyabhijñā inference. These considerations depend upon premises rather foreign to Western understanding. As explained above, Indian philosophy looks at cognition as occuring in an episodic manner. The Śaivas contend that because the self-luminosity which the Buddhist philosophers understand to validate each episode is integral to and temporary like the episode itself—it is impossible for one episode, memory, to know the episode which was the previous experience. Utpala explains:

> ... The cognition which is memory is produced from the impression [*saṃskṛti*] of a previous experience. However, since it exists in itself [*ātmaniṣṭha*], it does not make known the first experience. A cognition is only self-luminous. It is not the cognitive object of another [cognition], just as the cognition of taste [is not the object] of the cognition of color....[69]

Thus the qualification of the object as previously experienced would be impossible on the Buddhist account.

The Śaivas avoid the problem of objectivizing one cognition to another through the idea of the continuing self. It is the continuous self which enables the memory both to comprehend an original object, and to distinguish it as previously perceived. Utpaladeva explains :

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[68]See IPV 1.3.1, 1:124-125.

[69]IPK 1.3.1-2, 1:124-126. On this point also see IPV 1.3 introduction, 1:123; IPV 1.3.2, 1:127-129; IPV 1.4 introduction, 1:149; IPK and IPV 1.4.4, 1:166-171; IPV 1.4.8, 1:187.

> The manifestation in memory of that which is remembered would not be possible if there were a difference between the two. Therefore, there is a unity of experiences in different times. This is that Cognizer. The former experience does not appear separately in memory like an object. For there is the manifestation of it as resting in the Self [in the manner expressed]: "I previously experienced."[70]

The qualification in memory of an object as previously experienced is a judgement regarding the experience of the continuing self.

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta point out another necessary feature of memory which the Buddhists cannot explain without a recognitive connection of experiential episodes. This is the *comprehension of the similarity between the episodes of orginal experience and the memory itself:*

> How is there the ascertainment ... of similarity? For [the past] perceptual cognition does not cause one to comprehend similarity. Nor does the cognition which is memory. For, since they are reciprocally unknowing, there is not the possibility of the ascertainment of similarity existing in the two. And there is the nonexistence of another [i.e., the Self] which knows both of them.[71]

This point furthers the Śaivas' development of a distinctive understanding of self-luminosity in the context of memory. The Buddhist cannot account for a sort of recognition within memory which validates its authenticity.[72]

The Śaivas emphasize again that the validating self-consciousenss which the Buddhists admit cannot be episodic with experiences. An enduring subject is the epistemic ground of both direct experience and memory. Abhinavagupta explains:

> Therefore, this [memory] is possible in this manner: The very self-consciousness [*svasaṃvedana*] of memory is the self-consciousness [*svasaṃvedana*] of perceptual experience. Nothing other than self-consciousness is able to bring about that [memory]; neither direct-perception or inference can. Thus is

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[70]IPK 1.4.3-4, 1:162-167. Cf. IPV 1.4.4, 1:167-169.

[71]IPV 1.3.2, 1:129. Also see IPK and IPV 1.7.5, 1:362-364.

[72]The validating and temporal-connective features of memory described here have been discussed in various ways in Western philosophy. For example, Bertrand Russell explained memory as comprising both a feeling of familiarity and a feeling of pastness. See the survey in Warnock, *Memory,* 15-36.

> established the principle which is the subject, who is the unbroken self-consciousness pervading so much time [from the original experience through memory]. There being one experiencer, a different rememberer is not possible.[73]

Inasmuch as the recognitions integral to the temporal and validating aspects of memory pertain to the experience of the subject, they are expressions of self-recognition. The Śaivas thus reduce memory to a modality of such self-recognition designated as the Memory Śakti. This is brought out in the following definition of Abhinavagupta:

> ... At some previous time there was an extroverted awareness [*saṃvedana*] of a manifestation. The introverted essential nature of consciousness [*cit*] of that [awareness] remains existing in Himself even at another time. He recognitively ascertains [*parāmṛśati*] His [previous] extroversion towards a particular object [viṣaya]. Such is the Memory Śakti.[74]

Memory is a recognition by the Self/Lord of His previous "extroverted awareness" (*saṃvedanam bahirmukham*), i.e., awareness of an object.[75]

As explained above, the Śaivas maintain that all perception is nothing but the expression of the Lord's self-recognition. The Śaiva understanding of memory as the Lord's self-recognition articulates the same notion of a freedom from all extrinsic causality by objects. The following passage of Abhinavagupta more fully explains the process of memory, including the role in it of impressions, in a manner which brings out its total subjectivity:

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[73]IPV 1.7.5, 1:363-364. This same point is made at IPV 1.3.7, 1:140; IPV 1.4.5, 1:176-177; and IPK 1.7.5, 1:362.

[74]IPV 1.3.7, 1:141-142. Sometimes the term recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) or recognitive judgement (*parāmarśa*, etc.) is used as a synonym for memory in a manner which entails that the latter is an instance of the former. For example, see IPV and BIPV 1.8.1, 1:402-403.

[75]It is a widespread idea that there is required in memory a sense of self, which I am calling self-recognition. This idea is found in thinkers as diverse as Bishop Butler and Jean-Paul Sartre. See the discussion at Warnock, *Memory*, 58-63.

> ... At the time of the previous experience, an object is made separate through association with place, time, and a subject who is other [than the highest subject]. It is not dissolved in I-hood.[76] It is then as if covered by darkness[77] just as such [i.e., as originally experienced]. It thus exists as that which is called an impression [*saṃskāra*]. Then He removes its cover of darkness. When that [darkness] is removed, then that [object] appears, like before, as separated. It may be objected that it would then appear, like before, as "this." It is not so. For there is the awareness [*prakāśa*] of it without loss of the connection with the separated body, etc. of the manifestation of that [original] time. The recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] of the manifestation of the time of the memory, which is a present manifestation, also does not dissappear. Thus the recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "that" is said to have the essential nature of the recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] of the prior and later, which are contrary. In this manner that Supreme Lord remembers.[78]

The Pratyabhijñā agenda of course is to demonstrate this sort of deus ex machina in every sphere of explanation.

Such are the main lines of the Śaiva demonstration of the self-recognitive nature of memory. However, I must briefly take up one other issue raised in the course of the discussion which is critical to the success of the Śaivas' argumentative agenda. The Buddhist claims that he does not need to give an adequate explanation of the synthetic features of memory because memory, as a sort of conceptualization, is an illusion.[79] This objection in a sense moves the disagreement with the Buddhists to a more radical level than the discussion of cognition. Because the Buddhist logicians, as phenomenalists, accept that there is such a thing as valid cognition, the *vimarśa*

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[76]Abhinava is stating that it is experienced at the gross level of emanation, lacking the comprehension of absorption belonging to the Supreme level of self-recognition, according to the scheme explained in the previous chapter.

[77]The original experience ends.

[78]IPV 1.4.1, 1:151-153. Cf. IPK 1.4.1, 1:149; and IPV 1.4.3, 1:164.

[79]IPK and IPV 1.3.3, 1:130-131. For the Buddhist, the only validity in the illusion of memory, its only real similarity with the original experience, lies in the fact that it is itself an innate form (*svākāra*) of the succession of self-luminous experience (*svasaṃvedana*). See IPK and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133-135.

arguments[80] only have to show that, contrary to their understanding, this cognition must be intrinsically recognitive.

Here, however, the Śaivas need to establish that *memory is valid* in order for their demonstration of its nature as the self-recognition/Śakti of the Supreme Lord to have any force at all.[81] The Śaivas' response to the Buddhist criticism make the validity of memory hinge upon the necessary validity of something else—ordinary experience and behavior (*vyavahāra*). Memory functions in the synthesis of personal identity. It is also essential to forming the the desire for repeating pleasure which motivates actions such as approaching, leaving and taking.[82]

According to Abhinavagupta, the undesirable consequence of the Buddhist view with regard to justifying worldly affairs necessitates the alternative:

> Thus [on the Buddhist view] worldly affairs would be destroyed. However, they are not destroyed by the mere curse dear to you: "Let them be destroyed." Since they appear [*prakāśante*], they are established. And an effort must be made to understand them.[83]

It is on this point that the Śaivas articulate one of their fundamental premises. In endeavoring to transfigure ordinary experience as Śakti through transcendental

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[80]After the believers in external objects are refuted by the *prakāśa* arguments.

[81]Some statements in the intial presentation fo the prima facie entail that the Buddhist in fact accepts the synthetic nature of memory. Thus Abhinava characterizes the Buddhist view as the contention that "the recognitive synthesis of memory [*smṛtyanusaṃdhāna*] is accomplished by impressions [*saṃskāra*]." IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:83. Likewise in the IPVV Abhinava describes memory as a synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) which takes the expression "that." IPVV 1.2.1-2., 1:115.

[82]See IPK and IPV 1.3.6, 1:136-138. Also see IPV 1.3.4, 1:132.

[83]IPV 1.3.7, 1:138. Statements that the Buddhists view would destroy worldly behavior are also found at IPV 1.3 introduction, 1:123; IPK and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133-135; IPK and IPV 1.3.6-7, 136-145. The Buddhists believe that their account of memory is adequate: "By impressions [*saṃskāra*] there is given support for the collection of behaviors of the world." IPV 1.2.5. 1:99. The Śaivas differ from them in contending that such affairs cannot be grounded on an illusion.

investigation, the Pratyabhijñā method depends upon its having some sort of validity. It is of course difficult to defend the basic realist intuition against skeptics who deny it. The passage just quoted suggests a criterion of coherence. Worldly experience does not disappear just because it is "cursed" to do so.[84]

The Śaivas also directly attack the coherence of the Buddhist account. Thus they claim that the Buddhist theory of impressions itself would not even be sensible if memory were illusory. Abhinava explains:

> Since there is not the [genuine] awareness [*aprakāśana*] of that [object], nothing can be accomplished by [memory's] being born from the impression. For, it [the impression] is resorted to in order to explain the similarity [between memory and the original experience]. However, there is no similarity between an experience, which has the nature of the awareness [*prakāśana*] of the object, and an illusion called memory which does not touch the object in any way.[85]

We see here another example of the contradiction inherent to skepticism explained in the first chapter. Skepticism precludes giving an account of anything.

I will finish this section by presenting a passage from Abhinavagupta which points out the soteriological possibility of experiencing the Lord's self-recognition disclosed by the discussion of memory . This explanation is made in Abhinavagupta's commentary on IPK 1.4.3, which was quoted above. Utpaladeva there states the necessity of a unity of experiences in different times, and identifies the unity with the subject in the expression: "This is that Cognizer" (*veditaiṣa saḥ*).[86] Abhinava's comment parallels his assertion in the cognition chapter regarding the expression "This is She" as indicating the recognition of Śakti. It actually comes first in the Śaiva order of

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[84]At least this is so for most of us.

[85]IPV 1.3.4, 1:132. Also see IPK 1.3.4, 1:131 and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133.

[86]IPK 1.4.3, 1:162.

presentation, and is probably alluded to in the statement in the cognition section.

Abhinava states:

> The unity, that is, the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of "I experienced the pot" or "that pot" is undifferentiated from the synthesizer [*anusaṃdhātṛ*]. In order to show this, the unity is pointed out with the apposition: "This is that Cognizer." With "This ... is that" is made the clear manifestation [*sphuṭāvabhāsana*] of the principle of the subject, which is as if covered.[87] By this expression, which is filled with wonder [*vismaya*], recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is indicated. As the author has said: "The self-luminous principle of the subject had been muddied over by those who obfuscate, talking of this and that. This has been revealed, upon putting those fools in their place by means of clear arguments."[88]

The disclosure is filled with a mystical-aesthetic wonder.

We may now turn to consider the last of our three general epistemological topics—*apohana,* which I have translated as 'semantic exclusion.' This subject is again explained in terms of a modality of the Lord's self-recognition designated as the Semantic Exclusion Śakti.

I must begin by explaining the idea of semantic exclusion. It was the Buddhist logicians who originally developed this conception. These thinkers had radically divorced the unique particulars from linguistic or imaginative constuction. However, they were still faced with the problem of explaining some sort of 'coordination' (*sārūpya*) between language and the particulars as the basis for successful reference in communication and behaviors on the basis of language.[89] They developed the theory of semantic exclusion in the attempt to explain a "similarity between things absolutely

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[87]This word, *ācchāditasya,* is the same one Abhinava uses to refer to the condition of the original experience when it is in the form of the impression. See IPV 1.4.1, 1.152.

[88]IPV 1.4.3, 1:165-166.

[89]As just suggested regarding the explanation of memory, I believe that such an account is impossible for them.

dissimilar."[90] According to this theory, an expression such as "cow" does not positively designate or describe anything in the primitive sense data. Its only referentiality is the negation of what does not fit into the category of cow. The only similarity of the sense datum with the category is that it is *not a non-cow.*[91]

The Hindu realists rejected the theory of exclusion as a satisfactory account of semantics. Nevertheless it was generally accepted that the rejection of the inapplicable is an important feature of more positively referential construction. Now, as the Śaivas have already argued for the generation of all experience from the the Lord's self-recognition, their problem is not explaining the relationship between raw sense data and construction. However, in the explanation of conceptual construction at the gross level of emanation, they accept, like the realists, that exclusion is an aspect of more positive reference.[92]

Abhinavagupta explains the intrinsic character of conceptual construction of the rejection of the inapplicable using the example of the interpreted cognition of a pot:

> ... When a pot is seen, it is also possible for there to be in the place of the pot, a non-pot, having the nature of cloth, etc. [Such a non-pot could also] have the disposition to occupy a location believed to be a suitable place, produce cognition [of itself as object], and be brought there by its own causes.[93] Since there is the possibility of the manifestation of both the pot and the non-pot, there is an opportunity for a [mistaken] superimposition [of the non-pot]. When there is the superimposition of the non-pot, there is the operation of exclusion, which is characterized by negation. It is through that [exclusion] that there is the character of [gross] conceptual construction of the determinate ascertainment "pot."[94]

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[90]Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic,* 1: 205.

[91]Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic,* 2:417.

[92]It is because it has this rudimentary epistemological function that Abhinava asserts that the Logical Exclusion Śakti aids both the Memory and Cognition Śaktis. IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:299-300.

[93]Abhinava is trying to show that the non-pot is a viable alternative.

[94]IPV 1.6.2, 1:306. Also see IPV 1.6.1, 1:303-304.

The basic point in the Śaivas' theory of exclusion is that it depends upon a comparative synthesis, or recognition, of what does and does not fit into categories. The Śaivas contend that the Buddhists cannot account for this, because of their understanding of perceptions and concepts as series of entirely discrete events. Abhinava explains through a rhetorical inquiry:

> There may be this doubt: The pot is seen to have a very particular form. How can there be made the negation of the non-pot by means of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] which depends upon the cognition of the pot? For not even the name of non-pot has been apprehended by anyone. And how can the mental impression of the non-pot be awakened when the pot is seen? True. [However,] the Buddhist is to be censured thus, and not us.[95]

Since the Buddhists cannot even account for exclusion, it would naturally be impossible for them to posit it as the sole basis of reference.

Utpaladeva explains exclusion utilizing the term 'semantic intuition' (*pratibhā*), which for Bhartṛhari along with the Śaivas describes the revelatory unity of reference grounding all interpetation of experience:

> The determinate ascertainment [*niścaya*] of "this" results from the exclusion of the not-this by the cognizer who experiences the intuition [*pratibhā*] of the this and the not-this. This is explained to be conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] [as is expressed]: This is a "pot."[96]

The subject's recognition of reference comprehends similarity as well as difference.[97]

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[95]IPV 1.6.3, 1:309. According to Bhāskara, there is only supposed to be the awakening of the mental impression of that which is similar to an object of cognition. BIPV 1.6.3, 1:308.

[96]IPK 1.6.3, 1:309. Abhinava supports the idea of the subject's comprehension of both the this and the not-this with the analogy of a city reflected in a mirror. IPV 1.6.3, 1:309. Cf. the explanation of *pratibhā* by Abhinavagupta at IPV 1.7.1, 1:352-355. Here he identifies it with the Great Lord/subject having the nature of self-recognition, and asserts its effectuation of both the conjunction and disjunction of things.

[97]I note that the creative freedom evident in *acts of fantasy* (e.g., of an elephant with a hundred tusks and two trunks) is also taken by the Śaivas as demonstrating the

I point out the paradoxical character of the Śaivas' explanation. Exemplifying the logic discussed at the end of the last chapter, they have in effect *explained difference as similarity.*[98] Now, the theory of the Exclusion Śakti is an effort to accept and transfigure an issue in semantics and epistemology. However, we have also seen that for the Pratyabhijñā, illusion is not seeing the monistic reality of Śiva. Because exclusion is understood by the Śaivas along with other Indian philosophers to be intrinsic to gross conceptual construction, it is assimilated to the explanation of the fragmentation of the Lord's self-recognition. In addressing this problematic it is impossible for the Śaivas to avoid bringing in again the concept of illusion. The following passage by Abhinavagupta suggests the identification of the operation of the Exclusion Śakti in discriminating all subjects and objects from other subjects and objects with delusion:

> That which is caused to appear is differentiated from consciousness. Consciousness [is differentiated] from that. One consciousness [is differentiated] from another consciousness. One object of consciousness [is differentiated] from another object of consciousness. That differentiation is not really possible. Thus there is explained to be the mere manifestation of the differentiation. By so much, that [differentiation] is not ultimately real. For this [manifestation] is the ultimate reality of everything which is created. Due to differentiating all around [*paritaśchedanāt*], there is said to be all-around differentiation [*pariccheda*]. The capacity for the manifestation of that is the Semantic Exclusion Śakti.[99]

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principle that all dichotomizing conceptual construction is generated by the Lord's Exclusion Śakti. See IPK and IPV 1.6.10-11, 1:337-343.

[98]Though the Lord's self-recognition synthesizes the exclusion in gross conceptual construction the Śaivas stress that this recognition is not made through it. They deny the possibility of a superimposed alternative to be negated on the basis of the familiar idealistic premise that "there cannot be the manifestation of another, like awareness, which is different [from awareness]." IPK 1.6.2, 1:305. Also see IPV 1.6.1-2, 1:301-308.

[99]IPV 1.3.7, 1:142-143. Cf. Abhinavagupta's benedictory verse to the chapter on exclusion: "We praise Śiva who, through His own will, dividing entities which are a compact mass not different from His own nature with the chisel of semantic exclusion,

The mixture of positive epistemology with illusionism is puzzling. I refer to the discussion of the Śaivas' approaches to the logical problem of the relation of unity and diversity at the end of the last chapter.

Such are the basic outlines of the Pratyabhijñā treatment of semantic exclusion. The reduction of the topic to a form of recognition designated as the Exclusion Śakti again supports the inference for recognizing the identity of the person with the Supreme Lord. Abhinava explains:

> From this investigation of the differentiation of manifestations in connection with [the discussion of] the capacity for internal manifestation—the purpose in this *śāstra* which is the chief thing aimed at [*abhisaṃhita*], having the form of the recognition of the Lord in oneself, is established without exertion, according to the principle that when one thing is demonstrated its correlative is demonstrated.[100]

I have completed my survey of the Śaivas' efforts to demonstrate their theory of recognition in the arena of epistemology. The discussion of memory thematized an important Śaiva premise—that the ordinary experience of the world must be valid, even if it should be "transfigured." The Śaiva arguments are transcendental in that they attempt to show what must be the case in order to account for this experience—as analyzed into the topics covered by the triad of Śaktis. The true identity of the individual as the Supreme Lord is the grounding "limit of" beyond the "limits to" found in the study of the topics. Abhinava sums up the triad:

> There are all worldly behaviors by means of this triad of Śaktis. By this triad of Śaktis of the Blessed One there is the manifestation of Caitra, Maitra, etc., who have the nature of perceiver, rememberer and agent of dichotomizing conceptualization. For it is He who cognizes, remembers and conceptually

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creates diverse forms." IPV 1.6 benedictory verse, 1:299. For a description of the creation of the limited subject distinguished from objects, which invokes both the terms Māyā and Exclusion see IPK and IPV 1.6.4-5, 1:312-323. For a discussion of the discrimination of the pot from the non-pot, such as the self, cloth, etc.—which also invokes both these terms see IPV 1.6.3, 1:309-310.

[100]IPV 1.6.11, 1:341. Cf. IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:301.

> constructs in this and that form. As it has been said by the preceptor: "Although the establishment of objects is concealed by the individual soul as delimited by the vital breaths and psychophysical complex [*puryaṣṭaka*]—nevertheless that [establishment] is [actually] accomplished in the Supreme Self."[101] ... If this is not accepted, nothing can appear. Thus is the undesirable consequence. But it does appear. Therefore, this must necessarily be accepted. Thus is the avoidance of the undesirable consequence.[102]

In the conclusion to the dissertation I will suggest what are the main issues pertinent to a contemporary Western assessment of the plausibility of these epistemological arguments, along with the ontological arguments presented in the next chapter.

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[101]This is APS 20, 8.

[102]IPV 1.3.7, 1:143-145.

CHAPTER 6

FEATURES OF THE ONTOLOGY OF RECOGNITION

> Being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the agency of the act of becoming.[1]
>
> IPKV 1.5.14., 19

> Being is the agency of the act of becoming, that is, the freedom characteristic of an agent regarding all actions.[2]
>
> IPV 1.5.14, 1:258-259

We now turn to the Śaivas' theorization about a group of issues falling under the rubric of the Action Śakti. I am classifying this area as an ontology corresponding to their epistemology of recognition. As the Śaivas' speculation in this domain is vast and complex, this chapter will only be able to point out some of what I consider its most interesting features. I will first introduce what it is that I am describing as ontology, and explain why the Śaiva approach can heuristically be described as a narrative ontology. Then I will discuss the Pratyabhijñā understanding of the abstract structure of action as emanating from unity to unity-in-multiplicity. From this point of view the category of action is placed in a reciprocally comprehending relationship with the more static category of relation. Next I will turn to an aspect of the Śaiva ontology more familiar to

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[1]*sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā...* IPKV 1.5.14., 19.

[2]*sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam.* IPV 1.5.14, 1:258-259.

Western conceptions of narrative. I will show how the Śaivas explain action with the rationalized categories of Sanskrit syntactic theory in order to express the distinctive *tantric* mythico-ritual drama of omnipotence. The philosophical apologetics for this drama is thereby encompassed by it.

First, an introduction to the subject. I am using the classification ontology in the generic sense of reasoning about what is existence or Being, and what are the nature and structure of what exists.[3] The word which I have been translating as action, *kriyā,* is derived from the root *kṛ,* and is a cognate of the English word create. *Kriyā* actually means "creation" as well as "action." The placement of such reasoning under the rubric of the Action Śakti refers primarily to the understanding that it is the Lord's action-production which constitutes what exists. For the Śaivas, this is the mythic action of the emanation of the universe as Śiva-Śakti.

Kriyā furthermore has the important meaning for the Pratyabhijñā system, as it does generally for Sanskritic theological and philosophical discourse, of *ritual action.* Scriptures comprise injunctions about the *kriyās* which are to be done. The interconnectedness of the mythical and ritual meanings for the Śaivas is particularly strong because of their principle of the identity of spiritual means and goal. Readers will be familiar with another derivative from *kṛ, karman.* This is a major Asian, mythically and socially defined, conception or symbol of action as action-and-its results in rebirth.[4]

According to the mainstream of thinking in the Indian linguistic school (Vyākaraṇa) inherited by the Śaivas, the chief unit of meaning is the sentence, and the

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[3]The conception here is much more inclusive than Heidegger's. Ontology, as I understand it, can be distinguished from metaphysics only by a different emphasis.

[4]This word is also used to denote the direct object case in Sanskrit linguistics. The relation of the religious and grammatical meanings will be discussed below.

chief meaning and referent of that is action (*kriyā*).[5] One of the important reasons for this semantic conception is the role of texts in the sacred language of Sanskrit, of prescribing ritual behavior.[6] This semantic conception further reinforces the classification of the discussions of action as ontology. What language refers to depends upon what there is to refer to.

I believe that the Śaiva and related theories of action have some analogy to recently popular Western theories of the intrinsically narrative character of experience. The theory elaborated by Paul Ricoeur is considered by many to be the most sophisticated of these; Ricoeur describes three levels of *mimesis*—ranging from the most basic symbolization of action in ordinary experience, through literary narratives and their application again in experience.[7] A couple of qualifications must be made with the analogy. The Śaiva narrative is simultaneously mythic and ritual. Furthermore, we are not talking preeminently about the narrative character of experience—but unhesitatingly of existence itself. Everything is the action of Śiva-Śakti.

The Pratyabhijñā narrative ontology gives yet another twist to all of the interpretation made so far in this dissertation. Our Western category of ontology may be understood as in a certain way comprehending epistemology. That is, knowledge of

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[5]It is often said that language expresses action by expressing Being (*sattā*) as something to be accomplished through time. See *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 2, 3.8, 1-40, particularly 3.8.27, 22 and 3.8.35, 26. There are alternative semantic theories in India. The Naiyāyika understanding of the sentence, for example, is more similar to the Western conception of predication/qualification.

[6]The "ritualistic" school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā argued extensively for the primacy of ritual injunction in the semantics of sacred texts.

[7]Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative,* 3 vols., trans. Kathleen McLaughlin/Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-1988). Also see Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 39 (September 1971): 291-311; and Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination,* 275-276 and 296-298 n. 81.

various sorts must be assigned some sort of existence.[8] Similarly, cognition is explained by the Śaivas to be a sort of action. Thus Abhinavagupta cites for support a statement of Somānanda "At the time of the cognition of a pot, there is the action 'He knows the pot.'"[9]

Now, the Pratyabhijñā system devotes much more space to the topics falling under the rubric of the Cognition Śakti than to those of the Action Śakti. Also, the two Śaktis are often said to be identical. However, it is of great interest that in several places Abhinavagupta asserts the primacy of the Action Śakti over the Cognition Śakti. Furthermore, he identifies the two respectively with *prakāśa* and *vimarśa!* The following passage expresses the greater importance of Action as *vimarśa* over Cognition as *prakāśa,* at the same time as stressing the ultimate identity of the categories:

> The nature of this [Self] as the Great Lord consists in His having the nature of recognitively judging [*vimṛśad*], the nature of unbroken recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*], the nature of not being dependent on something else, and the nature of a mass of pure bliss. That recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] having the essential nature "I," is the pure and ultimately unitary Cognition and Action [Śaktis] of God [*deva*], who has play, etc.[10] Cognition is the condition of awareness [*prakāśa*]. Action is recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] having the nature of the freedom characteristic of an agent [*svātantrya*].[11] And recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] is introverted awareness [*prakāśa*].[12] Thus Cognition and Action are, on the Supreme level, nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*].... However, cognition is in every way nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. For it has

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8Of course this does not obviate the epistemological question of how we know what exists.

9SD 1.24, 19. Abhinavagupta cites this statement in the course of explaining the ultimately internal nature of the Action Śakti. IPV 1.1.4, 1:74.

10Abhinava is referring to the Lord's cosmic acts.

11Agency will be discussed in the treatment of syntax below.

12That is, it is self-recognition.

been said that without that there would be insentience. And that very [recognitive judgement] is Action.[13]

The bulk of this dissertation has shown that recognition as understood by the Śaivas fully embodies or actualizes the *tantric* myth and ritual at the same time that it is ostensibly universally intelligible. As a transcendental and "essential" process this recognition (*vimarśa*) is constitutive of awareness per se (*prakāśa*). The interpretation of recognition in terms of the Action Śakti further articulates the encompassment of discourse by the Śaiva myth and ritual qua narrative.

Nevertheless, another point must be made in this regard. Although the Śaiva epistemology is framed as an expression of the narrative, the philosophical explanation of action is in key ways parasitic upon the epistemology. The explanation of action relies on the idealistic premises of the emanation of a monistic Consciousness.[14] Thus in talking about action at the ordinary level of experience the Śaivas *conflate the performance of action with the observation of it.* The dependence upon the epistemology will become distinct in our consideration of the Śaivas development of earlier syntactic conceptions to interpret their mythico-ritual narrative.

Before moving to this syntax, I must explain a peculiar aspect of action as understood by the Śaivas, coming from its placement in the structure of emanation. I recall that in the chapter on the prima facie the important features of action identified

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[13]IPV 1.8.11, 1:423-424. Likewise: "Therefore Cognition and Action are not different. Cognition is animated by recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. And Action is nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. And Action does not belong to one devoid of the Cognition Śakti." IPV 3.1.1, 2:215-216. For identifications of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* with Cognition and Action Śaktis, and assertions of the priority of Action, also see IPV 1.1.1, 1:53-54; IPV 1.5.15, 1:237; IPV 1.8 introduction, 1:397-398; IPVV 2.1.2, 3:3; IPV 4.1.4, 2:285-286. On the different forms taken by the Cognition and Action Śaktis in the course of emanation, see IPV 1.1.3, 1:69-70. For further reflection about the ultimate identity of cognition and action, see IPK and IPV 3.1.1, 2:214-216.

[14]It should be clear that in an idealistic system epistemology inevitably functions constitutively in ontology.

by the Buddhists for refutation were: a *unity apprehended in an enduring substratum-object, occurring in a temporal sequence.* It would seem that these are features of a universal commonsensical understanding of action. For the Śaivas, however, action, in its highest nature as the Lord's self-recognition, has no temporal sequence. Thus Utpaladeva states:

> It is possible for ordinary action to have sequence due to the Time Śakti.[15] However, it is not [possible for there to be sequence of] the eternal [action] of the Lord, just as [it is not possible for there to be sequence of] the Lord [Himself].[16]

It is due to admixture with time that the eternal action is emanated into action with its commonsensical features. In fuller accounts, the monistic action is held to be differentiated due to differences of time, place and constitutive form.[17]

Abhinavagupta explains the descent of action from unity to unity-in-multiplicity:

> Therefore, Reality, though unitary by force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], accomodates within Himself contrary divisions of His essential nature. Inasmuch as this is so, they [the divisions], appearing in the form of sequence due to their contrareity, turn that [Reality] into the unitary substratum of action.[18]

The following pasage describes the recognition of action at the empirical level:

> When, from the force of the awareness [*prakāśa*] which is firm recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] there is the apprehension "This is essentially the same hand," then [it is the case that both] there is not a difference of the body, and also there appears a diversity of forms which because of their contrareity cannot exist in the

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[15]The Time Śakti will be mentioned again below.

[16]IPK 2.1.2, 2:10. Also see on this point IPV 2.1.2, 2:9-11; IPK and IPV 2.1.6-7, 2:19-23; IPV 2.1.8, 2:23-29; IPK 3.1.1, 1:214.

[17]See IPV 2.2.1, 2:33-34. Here the Śaivas are again accomodating the semantics of Bhartṛhari within their theistic vision. Cf. the following statement: "That [action] is without sequence due to its unity. It is is experienced as having before and after by means of the qualification of it [*dharmena tadarthena*] by what is before and after." *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 2, 3.8.18, 18.

[18]IPV 2.1.1, 2:9. (Part of this passage was quoted in the fourth chapter.) On the temporal fragmentation of the Lord's action, also see IPV 2.1 introduction, 2:5-6; IPVV 2.1.1-2, 3:2-4; IPK and IPV 2.2.2, 2:35-40.

> same essential form [i.e., the body at a particular time]. This [diversity of the unitary] is explained to be action.[19]

In its emanatory structure the Śaiva conception of action overlaps with another of their fundamental ontological conceptions, relation. It will be recalled that relation was repudiated by the Buddhists in basically the same manner as action—as an unsubstantiated and illogical unification of multiplicity. Relation is unity-in-multiplicity per se. Utpaladeva defines relation:

> Entities which exist in themselves and appear separately obtain unity as reciprocal connection in the unitary subject. This is the basis of the conception of relation [*sambandha*].[20]

The diversity comprehended by relation is again made on the basis of differences in the times, places and constitutive forms of the *relata*.[21] As in the case of action (and as was explained at the end of the fourth chapter), the unity and multiplicity of relation are understood to reside in different spheres. Abhinava explains: "Multiplicity is external. However, unity through the reciprocal connection of forms is internal. Such is the nature of relation [*sambandha*]."[22] In its static character, relation may be understood *as the most abstract ontological category for the referent of the transcendental recognition.*[23]

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[19]IPV 2.1.5, 2:17. This translation incorporates some of that of Pandey, IPV 2.1.5, 3:123. Cf. the similar explanation of a man's action of walking at IPV 2.2.1, 2:33-34.

[20]IPK 2.2.4, 2:49.

[21]IPK 2.2.2, 2:36.

[22]IPV 2.2.4, 2:50.

[23]The Śaivas' theory of relation is also largely developed from ideas of Bhartṛhari. For Bhartṛhari the root relation is that of word and object. This is a kind of approximation of the unity of word and object in the Word Absolute. The semantic idea is present in the Śaiva account, but I cannot do justice to it now. (I only list it as an example below.) In any case, the Śaivas generalize Bhartṛhari's conception to describe the structure of unity-in-multiplicity. Bhartṛhari's discussion is found in the

In the following passage Abhinavagupta places relation in the position of the fundamental ontological category generated by the Action Śakti:[24]

> This is the order of the descent of consciousness: Every movement/manifestation [*visphāra*] here results solely from the Action Śakti. In this the root is nothing but relation [*sambandha*].... Only sometimes this relation [*sambandha*] endures the knot of other designations.... However, when there is the destruction of the knot of other designations, then it is only correct to speak of relation [*sambandha*].... Thus the diverse affairs of the world are completely dependent upon relation [*sambandha*].[25]

The Śaivas reduce a number of other categories to relation on the basis of its metaphysical necessity. Thus it is relation which connects the words with their objects.[26] Although, as we have seen, the Lord's Action Śakti is said to generate relation—action is itself included as an example of relation. Action is a unity of an individual, such as the person Devadatta, across places, times and forms.[27] From a linguistic viewpoint, action is the relation between all the inflected nouns in the

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Sambandhasamuddeśa, in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 1, 3.3, 122-182. Utpaladeva focuses on relation in his SS, 1-15.

[24] I have taken out of the passage several examples of relation. These and others will be discussed shortly.

[25] IPV 2.2.4, 2:46-49. Abhinava continues by quoting the first benedictory verse of Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi:* "We praise that Śiva, through whose will there is the creation [*kṛti*] of worldly affairs, which is accomplished through all things possessing relation, the nature of which is differentiation and nondifferentiation." SS Intr.vs. 1, 1. Abhinava likewise elsewhere describes relation as "the yawning open of the Action Śakti," IPV 2.2.6, 2:57; and "the chief expanding-manifestation of the Action Śakti," IPV 2.4 introduction, 2:151.

[26] See IPV 2.2.4, 2:47 and IPV 2.2.6, 2:55.

[27] IPV 2.2.4, 2:47.

sentence.[28] A universal is a unity belonging to a diversity of things which are similar.[29] A whole is a unity of different parts occupying different places.[30]

The great differentiator, time, is itself explained as a relation. Time is *the relation of difference between manifestations of something in the course of action.* Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta further point out that the (relational) changes of regular duration such as those of the sun and the moon and seasons are used to measure the changes of irregular duration such as going or reading.[31] As has already been seen, the Śaivas define the capacity of the Lord for the generation of temporal sequence as His Time Śakti.[32]

Locations and directions are relations between material objects existing at the same time. For example, they are before, behind, near or far from each other.[33] Other categories stated by Abhinavagupta to be relations are grammatical cases,

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[28]See IPK 2.2.6, 2:54 and IPV 2.2.6, 2:54-55. More will be said about syntax shortly.

[29]IPV 2.2.4, 2:47. I have already discussed in the previous chapter the Śaivas' use of their theory of the transcendental nature of recognition to reverse the Buddhist understanding of the cognitions of universals and particulars. It is unfortunately not possible for me at present to work out systematically the relations of universals and particulars to the broad frameworks of action and relation.

[30]IPV 2.2.4, 2:47.

[31]Unfortunately it is not possible for me now to go further into the Śaivas' interesting ideas about time. See the discussions of the nature of time, its classification as relation, and its recognitive synthesis at IPK and IPV 2.1.3-5, 2:11-19; IPV 2.2.4, 2:47; IPV 2.2.6, 2:56-57; IPVV 1.4.3, 2:37.

[32]IPK 2.1.2, 2:10; IPV 2.1.2, 2:10-11; IPV 2.1.4, 2:14-16.

[33]See IPV 2.2.4, 2:47; IPV 2.2.6, 2:55.

measurements of number, size and weight, and the Hindu realists' categories of inherence and conjunction.[34]

Having observed the structure of the homologous frameworks of action and relation as emanating unity-in-multiplicity, we may now turn to more familiarly narrative aspects of the Śaiva ontology. What I wish to show is that the Pratyabhijñā system carries forward in its ostensibly universal discourse the *syntax* characteristic of the monistic Śaiva mythico-ritual narrative. This syntax is deliberately articulated in the terms of scholastic grammatical theory about the structure of Sanskrit sentences.

Here I will explain some elementary ideas from Sanskritic theory on syntax.[35] As has been said, *kriyā* designates the action expressed by the verb. The word roughly corresponding to our notion of grammatical case is *kāraka*. The six *kārakas* parallel our ideas of nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative and ablative. However, the concept of *kāraka* is more subtle than case per se. *Kārakas* are categories bridging in a

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[34]IPV 2.2.4, 2:47-49; IPV 2.2.6, 2:56-58.

[35]Most of the ideas explained in this section and below may be found in *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika (P.1.4.23-1.4.55),* ed. with introduction, translation and notes by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen (Pune: University of Poona, 1975). Also see the *Kriyāsamuddeśa,* in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 2, 3.8, 1-40, and the *Sādhanasamuddeśa,* in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 1, 3.7, 230-370. Some of the more important secondary studies are: K.A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari: A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries* (Pune: Deccan College, 1969), 283-344; Rosane Rocher, "'Agent' et 'objet' chez Pāṇini," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 84 (1964): 44-54; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (*Vākya*)," *Foundations of Language* 2 (1966): 377-393; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic," *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* 17 (1960): 63-69; Frits Staal, "Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini," *Foundations of Language* 5 (1969): 83-117; George Cardona, "Pāṇini's Syntactic Categories," *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda* 16 (1967), 202-215; George Cardona, "Pāṇini's *Kārakas:* Agency, Animation and Identity, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1974): 231-306; Edwin Gerow, "What is Karma (Kiṃ Karmeti): An Exercise in Philosophical Semantics," *Indologica Taurinensia* 10 (1982): 87-116.

special way the areas of semantics and syntax. They describe various logical relationships of nouns (to which there are added modifications) to the main action expressed by a verb. The same *kāraka* may actually be expressed in more than one case. The genitive is not even considered a *kāraka,* as it usually expresses relationships between nouns.

The word *kāraka* is a derivative from the same root as the word action (*kṛ*), having the causal significance of 'actor, maker, factor.' The *kārakas* are understood as functioning to accomplish the action expressed by the verb. From this point of view, the action is said to be 'that which is to be established' (*sādhya*) and the *kārakas* are 'establishers' (*sādhana*). Take the typical example: "He cooks rice in the pot with fire." The pot contains the rice and water. The fire heats them, and the pot contains them. The rice, i.e., the direct object expressed in the accusative, is explained to be the locus of the result (*phala*) of the action of cooking. This result is a transformation of the nature of the rice. In contemporary scholarship on Sanskrit, the *kārakas* are sometimes described as 'syntactico-semantic categories.' To give them the significance of what accomplishes the action, I would rather use the gloss 'syntactico-semantic factors.'

In accordance with its general emphases on language and action, Sanskritic speculation about many philosophical topics often has recourse to considerations about these factors. Such discussions may be taken as efforts of the different schools to structure reality and experience with their converging and diverging mythico-ritual narratives.

On the premise that all intellectual expressions maintain associations with narrative (in the broadest sense of symbolized action), I suggest a particular line of comparative-systematic reflection. A preliminary idea of such reflection may be taken from the theory of Dramatism developed by Kenneth Burke in his *Grammar of*

Motives.[36] I do not wish to go into the idiosyncrasies of Burke's scheme (which I do not always agree with). Rather I would like to take from him the basic approach of typifying intellectual strategies, even of the philosophical variety, on the basis of a corresponding narrative syntax.

Burke analyzed a set of "motives" which might be called transcendental to any genre articulating narrative. These are the grammatical terms of scene, agent, act, agency (i.e., instrument) and purpose. For the inquiry being developed here, these motives may be taken as analogous to *kārakas.* They are a set of syntactico-semantic factors necessary to the narrative of life.[37] According to Burke, different litarary and intellectual expressions tend to emphasize or "feature" particular motives at the expense of the others.

The quantitative and qualitative relationships between the sorts of syntactico-semantic factors in question actually would seem endless. Such relationships certainly are discussed in numerous ways in India. What I wish to do is sketch the way the Śaivas

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[36]Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

[37]Our agenda does not require a detailed analysis of the numerous similarities and differences between the schemes. However, I will make a few observations. A basic difference is that Burke is developing a sentence-based idea of grammar as applying to narative, while *kāraka* is firstly a term of sentence analysis. An interesting parallel may be observed between the causal significance of *kāraka* and that of motive. Burke actually attempts to ground his motives in Aristotle's causes. Obvious differences in the terms themselves are that Burke excludes an ablative, and lists the act itself as a motive. After having already developed the ideas presented in this section, I discovered the following: The use of terminology for dramatical roles is applied to understanding the sentence by D. Terence Langendon. The roles are actually used to describe semantic relationships which are turned into syntactic relationships through transformational rules. D. Terence Langendon, *Essentials of English Grammar* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 61ff. This approach in turn is suggested as a way of understanding *kārakas* by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, introduction to *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika,* iii-iv.

utilize earlier syntactic theory within their philosophy in order to interpret the Lord's transcendental self-recognition. The Śaiva syntax gives the agent *kāraka* a special status, and *reduces* to it the action and the other *kārakas.*[38] This grammar retells in a philosophically rationalized form the *tantric* mythico-ritual drama of the omnipotent subject Śiva cre-ating (emanating) the universe through Śakti. The particular direction of explanation taken by the Śaivas is quite distinct from that of the mainstream orthodox Indian philosophical systems, Hindu as well as Buddhist, which have particular ways of denigrating the agent.

Before turning to the agent-based syntax, I will briefly summarize some of the ways in which Sanskrit grammatical theory has provided justifications for the denigration of the agent. Firstly, the agent is devalued in the same manner as all of the other *kārakas.* As I have said, action is the chief meaning and referent of language. All of the *kārakas* are accessories helping to accomplish that action which is to be accomplished (*sādhya*).

In his study of *karman,* Edwin Gerow places the point just mentioned in a more complicated pattern of considerations which syntactically subordinate the agent.[39] Thus, on the one hand, the word *karman* means action. On the other, it designates the *kāraka* indicating the direct object, which is (usually) expressed in the accusative case. As stated above, the direct object is understood to receive the result (*phala*) of the verbal process (*vyāpāra*).

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[38]Burke also emphasizes that it is idealism which stresses or features the agent. Burke, *Grammar,* 171-226. This classification would not work, I note, for many other kinds of Indian idealism, e.g., the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntin. There are many aspects of Burke's characterization of idealism which I believe are wrong, e.g., its rather exclusive emphasis on the character of idealism as legitimation.

[39]Gerow, "What is Karma."

Gerow points towards a strong tendency in Indian linguistics and philosophy to identify the verbal process with the result. The reasoning for this identification is complex. However, it may be stated briefly that the case of intransitive verbs, which to us would seem exceptional, became paradigmatic. In "He sits" the sitting is a unity of both process and result. The meaning of the word *karman* as both action and direct object articulates the identity.

Furthermore, explains Gerow, the unitary nexus of process and result, came to be understood as the dominant feature of syntax. This is observed in a proclivity in Sanskrit to use passive constructions—a proclivity which in itself emphasizes the agent's accessory status. Now, in passive syntax, the verb agrees with the *karman*. E.g., "The rice is cooked by him." In Gerow's interpretation, the culmination of the patterns of thinking mentioned here is a treatment of what would seem to us the oddest case, passive intransitive syntax, as most paradigmatic. Thus "It is sat (by him)." The process-result is featured strongly.

According to Gerow, this grammatical understanding is *the same* as the religious conception of *karman* as a chain of process and result extending across lives. The agent is seen as a kind of adjunct bound within the nexus. Though Gerow makes some cautionary remarks, I believe that the tone of his study too strongly suggests the notion that syntax actually causes world view. Where is the evidence for that? The range of ideas about *karman* in Indian history is simply far too vast to be explained this way. However, Gerow has pointed out an important homology about which Western scholars previously had very little awareness.

A widely divergent group of philosophical and theological systems do think in precisely the way he identifies, using grammar to support their views. There is a tendency to look at the agent as a slave to the syntax. I believe that this pattern of thinking articulates the agent's subordination to the order of objective ritual behavior in

orthodox Hindu society as well as bondage to action and result of action in rebirth—for both Hindus and Buddhists.

Support is accorded to this mode of explanation by Alexis Sanderson's study of the conceptions of human identity in Hindu orthodox and *tantric* traditions in Kashmir.[40] Sanderson takes a sociological rather than a grammatical angle. However, his analysis is based on the very texts discussing the syntax of action—and his discussion of the denigration of agency directly parallels what has been explained here.[41] Sanderson particularly focuses on the extreme but divergent approaches to denigrating agency of the orthodox traditions of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta. We will briefly look at the understandings of agency in each of these traditions to provide a contrast with that of the Śaivas.[42]

The case of the orthodox ritualistic system of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is particularly interesting. The Mīmāṃsakas actually stress the importance of the role of the agent in carrying out ritual injunctions. However, the agent is "depersonalized" in various ways. As with most Indians traditions, he is subject to *karman* as action and result in rebirth. More specifically, he must follow the injunctions to perform rituals. Salvation comes from performing rituals which *completely transcend all worldly purpose.* Sanderson explains:

> This contradiction, that of the "solipsistic conformist," was his self-representation as ritual agent. The notion of autonomous agency individualised the person, but his determination by a world of revealed duties, his wish to conform to the

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[40]I have already referred to Sanderson, "Purity."

[41]Sanderson also emphasizes the symbolism of purity associated with conceptions which denigrate agency.

[42]For the sake of convenience, I will follow Sanderson on the former, but give my own (similar) interpretation of the latter. If time permitted, a number of examples could be provided from the texts of both traditions.

Brahmanical ideal, depersonalized this individual, purging him of all independent motivations.[43]

I will take Śaṅkara as the representative of Advaita Vedānta because his name is so well known in the West. Śaṅkara is thoroughly grounded in the ritualistic school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. He rigidly defends the orthodox Hindu patterns of behavior. However I would say that he is equally terrified of them. For him an agent is inexorably subordinated to the syntax of acting and enjoying results. Śaṅkara thus systematically rejects the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā process of exegesis and ritual action as a the way to ultimate salvation. He divorces the saving knowledge of the real Self/Brahman from agency and action. The following passages from the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* are typical:

> We accept [as opposed to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā] that the knowledge of the Self does not pertain to something which is to be done. It is not for the purpose of avoiding or pursuing [anything]. Our excellence [*alaṃkāra*] is [maintaining that] when there is the realization of the Self as Brahman there is the abandonment of everything which has to be done, and the completion of what has to be done.[44]

> "I am Brahman, which is completely different from that [limited self] known previously as agent and enjoyer, and is neither agent nor enjoyer in any of the three times [i.e., past, present and future]. Thus previously I was neither agent nor enjoyer. Nor am I now. Nor will I be at a future time." This is what one who knows Brahman realizes. Only thus is liberation possible. For otherwise, if there were no destruction of the *karmas* which have been proceeding for beginningless time, there would be no liberation.[45]

The valuation of subordination to action in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the attempt to escape from the same in Advaita Vedānta indicate the diversity of ways of proceeding from the same or similar assumptions. Sanderson also observes that there are moderate

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[43]Sanderson, "Purity," 196.

[44]Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimiśra, Amalānandasarasvatī and Appayyadīksita. *The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya: With the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala,* 2 vols., ed. K.L. Joshi (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987), 1.1.4, 1:130.

[45]Ibid., 4.1.13, 2:954. Cf. 3.4.16, 2:876.

devaluations of agency in the "middle ground," e.g., of Vaiṣṇavas.[46] Of course, the mainstream Buddhist positions completely deny the existence of a self. I have said enough to provide a foil to the Śaiva conceptions.

The Śaivas utilize their theory of recognition to develop a syntax which directly reverses the direction of thinking observed by Gerow. In this they strongly emphasize a number of earlier considerations found in Indian linguistic theory about the syntactic *importance* of the agent. The alternatives provided by these considerations were not given sufficient attention by Gerow.

I will summarize the grammatical conceptions of the special role of the agent which were most important to the Śaivas. As I have explained, all of the *kārakas* are understood to function in accomplishing the overall action or process (*vyāpāra*) expressed by the verb. They do this through their own *subordinate processes.* The pan *holds* the rice, the fire *heats* it, etc. More complicated sets of subordinate processes could easily be envisioned. Where are all the subordinate processes synthesized into the larger one? This is understood to be accomplished by the agent, who is the locus of the overall process (*vyāpārāśraya*).

Furthermore, it is the agent who is instigator (*prayojaka*) of all of the subordinate processes comprising the larger one. He arranges the equipment, lights and controls the fire, etc.[47] Sometimes further subjective factors in this instigation are identified. The Naiyāyikas in particular stress that the agent has the intention (*icchā*) and makes the effort (*yatna*) which brings about the action. The followers of Pāṇini state that the direct object (*karma*), as receiving the result of the process, is that which is most desired by (*īpsitatama*) by the agent.

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[46]Sanderson, "Purity," 197-198.

[47]In this respect, there are analogies between the ordinary agent and the agent of the causative conjugation.

I will make one more point. While the agent controls the processes of the other *kārakas,* no other *kāraka* has a similar influence on him. The other *kārakas* are 'determined by another' (*paratantra*), but he is 'self-determined' or 'free' (*svatantra*) with regard to their operations.

The Śaivas formulate of the agent an absolutely fundamental place in syntax by interpreting all of the special characteristics just mentioned in terms of their idealistic theory of the Lord's self-recognition. These characteristics are asserted to belong to the Lord as cre-ator through recognition. Thus the agent's role as substratum of the overall process is interpreted in terms of the synthetic function of recognition. The agent's instigating intention (*icchā*) and freedom (*svātantrya*) are the Lord's will to emanate. The reader will recall the explanation that for the Śaivas action, in its highest nature as the Lord's self-recognition, has no temporal sequence. It is precisely the agent who is the higher nature of action.[48] These identifications are exemplified in the following explanation by Abhinavagupta, which uses the analogy of ordinary agency to elucidate that of the Lord:

> Here [according to this system], action is really nothing but the Supreme Lord's agential intention [*icchā*], which is not dependent on another, and has the nature of unbroken self-recognition [*svātmāparamarśa*] which has the form of unobstructed agential freedom [*svātantrya*].... The inner agential intention [*icchā*] of Caitra or Maitra, etc., "I cook" is action. Thus, even when there is relation [*sambandha*] of him with numerous movements such as putting something on the fire, etc., the [intention] "I cook" is unfragmented. It is nothing but the intention [*icchā*] "I cook" which appears as such movements. However there is really no sequence in this [intention]. Likewise is that recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] of the Lord having the nature of agential intention [*icchā*] such as is expressed "I Lord," "I appear," "I vibrationally appear [*sphurāmi*]," "I cosmogonically agitate [ghūrṇe]," "I recognitively judge [*pratyavamṛśāmi*]." The essential nature [of such recognitive judgement] is nothing but "I," and it has no sequence."[49]

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[48]There are no indications that Bhartṛhari identifies the higher, non-sequential nature of action with the agent.

[49]IPV 2.1.8, 2:24-25.

Thus there is a reductionism in a direction opposite to that which Gerow observed. In a sentence such as "Devadatta cooks rice in the pan with wood," the factors such as the pan, wood and rice appear (*prakāśante*) as merged in the action. The action in turn rests (*āśritām*) in the agent.[50] According to the Śaivas, even action which seems to be situated primarily in the object is actually located in the agent through His unifying recognitive synthesis.[51]

The Śaivas' ontological syntax may be further elucidated by considering some of their theorization about the relation of cause and effect.[52] To begin, the term most frequently used for cause in discussions of causality is *kāraṇa*. This word is situated in syntax in the position of the *kāraka* called *karaṇa,* which corresponds to our instrumental case.[53] It is conceived as the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*) operating in the accomplishment of an action. The effect is the result (*phala*) which is understood to occur in the direct object (*karman*).

The Śaivas subsume the cause-effect relation within their idealistic agential syntax. Through His recognitive synthesis, the agent is the substratum of the overarching verbal process which contains the subordinate operations of the other *kārakas.* As it is He who connects what is ordinarily considered the cause with the effect in the object—it is He who is the real cause. Utpaladeva puts this densely:

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[50]SS 74,9.

[51]IPVV 2.4.5, 3:189-190.

[52]Unfortunately I cannot do justice here to the Śaivas' elaborate discussion of causality. I can only point out some of the key ways in which they structure the subject with their understanding of syntax. Causality is the focus of the whole of IPK and IPV 2.4, 2:150-209.

[53]For elucidation of the correspondence of *kāraṇa* and *karaṇa*, see Matilal, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic."

> That [Action] Śakti, which is the existence [*sattā*] of both [moments of cause and effect, which are at different times] existent [*sat*] and nonexistent [*asat*], does not belong to the insentient. Therefore the cause-effect [*kāryakāraṇa*] relation has the nature of the agent-direct object [*kartṛkarma*] relation.[54]

In the following passage of his commentary, Abhinavagupta more fully explains the Lord's instigation and synthesis of the different moments through His Action Śakti, using the example of germination:

> The insentient seed does not have the capacity to make either a nonexistent or an existent sprout have such existence that it is experienced. The sprout is born from the seed. In this there is no power of the sprout because it does not exist. The sprout is born. How can there be the power of the seed in this, since it is other than the sprout? Since it is so, therefore the effect [*kārya*] is only the direct object [*karma*] being manifested through the Action Śakti. This is seen in the gerundive suffix [used to derive the word for effect, *kārya*, from the verb for action, *kṛ*]. [The effect] is caused to be brought about by Him. [He is the] agent by reason of exercising the capacity for this.[55] Therefore the cause [*kāraṇa*] rests in consciousness [*cetana*], which is the agent [*kartṛ*].[56]

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[54]IPK 2.4.2, 2:153. Abhinavagupta is not sure exactly how to take Utpaladeva's reference to the existent and the nonexistent. In my translation, I have taken the assertion as indicating the fact that the successive moments of an action, and thus the constituent "processes" of cause and effect, become existent and then nonexistent. The action is the Being (*sattā*) which unifies these moments. This interpretation seems to be supported by the following statement of Bhartṛhari: "Therefore that which is nonexistent [*asat*] has disappeared. And that which is existent [*sat*] is experienced. [*Action*] is understood as the seemingly unitary essential nature [*ātman*] of the existent [*sat*] and the nonexistent [*asat*]." *Vākyapadīya*, 3.8.19, 18. Another possibility is that Utpaladeva is asserting the inadequacy of both the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya theories of causality. According to the former, the effect preexists in the cause, and arises as a sort of transformation of it. (This view will be discussed further below.) According to the latter, the effect is nonexistent in the cause, and "emerges" as something new. For Abhinava's discussion of the alternative interpretations, see IPV 2.4.2, 2:154 and IPVV 2.4.2, 3:186. Also see BIPV 2.4.2, 2:154. In any case the basic point expressed by Utpaladeva regarding the role of the agent remains the same.

[55]The translation here is uncertain.

[56]IPV 2.4.2, 2:153-154. I note that Utpaladeva explains the Lord's creation of things through His agential intention (*icchā*) at IPK 2.4.1, 2:152. Abhinavagupta epitomizes this verse as also asserting that the relation of cause and effect is nothing but the relation of agent and direct object. IPV 2.4 introduction, 2:151. Cf. the explanation more focused on the idealistic character of causality at IPK 2.4.4, 2:153.

Because of the dependence of the Śaivas' conception of agency on their monistic idealism, the apparently unconscious process of a sprout arising from a seed is really not different from the conscious process of a potter making a pot. The Lord manifests from Himself the seed, along with the additional necessities such as earth and water—and then the sprout.[57] Also, it is ultimately the Lord Himself, and not the potter qua limited individual, who makes the pot. The Lord manifests the potter, the tools and materials, and their activities. Abhinava places the process in the monistic idealistic perspective with the analogy of the reflection in a mirror of a potter making a pot.[58]

The Śaivas elaborate some of the same basic syntactic considerations to produce an interesting refutation of the Buddhist logicians' understanding of causation as "dependent origination." It will be recalled that this theory was interpreted in the third chapter as a minimal phenomenalist reconstruction of the raw data behind the causal relationship. According to it, causality is a mere regularity of succession between evanescent entities, without any continuous or substantial "connection" between them. Such causality may be described in the manner "When there is this, then there is this."[59] Now, this expression in Sanskrit uses the grammatical construction which in English is called the "locative absolute."

The Śaivas interpret the regular priority and posteriority expressed with the locative construction as a sort of expectation (*apekṣā*) between the moments. They contend that such an expectation could not exist between discrete entities which in

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[57]This is spelled out at IPVV 2.4.8, 3:192.

[58]See IPV 1.8.9, 1:411; IPV 2.4.4, 2:157-159; and IPV 2.4.9, 2:169-170.

[59]I.e., *asmin satīdam asti.*

themselves lack recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*).[60] Here is another terse statement by Utpaladeva:

> The cause-effect relation [formulated by the Buddhists as dependent origination expressed] "When there is this, then there is this"—cannot belong to insentient things, which are devoid of expecation [*apekṣā*]. For the referents of the seventh case cannot be supposed to be those [insentient things] which are situated only in themselves and are devoid of recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*], whether they are existent [*sat*] or nonexistent [*asat*].[61]

In his commentary Abhinava again invokes the Śaiva interpretations of the syntactic principles regarding the agent as free and as substratum uniting the constituent processes of the *kārakas* in the overarching process. It is He who unites what is expressed in the locative with what is expressed in the main clause:

> The meaning of the seventh [i.e., locative] or other declension, defined as the relation between the syntactico-semantic factor and the action [*kriyākārakabhāva*], is the regular succession [*samanvaya*] of things. There is no other dry[62] [relation]. That [relation] is possible if the pair of things [*bhāvādvaya*] rest on [He] who is agentially free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness, and not otherwise.... Therefore, when there is rest on the subject [*pramātṛ*] who is agentially free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness, all this—such as "When there is seed, there is sprout" and "Where there is fire, there is smoke"—is possible. And not otherwise.[63]

For the Śaivas there is no unrelated component of the sentence. All syntax is related through the agent.

We see that in the discussions of causality the agent's ability, as substratum and instigator, to unite the processes of cause and effect is crucial. It will be useful for us to

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[60]See IPV 2.4.14, 2:188; IPVV 2.4.14, 3:218.

[61]IPK 2.4.14-15, 2:187-190. See the discussion of the qualifications existent and nonexistent above.

[62]It is notable that Abhinava refers to other relations as 'dry' (*śuṣka*). Bhāskara glosses this term as *niḥsāra*, 'without essence,' and lists as examples conjunction (*saṃyoga*), etc. It is clear that Abhinava's "moist" relationship is that which involves subjective action.

[63]IPV 2.4.16, 2:192-193.

look at the Śaivas' treatment of one additional causal theory, that of Sāṃkhya.[64] According to the Sāṃkhya thinkers, an effect is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a *continuous* underlying material cause (*pradhāna, prakṛti*).[65] The Śaivas applaud the Sāṃkhya assertion of the continuity between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta describes the Sāṃkhyas as "having long-ranging insight" and "resorting to recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)."[66] However they disagree with the Sāṃkhya understanding of the underlying material cause as insentient matter. Transformation is an action extending across different moments. For the Śaivas, the different moments of the action of transformation can only be synthesized and instigated by a conscious agent. Here is an excerpt from Abhinavagupta's argument that the material cause must be a conscious agent:

> Action is explained to be a difference, that is,[67] a reciprocal differentiation of forms, of that unitary essential nature which is unitary due to the force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. For it is accompanied by sequence, which is the characteristic of time. These mutually different forms do not appear simultaneously. Action is said to be nothing but the condition of forms being prior and posterior. Since action is so, therefore, "in that way," the material cause [*pradhāna*] has agency, because it is characterized by a particular Action. It does not have a mere dry causality....[68] The [material cause] [*pradhāna*] always enters into the action having the character of transformation ... in a sequence of various forms such as *mahat*, etc.[69] Therefore it has the condition of One who transforms

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[64]As asserted above, Utpaladeva may have briefly expressed disagreement with the Sāṃkhya account in IPK 2.4.2, 2:153.

[65]The Sāṃkhya doctrine is also called *satkāryavāda*. This refers to the idea that the effect preexists in the material cause.

[66]IPV 2.4.18, 2:194-195.

[67]Abhinava is explaining the verse.

[68]Cf. the discussion of "dry" relations above.

[69]Abhinava is referring to the Sāṃkhya technical conceptions of the various transformations of the material cause. These are not important here.

> [*pariṇamattā*].... The material cause abandons and establishes the different forms ... and has the intention [*prahvatā*] towards a third....[70]

I will now summarize the significance of the discussion of causality in the larger context of the Śaiva ontology. I have explained that the Śaivas understand ontology in terms of a mythico-ritual narrative, describing an action which is ultimately untouched by time and a self-identical expression of agency. Causality pertains to what is involved in the bringing about of a result. This finally is a question of what constitutes its existence. The answer is that the existence of anything is the eternal agency of its cre-ation. Abhinava explains:

> Thus the meaning of "The pot exists" is that the Great Lord exists as awareness, while desiring to exist as as the pot and assuming that existence through His agential freedom [*svātantrya*]....[71]

The statements quoted at the beginning of this chapter directly equate Being with this agency. Thus we may say that the Śaivas develop corresponding to their epistemology of recognition an "eternalizing agential mythico-ritual narrative ontology" or "monistic theistic ontology"—or perhaps a better summary would be simply "agential ontology"!

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[70]IPV 2.4.18, 2:196-197. The translation of the last sentence is rough, but the idea is clear for our purposes. See the discussion of the Sāṃkhya view throughout IPK and IPV 2.4.17-19, 2:193-200. The thinkers argue that only a conscious agent can logically arbitrate unity and multiplicity at IPK and IPV 2.4.19, 2:197-200. The Śaivas' emanationism is a distinctive *satkāryavāda* of Consciousness. I mention that the Śaivas' refutation of the doctrine of causality of Advaita Vedānta also invokes syntax. Abhinavagupta explains that Advaita Vedānta cannot explain the creation of the universe because the conscious subject it admits lacks self-recognition (*parāmarśa*) in the form of agential intention (*icchā*) and freedom (*svātantrya*). See IPK and IPV 2.4.20, 2:201-206. I am not going into this discussion in more detail, because I believe that the Advaita Vedānta has first to be forced to enter the discussion of the syntax of creation (as opposed to the syntax of actions in the illusory world) through non-syntactic considerations. In various contexts the Śaivas do refute Advaita as regards its denial of ordinary experience, its doctrine of the ontological status of the world as inexplicable, and its difficulty of specifying the subject of ignorance.

[71]IPV 2.4.21, 2:207.

I believe that I have sufficently explained the basic syntactic and emanatory features of the Śaiva ontology. However, our picture will be more complete if I develop to the same level a theme from the beginning of this chapter. It was explained that epistemology is in a sense comprehended in the ontology. Processes of knowing must be accorded some sort of existence. The Śaivas thus talk about cognition as action. Now, the Śaivas frequently explain processes of knowing in terms of their syntax. Because the ontology is itself dependent on the idealistic epistemology, these discussions do not cover entirely new territory. However, a few examples will be useful.

To proceed, the Śaivas frame the operation of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) within their syntax. The word for means of cognition, *pramāṇa,* is derived in the same way, and has the same syntactic function as the *kāraka* usually used to express the cause, i.e., *karaṇa*. The *pramāṇa* is the most efficient means for the accomplishment of the action of cognizing. The cognition is the result (*phala*) of the process (*vyāpāra*) of cognizing the object of cognition. The relation between means of cognition and cognition thus parallels that between cause and effect. In the following passage Abhinavagupta places both in the synthetic nexus of the agent's self-recognition:

> That essential condition of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*], which has been established previously to be inwardly directed [as self-recognition], when it is contracted into the condition of [having apparently separate] objects, is that very cognition which is the result [*phala*]. For, it is just as the two conditions of bravery and victory, which are situated in one [agent] in the awareness "I who am brave have become victorious" are distinguished by one engaged in analysis in the cause-result relation: "Since I am brave, I am victorious." Similarly [there is the analysis] that, since there is the awareness [i.e., the cause or means of cognition] of blue, therefore there is the judgement [*parāmarśa*] 'This is blue.' Thus, even though there is really a unitary nature, there is [understood to be] a cause-effect [*hetu-phala*] relation.[72]

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[72]IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:74-75.

What are normally regarded as cognitive means and effect are equally reduced to subjective conditions.[73]

Aside from the discussion of *pramāṇas* per se, there is also a large set of examples where the Śaivas reinterpret expressions of cognitive states in forms which uncover the syntactic role of the agent. Thus Abhinava glosses the sentence "The blue appears to me [*mama nīlam bhāti*]" as "The blue is cognized by me [*mayā nīlam jñāyate*]"[74] Likewise Utpaladeva explains regarding the memory of an earlier experience:

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[73]I note that in this analysis the Śaivas are subverting and reformulating within their own syntax the Buddhist understanding of means of cognition. As we have seen, the Buddhists believe that action is an invalid projection on experience. Thus they completely identify the means (*pramāṇa*) with the result of cognition itself (*pramā*), thereby claiming artificial the notion of a process (*vyāpāra*) connecting them. At IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:75, Abhinavagupta cites *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.309, 193 on the means-result identity. For a discussion of the Buddhist theory as denying the essential features of action-syntax (which I observe necessarily articulates non-syntax with reference to syntax), see Nandita Bandyopadhyay, "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Pramā and Pramāṇa," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979), 43-78. This Buddhist conception may be understood as a non-agential formulation of *esse est percipi*. (It also instantiates in a particular epistemological context, and in a radical form, the general syntactic trajectory exposited by Gerow.) While accepting the Buddhist idealism, the Śaivas place it within the processual nexus of an enduring cognitive agent. See the discussion at IPV 2.3.1-2, 2:73-76. Though it further complicates the picture, I mention that the Śaivas also express in terms of syntax their transformation of the partial "objectivity" admitted by Buddhist logic. This admission comes from the more Sautrāntika-influenced direction of thinking in the Buddhist system. We might say that phenomenalism presents the idealistic unity of *esse* and *percipi* as a series of evanescent object-experiences. Abhinava explains that it is by demonstrating that there is the establishment of manifestations through recognitive judgement (*pratyavamarśa*) that it is shown that the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not dependent on the object having the nature of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). IPV 2.3 introduction, 2:67.

[74]IPV 1.1.3, 1:63.

> That which is remembered as different [expressed in the form] "That cognition of mine was thus"—is nothing but a grammatical analysis of the memory [expressed in the form] "It was seen by me."[75]

Here is another example of this same interpretation:

> There may be this doubt: Cognition rests on the lotus face of the wife, etc., and is not produced in the Self, because there is the past passive participle affix in relation to the direct object [*karman*].[76] [We respond:] That one does not understand his own speech. For the direct object [*karman*] is to be obtained by means of the action [*kriyā*] of the agent [*kartṛ*]. Thus the action [*kriyā*] of cognizing is established in the agent [*kartṛ*].[77]

Sometimes the thinkers parse the underlying syntax of experiences with expressions which do not even mention a direct object.[78] Thus Abhinava states:

> Thus even blue, etc., existing in the middle[79] recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] as "This is blue," are established to be constituted by the Self, because they rest upon the root recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "I." Even "I cognize this to be blue" really amounts to "I am aware [*prakāśe*]."[80]

Abhinava states that some believed that the expression which does not mention the object is the most proper one.[81]

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[75]IPK 1.4.6, 1:178. Also see on this IPV 1.4.6, 1:177-182.

[76]That is, the past passive participle "was seen" agrees grammatically with the word denoting the object of perception.

[77]IPV 1.4.6, 1:180. Bhāskara here cites the familiar principle of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49. BIPV 1.4.6, 1:180.

[78]In the sentence in Utpaladeva's verse, "It was seen by me," the direct object is not given a pronoun but is clearly expressed, according to normal Sanskrit usage, as the referent of the participle.

[79]Abhinava is referring to the comparison of ordinary experience to the midpoint of a journey, discussed in chapter 4.

[80]IPV 1.5.17, 1:279. Utpaladeva uses the objectless syntax to explain the awareness in memory of an original experience at IPK 1.4.4, 1:167. See Abhinavagupta's grammatical explanation at IPV 1.4.4, 1:169-170.

[81]IPV 1.4.6, 1:182. There is another involved grammatical discussion of epistemology at IPK and IPV 1.5.17, 1:273-280.

I have completed my survey of the Pratyabhijñā agential ontology. This ontology gives us one more homologous framework for understanding the Pratyabhijñā system's modus operandi. The nature of Being as an eternal agent gives the ontological expression to the "limit of" arrived at in philosophical analysis. The inference working through the revealing of Śakti has been explained as a clarification of the Lord's ever-existent self-recognition. The same is a clarification of His agency. Utpaladeva asserts in the third to the last verse of the book:

> This new, easy path has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*. Therefore, one who places his feet on this, and, contemplating that the condition of the Agent of the world belongs to himself, submerges himself incessantly in the state of Śiva, succeeds [*siddhyati*].[82]

The fourth chapter has already shown how in its ambitiously transcendental character the Pratyabhijñā argumentation endeavors to encompass the arena of denaturalized discourse within the Śaiva soteriology. It becomes a scholastic ritual identical with its goal. The present chapter further elucidates this effort of encompassment. The Pratyabhijñā system is an expression in philosophically

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[82]IPK 4.1.16, 2:309. Also see IPV 4.1.16, 2:310-311. The direct equivalence between agency and Śakti is illustrated at IPV 1.4.8, 1:191. I recall Abhinava's interpretation of Utpaladeva's statement in the treatment of memory "This is that cognizer" as disclosing recognition. Here Abhinava also draws attention to the cognizer as agent. See IPV 1.4.3, 1:164-165.

rationalized form of the soteriology qua mythico-ritual *narrative.*[83]

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[83]I will briefly mention some other areas of homologies between the Pratyabhijñā system and this narrative—which it is unfortunately not possible at present to explain in more detail. Firstly, the categories of Sanskritic grammatical theory are actually employed in sophisticated transformations of *tantric* practice. Abhinavagupta thus prescribes gnoseological procedures in which the components of ritual are identified with the syntactico-semantic factors (*kāraka*). These are contemplated as absorbed in the ritual (*kriyā*). The ritual in turn is absorbed in the special factor which is the agent (*kartṛ*). See TS 13, 135ff.; TA 1.146ff, 6:2595ff. There is also an extensive mystical iconography of circles of Śaktis developed out of Krama *tantrism,* which incorporates the syntax of the subject (*pramātṛ*), means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of cognition (*prameya*). These are respectively identified with fire, the sun and the moon. The latter are conceived as absorbed in the former. See TA 4.122ff., 3:740ff.; TA 5.19ff., 3:945ff. Another area of homologies, is the Śaivas' situation (at an abstract level) of inference per se within their *tantric* syntax. This is seen in their effort to reduce the inference of "species" from "genus" (i.e., *svabhāvahetu* inference) to the inference of cause from effect (*kāryahetu*)—the latter of course located in the Śaiva syntax. See IPK and IPV 2.4.11, 2:173-181; IPVV 2.4.11, 3:196-214. Cf. the explanation of the Lord's generation of the experiences necessary for the inference of causality at IPK and IPV 1.7.4, 1:359-361. Besides all of these areas of connection between the Prataybhijñā and the Śaiva mythico-ritual narrative, I should mention that in the Pratyabhijñā and related religious and philosophical texts there are explanations of spiritual practice in terms of our "more static" ontological category of relation (*sambandha*). Unity-in-multiplicity is a sort of metaphor pointing towards the ultimate unity. Both Bhartṛhari's *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (perhaps even the whole *Vākyapadīya*) and Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi* can be understood as sorts of meditation on the unity intimated by relation. At IPV 1.7.14, 1:391, Abhinava cites the support of the *Vijñāna-Bhairava* 106, 92 on the contemplation of the relation of subject and object. These practices do not undermine the narrativity discussed in this chapter. Even "horizontal relations" between objects in the world depend upon the vertical syntactic relation with the agent. I plan to discuss the topics brought up in this note in future studies.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

> What answer can be given to the question "Who are you?" by one possessed by a demon, who, not having recognized Himself, desires to study something else?
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> IPV 4.1 concluding verse 3, 2:317

This dissertation has attempted to address the problem of the arbitration between ideas and behaviors starting from different assumptions, a problem that is crucial to contemporary religious studies. I have contended that this problem is best approached through philosophical argument and dialogue. I have found Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta to have an analogous understanding of the value of philosophical discourse, in developing a philosophical apologetics to make their spiritual tradition available to "all humanity."

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers try to achieve more universal intelligibility through a "correlational" interpretation of their soteriology in terms of the inferential methods, and the epistemological and ontological concerns, typifying the "denaturalized discourse" of the medieval Sanskritic academy. They attempt to defend their soteriology at the most basic level, as a recognition of interpretation in experience. They endeavor to show the groundedness of their soteriological recognition when confronted with the radical otherness of arguments of phenomenalist skeptics who deny the groundedness of all recognitions.

We have seen that at the same time as the Pratyabhijñā thinkers pursue universal intelligibility they conceive their apologetics as a complete actualization of their *tantric* myth and ritual, which "encompasses" the arena of denaturalized discourse. Through a transcendental inquiry they ostensibly disclose the self-recognition of the individual as the Supreme Lord as the "limit of" grounding, constituting all interpretation in experience. They further encode philosophy with the narrativity of their myth and ritual by structuring ontological topics with a grammatical interpretation of their syntax.

I will finish with some final remarks about the structure of the Pratyabhijñā arguments, and suggestions about their tenability in confrontation with the standards of contemporary Western academia. Unfortunately, however, the limited time necessitates that I can only discuss the truth of the Śaiva system as a possibility, rather than make a tight argument about its referent.[1] In this effort, it seems useful to attempt first to summarize the accomplishments of the system *without the strong idealism formulated in the chapter on perception.* Then I will comment on the full presumptiveness of the system as structured by that idealism, and the issues which come up in considering its plausibility.[2]

I believe that the Śaivas' arguments for the transcendental necessity of recognition in perception, memory and semantic exclusion could be accepted by many

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[1]Tracy treats the interpretive distinction in various ways. For example, see the discussion of the manner in which it arises from the work of Ian Ramsey and Frederick Ferre in *Blessed Rage,* 150-153.

[2]The reader will understand that I am separating the presumptiveness of epistemological and ontological arguments throughout the system related to *prakāśa* on the one hand, and *vimarśa* on the other. I explained in the discussion of perception that for the Śaivas these classes of arguments are interpretations of a single fact. Nevertheless, they address different problematics and raise different issues for evaluation.

as making a contribution to discussions in the Western academy. The unavoidability of fully assertory or "normative," recognition refutes not only phenomenalists, but also other skeptics; it provides support to my refutation of relativism in the first chapter. As I have explained, there is also an analogy between the Śaivas' and Bhartṛhari's understandings of the linguisticality of experience on the one hand, and the theories of recent hermeneutics on the other. Even the Indian conception of a "subtler" level of interpretation or language, preceding and allowing the learning of the concrete forms, has resonance in Western theories of innate structures of the mind.

The most direct ontological counterpart to the transcendental recognition is the abstract category of relation. The Śaiva theory of relation may be taken as making the valid claim that the categories into which we organize the world are always trans-situational.[3] There can be no consistent phenomenalist account of "atomic" sensual objects, and there can be no consistent radical historicism. Thought is essentially essentialist.

The larger Śaiva ontological framework, interpreting Being in terms of a distinctive narrative, depends upon the Śaiva idealism (as will be discussed shortly). However, this area of analysis without the idealism could minimally be accepted to make a contribution to Western theories of *epistemology and discourse, rather than ontology*. I have already observed the resonance between the Śaivas' and general Indian linguistic understandings of action, and Western theories of the narrative character of experience; and suggested the value of their syntactic theories to comparative-systematic inquiry along the lines initiated by Kenneth Burke.

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[3]Regarding this point, I have cited in different contexts Edward Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of the Enduring," on the primordial character of the experience of universals; and Scharfstein, "The Contextual Fallacy."

Now, as I see it, it is the *prakāśa* arguments which make all of the ideas just mentioned do what the Śaivas want them to do. The contention of these arguments to the effect that *esse est percipi* makes the recognition which is integral to all epistemic processes constitutive of them and their objects. Because, on the radical logic of the Śaivas' idealism, this recognition belongs to one universal subject, *He must be God; and the recognition which constitutes all there is must be His self-recognition.*

It is the application of the same idealism in ontology which interprets Being as an "eternalizing agential mythico-ritual narrative." This may be appreciated through the analogy of the Śaiva contention with a more modest Western attempt to adduce the agency of God in metaphysics—the argument from design.[4] The Śaiva approach differs in that it attempts idealistically to reduce design to its designer. The world "design" for the Śaivas includes all actions, along with all other transtemporal, transspatial and transformal *relations*—including causality, place, time, number, etc. For the Śaivas, *the subjective-recognition which knows action and other relations is what "designs" them.* In this way they transpose earlier Indian syntactic theories on to the cosmic scale to interpret the self-identical cre-ation of an eternal agent.

If, from the effect of the *prakāśa* arguments, all recognition is the Lord's self-recognition, and Being is His agency, then the apologetic presumptions of the system of enabling the individual to participate in the Śaiva soteriological realization would seem to follow naturally. Having brought the issue of plausibility to this point, however, my task becomes more difficult. I can only make some observations, and raise some

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[4]In 1988 I had some conversations with Priyawat Kuanpoonpol in which I discussed both the Śaiva agential syntax and teleological arguments for the existence of the God. It was she who first observed the connection between these areas. For a useful contemporary defense of the argument from design see Richard G. Swinburne, "The Argument from Design," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach,* ed. Baruch A. Brody (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 137-149.

questions, about the Western academic trends which would seem to affect the perception of the tenability of the Śaiva idealism.

I will give up the specificity of the interpretation to comment on the Pratyabhijñā in its general analogy with Western *theistic idealism.* The belief that reality is constituted in the ideas/mind/Word of God has been a dominant theme in the longest portion of our intellectual history, as formulated in a variety of Christian and Jewish Neoplatonic and Neoplatonism-influenced Aristotelian theologies.[5] Of course there are numerous differences between these Western theologies and the Pratyabhijñā, as there are among these theologies themselves.

Most importantly, none of them directly parallels the Pratyabhijñā system's inferential clarification of the person's self-recognition as the Lord. The idea of the complete identity of the person with God is unacceptable to the monotheistic orthodoxies. On this matter, I only remark that the divergence should be considered along with a careful examination of the commonalities permitted by the monistic moment in the Neoplatonic monotheism, and the paradoxically dualistic moment in the Śaiva idea that multiplistic experience is real as Śiva.[6] However, the essential point in the present context is *the assertion of the dependence of phenomena on a higher subjectivity.* If this is invalid, the further relations between idealists would only be topics for non-idealistic retrievals, or reductionistic or deconstructive theories.

The last representatives of this wide intellectual orientation who had an important influence in the Western academy were the Absolute Idealists or

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[5]These theologies also comprise the majority of Western formulations of truth as disclosure.

[6]Much of the monistic Śaiva devotional literature also has a dualistic, supplicatory quality. See Utpaladeva, *The Śivastotrāvalī, with the Sanskrit Commentary of Kṣemarāja,* ed. Rajanaka Laksmana (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1964).

Neohegelians such as Green, Bradley, Royce, Gentile, etc. These thinkers articulated idealism in a manner addressing post-Kantian discussions of the interpretation of experience. Fundamental to these idealisms, according to most advocates and opponents of them in their period, was Berkeley's formulation that *esse est percipi,* which I used to characterize the *prakāśa* arguments.

These idealistic systems were finally driven into academic disrepute earlier in this century by attacks from a diverse group of philosophers reforming the discipline in conformity with modern patterns of rationality. It is notable that two of the sharpest critics, G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, had at one time been idealists. Philosophy for them was a linguistic or quasi-mathematical tool assigned the role of defending and analyzing the empirical data of both common sense and science.[7] An early formulation of Moore typified much of the criticism of idealism, and plays directly into our reflections on narrative syntax: The anti-idealists wished to separate the *acts* of any subject's awareness from its *objects.*[8] They thus held that it is a logical fallacy to conclude on the basis of the tautology that we only know what we know that it is

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[7]For valuable sources illuminating the purposes and presuppositions in the idealist-realist debates see, A.C. Ewing, ed., *The Idealist Tradition: From Berkeley to Blanshard,* The Library of Philosophical Movements, ed. Paul Edwards (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957); Roderick M. Chisholm, ed., *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,* The Library of Philosophical Movements, ed. Paul Edwards (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960); and Edwin B. Holt and others, *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1912). For an excellent early study, critical of but sympathetic with the insights of the idealists, see A.C. Ewing, *Idealism: A Critical Survey* (London: Metheun & Co., 1934; reprint 1974). A useful short study of the change in orientation of philosophy is J.O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956; paperback, 1978).

[8]See G.E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Ewing, *The Idealist Tradition,* 289-310; and Russell, "The Fallacies of Idealism," in Ewing, *The Idealist Tradition,* 311-316.

impossible for things to exist which we do not know. Moore, in particular, is famous for arguing the complete undeniability of the common belief in external objects.

The pattern of thinking underlying modern philosophy in its empiricist and methodological orientations may be broadly characterized in our comparative narrative-syntax framework by an emphasis on two factors. First is the *object* or what Burke interpreted as a material "scene." Second is the *instrument.* Such thought is "objectivist" and "instrumentalist." It may also be characterized as "scientistic" and technological. Following Heidegger, we may say that for such thinking the world presents itself in the causal relationships identifying intellectually controllable and practically exploitable "standing reserve."[9]

When this conceptual orientation is absolutized, as it often has been, the super-agent God, whether posited idealistically or in any other way, moves from being viewed as irrelevant to being viewed as impossible.[10] Recall the explanation, in the first chapter of this dissertation, of the fate of the natural theological proposition in confrontation with the empirical-historical and social scientific trajectories in the history of religions.[11]

In the developing "post-modern" consciousness, through studies of scientific theory formation and from appreciation of the increasing interpretive pluralism, there has been a greater sensitivity to the role of various forms of subjectivity or agency in

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[9]See Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," trans. William Lovitt, in *Basic Writings,* 283-317.

[10]Of course human agency too is often eroded by objectivist and broadly functionalist orientations in the human disciplines. (Functionalism is pointed to as the character of modern instrumentalist thinking, and not only Durkheimian social theory.)

[11]Also important to this fate was the final unacceptability of the syntactic factor of purpose or *telos.* It is the *telos* which gives the order to the phenomenological hierarchies, e.g, Otto's schematizing concepts, and Eliade's logic of symbols.

experience. Such subjectivity may be identified in the constructions of either the individual or the group. The more radical sorts of skepticism or relativism even come close to the *esse est percipi* of idealism, although their advocates would not like the appellation of what modern thinking superseded. On the other hand, these systems still in a modern fashion tend to reduce cultural and individual "subjectivity" to what can be objectively contextualized and functionally described—whether the terms be linguistic, historical, economic, psychological, etc. In thinking where even human creativity tends to be assimilated to fragmented narratives of coping or enjoyment-consumption, a monolithic agent would be anathema. The truth of the story of God would seem to be more of a problem than the idealism.

Nevertheless, there does seem to be more space for a serious consideration of alternatives in the current situation, in which this dissertation has advocated messy, decentered argumentation as the alternative to both scientism and relativism. Analogous perceptions of the limitations of modern and post-modern anti-theism have informed the broadly transcendental arguments of diverse philosophical theologians and hermeneutic thinkers. The academic invocation of a super-agent finds corroboration in the efforts to posit God as grounding various epistemic, moral or metaphysical judgements, by scholars such as Bernard Lonergan, David Tracy, Charles Taylor, Franklin Gamwell, John Macquarrie and George Steiner. If the *logos* adverted to by these thinkers is understood as an expression of divine subjectivity, theistic idealism may not be such a distant relative.

Abhinavagupta's explanation of the soteriological recognition itself describes a retrieval, in the sense of a deep personal appropriation. He places the knowledge of God from scriptures in the counter of what is in memory and re-experienced. In a correlationally expanded retrieval of the significance of the Śaiva understanding of recognition, the tradition-bearing memory may perhaps be taken to include analogous

expressions of spirituality in theistic-idealistic terms in the West, Islam, other forms of Hinduism, etc. If basic features of the Śaiva approach seem tenable, then there could be further disagreement about additional theological points—whether God's Word, the judgements it grounds and their referents are in any ways expressions of His self-recognition.

I believe that I have said enough to suggest some of the orientations in the contemporary Western academy supporting and denying the possible validity of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics. The epistemic merits and limitations of these orientations are extremely difficult to assess, and will be assessed in different ways by different people. Wrestling with this difficulty is both the most rational approach we can take, and the one most respectful of the intentions of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.

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